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ABSTRACT 
A plethora of retailers have begun to embrace a dual-channel retailing strategy 
wherein items are provided to consumers through both an online store and a physical 
store. As a result of standards and competitive measures, many retailers provide buyers 
who are unhappy with their purchases with the ability to achieve a full refund. In a dual-
channel retailing system, full reimbursements can be done through what is called a cross-
channel return, when a buyer purchases a product from an online store and returns it to a 
physical store. They can also be done through what is called a same-channel return, when 
a buyer purchases a product from a physical store and returns it back to the physical store, 
or purchases a product from an online store and returns it back to the online store. No 
existing research has examined all common types of customer returns in the context of a 
dual-channel retailing system. Be notified that the practice of cross-returning an item 
purchased from the physical store back to the online store is not common. Thus, it is not 
considered in this dissertation. 
We first study the optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized 
dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. We consider two 
factors: the dual-channel retailer’s performance under centralization with unified and 
differential pricing schemes, and the dual-channel retailer’s performance under 
decentralization with the Stackelberg and Nash games. How dual-channel pricing 
behaviour is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. 
In this study, a channel’s sales requests is a linear function of a channel’s own pricing 
strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy. 
The second problem is an extension of the first problem. The optimal pricing 
policies and online channel’s responsiveness level for a centralized and decentralized 
dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns are studied. Indeed, the online 
store is normally the distribution centre of the enterprise and is not limited to the 
customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store experiences a much higher return 
rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the capability and the need to optimize its 
responsiveness to customer returns along with its pricing strategy.  A channel’s sales 
requests, in the second problem, is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a cross-
channel’s price, and the online store’s responsiveness level. 
The third problem studies the dilemma of whether or not to allow unsatisfactory 
online purchases to be cross-returned to the physical store. If not properly considered, 
those returns may create havoc to the system and a retailer might overestimate or 
underestimate a channel’s order quantity. Therefore, we study and compare between four 
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different strategies, and propose models to determine optimal order quantities for each 
strategy when a dual-channel retailer offers both same and cross-channel returns. Several 
decision making insights on choosing between the different cross-channel return 
strategies and some properties of the optimal solutions are presented. 
From the retailer’s perspective of outsourcing the e-channel’s management to a 
third party logistics and service provider, we finally study three different inventory 
strategies, namely transaction-based fee, flat-based fee, and gain sharing. For each 
strategy, we find both channels’ optimal inventory policies and expected profits. The 
performances of the different strategies are compared and the managerial insights are 
given using analytical and numerical analysis. 
Methodologies, insights, comparative analysis, and computational results are 
delivered in this dissertation for the above aforementioned problems. 
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 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1:
1.1  Dual-Channel Retailing Strategy 
The rapid development of the Internet, the growth of third-party logistics and 
service providers (herein called providers), and the existence of several competitive 
players have inspired enterprises to adopt a dual-channel retailing strategy. According to 
Ryan et al. (2013), such a strategy offers products through both physical stores 
(sometimes called retail, brick-mortar, traditional, conventional or offline stores) and 
online stores (sometimes called e-tail, click or electronic stores). The dual-channel 
retailing strategy was first introduced by Sears in 1925 when it initiated a physical store 
beside a catalogue store (Zhang et al. 2010). About 42% of merchants in the different 
industries implement the dual-channel retailing strategy (Dan et al. 2012). 80% of all US 
retailers and almost every top US retailer use more than one channel to sell products and 
services (Zhang et al. 2010). For example Wal-Mart, Toys“R”Us, Target, IBM, Hewlett–
Packard, Nike, Pioneer Electronics, Dell, Costco, Kmart, Barnes and Noble, Kohl’s, and 
Cisco System are all dual-channel retailers. Those DCRs are, sometimes, referred to 
as click-and-mortar companies. In the coming few years, it is expected that dual-
channel retailing will be the dominant retailing strategy for all type of enterprises (Chen 
et al. 2012). 
Adopting a dual-channel retailing strategy offers retail businesses several 
advantages and disadvantages. For example, retailers may use the strategy as a 
mechanism to segment consumers. Shoppers who prefer to save time and transportation 
costs purchase products online after viewing products’ descriptions. They are separated 
from those who prefer to purchase products in person after touching and feeling the items 
(Lu and Liu 2013). The use of a dual-channel retailing strategy, allows retailers to reach 
wider segments of customers and increase revenue (Ryan et al. 2013). Since the Internet 
is cost effective and has low entry barriers, the use of an online channel can reduce 
operational retail costs (Chen et al. 2012; Hua et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2010). Moreover, 
using a dual-channel retailing strategy allows retailers to satisfy increasing customer 
demands for multiple channels through which to shop. Thus, using a dual-channel 
retailing strategy increases customer loyalty and satisfaction (Zhang et al. 2010). 
Providing an online channel adds flexibility to each retailer’s supply chain (Chiang and 
Monahan 2005). This flexibility allows customers to view a product’s description online 
and purchase it at a physical store, order a product online and pick it up from a physical 
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store, or purchase a product online and return it to a physical store. Furthermore, having 
an online channel facilitates stock-out substitutions for consumers, as retailers can 
provide easy access to their inventory levels (Chian 2010). A dual-channel retailer can 
use a differential pricing strategy to direct customer traffic depending on an enterprise’s 
best interest (Zhang et al. 2010). For example, if revenue to weight ratio is low, then the 
enterprise can set a higher price in the online channel to avoid high shipping and return 
cost. Coordinated channels allow retailers to collect wide information about their 
customers’ behaviour. Thus, marketing activities can be easily performed and uncertainty 
can be efficiently reduced. 
On the other hand, the dual-channel retailing strategy is normally associated with 
sales substitution or cannibalization that may form competition between stores. If stores 
are not coordinated, then this competition may lower a retailer’s total profitability (Ryan 
et al. 2013). Moreover, selling through the online channel imposes operational difficulties 
when it comes to receiving large packaged items and then repackages customer orders in 
smaller cartoons (Zhang et al. 2010). 
1.2  Customer Returns 
In today’s market, many North American retailers implement a full refund policy. 
The policy increases the number of customer purchase returns, as it allows customers to 
return purchased products for numerous reasons. For example, a product can be returned 
to a merchant because it is defective, a wrong order, or a wrong product, because the 
customer did not like it, or because the purchase was impulsive. However, a full refund 
policy allows retailers to increase customer loyalty, provide customer satisfaction, boost 
sales, and/or comply with country legislations. 
Additionally, customer returns have risen due to a growth in online selling 
channels. Online customers do not see, touch, or feel products prior to purchasing them. 
In these cases, a full refund policy “can be an indicator of product quality” (Akcay et al. 
2013; Chen and Grewal 2013). Therefore, products purchased online are expected to have 
higher return rates. For example, fashion products purchased in person through physical 
stores can have return rates as high as 35%. In contradistinction, fashion products 
purchased online can have return rates as high as 75% (Akcay et al. 2013; Mostard and 
Teunter 2006; Vlachos and Dekker 2003). Furthermore, online returns may lead to an 
annual reduction in revenue between $1.5 and $2.5 billion dollars (Li et al. 2013). In the 
United States and Canada, yearly returns to merchants total between $100 and $10 billion 
dollars of products, respectively (Akcay et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2009; Su 2009). 
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According to the Center of Logistic at the University of Nevada, Wal-Mart, alone, 
process returns worth of $6 billion dollars every year (Chen & Bell 2012). While a 
significant amount of returned apparel is of good quality and can be resold several times 
without a recovery process, electronic returns cannot be resold as new and must instead 
be sold as open-box items (Akcay et al. 2013). In general, defective returns constitute 
only 5% of all customer returns (Akcay et al. 2013; Su 2009). 
Moreover, many retailers (for example, Wal-Mart or Toys“R”Us) allow same-
channel returns, wherein an item purchased from one of their physical stores is returned 
to one of their physical stores, or an item purchased from their online store is returned to 
their online store. However, many also allow cross-channel returns, wherein a product 
purchased from their online store may be returned to one of their physical stores. 
Allowing cross-channel returns is vital for online stores as such a policy increases sales 
and customer satisfaction and allow physical stores to create additional cross-selling 
opportunities (Zhang et al. 2010; Cao and Li 2015). Notice that the process of purchasing 
items from the physical stores and return them to the online stores is not common. Thus, 
it is not considered in this work. 
1.3  Research Objective 
The objective of this dissertation is to analyze the problem of customer returns 
under the dual-channel retailing system. The main goal is to investigate the different 
cross-channel return polices, to study selected outsourcing options for the management of 
the online store, and to develop proper methodologies of inventory control management, 
price management and responsiveness level management. 
1.4  Research Methodologies 
We will now explain some of the tools and methodologies that have been used 
throughout this dissertation.  
Unconstrained non-linear programming: the unconstrained non-linear 
programming is the process of minimizing or maximizing a non-linear function without 
considering any constraint. The problem might be unbounded or has several critical 
points if the function is positive semi-definite, negative semi-definite or indefinite. In all 
aforementioned cases the optimization process is impossible or difficult. Thus, to simplify 
the prediction of systems’ behavior and grantee the existence of a sole optimal solution, 
we normally condition parameters so that our functions are either positive definite (i.e. 
there exist one global minima) or negative definite (i.e. there exist one global maxima). 
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We use the second derivative test to check the concavity or convexity of single variable, 
two variables, or three variables functions as the following: 
For single variable functions: 
1. Assume that the second derivative of the function 𝑓 is continues on ℝ. 
2. The function’s “Hessian” matrix is 𝐻 = 𝑓!! . 
Let 𝐷 = 𝑓!! . 
(a) If 𝐷 > 0, then the function 𝑓 posses a global minimum at 𝑎 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎 = 0. 
(b) If 𝐷 < 0, then the function 𝑓 posses a global maximum at 𝑎 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎 = 0. 
For two variables functions: 
1. Assume that the second derivative of the function 𝑓 is continues on ℝ!. 
2. The function’s “Hessian” matrix is 𝐻 = 𝑓!! 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!! . 
Let 𝐷! = 𝑓!!  and 𝐷! = 𝑓!! 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!! . 
(a) If 𝐷! > 0 and 𝐷! > 0, then 𝑓 posses a global minimum at 𝑎, 𝑏 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0 
and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0. 
(b) If 𝐷! < 0 and 𝐷! > 0, then 𝑓 posses a global maximum at 𝑎, 𝑏 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0 
and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0. 
For three variables functions: 
1. Assume that the second derivative of the function 𝑓 is continues on ℝ!. 
2. The function’s “Hessian” matrix is 𝐻 = 𝑓!! 𝑓!" 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!! 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!" 𝑓!! . 
Let 𝐷! = 𝑓!! , 𝐷! = 𝑓!! 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!!  and 𝐷! = 𝑓!! 𝑓!" 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!! 𝑓!"𝑓!" 𝑓!" 𝑓!! . 
(a) If 𝐷! > 0, 𝐷! > 0 and 𝐷! > 0, then 𝑓 posses a global minimum at 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0, 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0 and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0. 
(b) If 𝐷! < 0, 𝐷! > 0 and 𝐷! < 0, then 𝑓 posses a global maximum at 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ; where 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0, 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0 and 𝑓! 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 = 0. 
Nash games: the Nash game is a non-cooperative game that is widely used in supply 
chain management. It is used in a static environment where active competitors 
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simultaneously choose their decisions in isolation. Let us consider two competitors where 
players’ decisions affect each player’s payoff.  Thus, if player-1’s decision is 𝑝! and 
player-2’s decision is 𝑝!, then player-1’s utility is 𝑢! 𝑝!,𝑝!  and player-2’s utility is 𝑢! 𝑝!,𝑝! . The objective of each player is to maximize his/her own utility. Assuming 𝑢! 
and 𝑢! are differentiable, then the following conditions are necessary for the existence of 
Nash equilibriums: !!! !!,!!!!! = 0  !!! !!,!!!!! = 0  
To find the equilibrium points, the above system of equations should be solved 
simultaneously. Thus, for as long as the competitor adheres to Nash equilibrium, a player 
will generate a lower payoff when deviating from the equilibrium point. If each utility 
function is concave with respect to the player’s own strategy, i.e. 𝑢! 𝑝!,𝑝!  is concave in 𝑝! and 𝑢! 𝑝!,𝑝!  is concave in 𝑝!, then there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the 
game. To test for the Nash equilibrium uniqueness, we construct the hessian matrix as the 
following: 
𝐻 = !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! . 
If −1 ! 𝐻  is positive, then a unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed. 𝑛 in the previous 
relationship is the number of strategies and it equals two in our example. 
Stackelberg games: the Stackelberg game is another non-cooperative game that is 
widely used in supply chain management where one competitor dominants the other. The 
game is dynamic in nature and the events occur in two stages. The dominant competitor is 
the leader and is allowed to initiate the game or choose his/her strategy first. Based on the 
revealed strategy, the dominated competitor or the follower end the game or chooses 
his/her strategy second. Knowing that both players are rational, the leader should use the 
backward induction and choose his/her decision based on the follower’s best response 
function or strategy. Again, let us consider two competitors where players’ decisions 
affect each player’s payoff.  If the leader’s decision is 𝑝! and follower’s decision is 𝑝!, 
then the leader’s utility is 𝑢! 𝑝! ,𝑝!  and the follower utility is 𝑢! 𝑝! ,𝑝! . The objective 
of each player is to maximize his/her own utility. Assuming 𝑢! and 𝑢! are differentiable, 
then the following conditions are necessary for the existence of Stackelberg equilibriums: 
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If 𝑢! 𝑝! ,𝑝!  is concave in 𝑝!, then there is a unique solution for the follower. However, if 𝑢! 𝑝! ,𝑝!∗ 𝑝!  is concave in 𝑝!, then there is a unique solution for the leader and we can 
guarantee the existence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Stochastic programming: the purpose of stochastic programming is to seek optimal 
decisions that best suit all applicable random parameters. Thus, with stochastic 
programming one may minimize the system’s expected cost or maximize the system’s 
expected profit. 
1.5  Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is organized as follows: literature is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Pricing policies for a dual-channel retailer is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is an 
extension of Chapter 3 and it discusses pricing and responsiveness level decisions under a 
dual-channel retailing system. The optimal cross-channel return policy for a dual-channel 
retailer is studied in Chapter 5. The optimal outsourcing strategy for managing the e-
channel is then discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, conclusion and future works are discussed 
in Chapter 7.  
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  LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 2:
2.1  Literature on Dual-Channel Systems 
This chapter sheds the light upon two streams of literature. The first stream 
addresses dual-channel systems under two settings: dual-channel supply chain setting and 
dual-channel retailing setting. The second stream addresses customer returns under four 
settings: single retailer setting, manufacturer-retailer setting, two competitive retailers 
setting, and dual-channel retailing setting. 
2.1.1  Dual-Channel Supply Chains 
Considerable research works have analyzed systems that contain a manufacturer 
(or supplier) that sells a single product to customers through both a manufacturer-owned 
online store and an independent retail store(s) (Figure 2.1). Several different types of 
competition take place between the two channels, including competition in price 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2014; David and Adida 2015; Ryan et al. 2013), competition in 
services (Lu and Liu 2013; Dan et al. 2012), and competition in product availability 
(Takahashi et al. 2011; Chiang 2010; Chiang and Monahan 2005). Price competition may 
take a horizontal form, between an online store and a physical store; take a vertical form, 
between an upper echelon (i.e. manufacturer) and a lower echelon (i.e. retailer); or take 
both forms (David and Adida 2015; Lu and Liu 2013; Ryan et al. 2013; Dan et al. 2012). 
According to Chiang (2010), vertical competition enhances price double marginalization 
inefficiency, while horizontal competition enhances cannibalization. Literature shows that 
a great deal should be exerted to coordinate both channels in order to diminish, eliminate 
or, even, reverse the negative effect of competition. 
 
Figure 2.1: Dual-Channel Supply Chain (Chiang and Monahan 2005) 
Existing literature shows that decentralized systems are a representation of a 
situation wherein each channel seeks to maximize its own profit in the presence of 
cannibalization. Thus, a manufacturer competes by selecting a wholesale price, an online 
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price, a production quantity, a service level, and/or a delivery lead time. A retailer 
competes by selecting retail price, an acquisition quantity, and/or a service level. This 
competition is primarily modeled as a manufacturer-Stackelberg game (e.g. David and 
Adida 2015; Lu and Liu 2013; Ryan et al. 2013; Dan et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2012; Chen 
et al. 2012; Hua et al. 2010; Bin et al. 2010; Chiang 2010; Yao et al. 2009; Cai et al. 
2009). However, it is sometimes modeled as a Nash game (e.g. Lu and Liu 2013; Ryan et 
al. 2013; Chiang 2010; Cai et al. 2009). A few existing papers have also modeled this 
competition as a retailer-Stackelberg game (e.g. Cai et al. 2009). 
In a coordinated or centralized duopolistic system, each player maximizes its own 
profit. However, it is done within the boundaries of a contract. David and Adida (2015) 
examined the equilibrium quantities and prices of a supplier selling items through a self-
owned online store and 𝑁 different retailers. They proposed a linear quantity discount 
contract to coordinate the system wherein the amount of discount offered to a retailer 
store is linearly related to the quantity ordered. Ryan et al. (2013) studied the performance 
of a system under a modified revenue sharing contract in which a retailer shares part of its 
revenue with a manufacturer. They also studied the performance of a system under a 
gain/loss sharing contract in which a manufacturer shares part of its gain or loss with a 
retailer. Moreover, a two-part tariff contract was studied by Chen et al. (2012). In such a 
contract a retailer is charged a lump sum fee and a wholesale price equivalent to 
production costs. Chen et al. (2012) also studied a profit-sharing agreement wherein 
channels share their profits with competitors’ channels for better system performance. 
Furthermore, an 𝑎,𝑑  contract was examined by Bin et al. (2010). In such a contract, a 
retailer pays a franchise fee of the value 𝑑 to a manufacturer. In turn the manufacturer 
offers the retailer a portion, 𝑎, of its total revenue. Chiang (2010) implemented an 
inventory and direct revenue sharing contract wherein a retailer shares part of its 
inventory cost with a manufacturer. The manufacturer then shares part of its revenue with 
the retailer. Finally, Cai et al. (2009) compared a system’s performance with and without 
price discount contracts. They assumed prices were either consistent (i.e., channels’ 
prices were equal) or inconsistent (i.e., channels’ prices were not necessarily equal). 
Some of the findings that are related to contracts implementation are stated next. 
Ryan et al. (2013) claim that unless coordinated, loss of retailer’s profit and significant 
increase in manufacturer’s profit can occur due to the introduction of online channel. 
Similarly, Bin et al. (2010) argue that competition between channels enhances system’s 
performance if contracts are used and a retailer will experience lower selling costs. They, 
also, stated that higher information uncertainty in the retailer channel leads manufacturer 
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to adopt a menu of contracts, while lower uncertainty leads to a single contract. Cai et al. 
(2009) found that contract coordination and consistent pricing strategy reduce conflict 
and increase profitability in a system where customers are considered to be either brand 
loyal or retailer loyal. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2012) claim that coordination 
through complementary contracts such as two-part tariff and profit sharing is not always 
profitable to the system. 
A fully coordinated or centralized monopolistic system uses a sole decision maker 
to maximize the system’s total profit (e.g. Huang et al. 2012; Hua et al. 2010; Yao et al. 
2009; Dumrongsiri et al. 2008). Bin et al. (2010) used both centralization and the 
principle agent method to examine an asymmetry in information that occurs within the 
dual-channel system when demand is stochastic. Chiang (2010) argued that a 
monopolistic dual-channel supply chain outperforms both duopolistic and uncoordinated 
dual-channel supply chains. Yao et al. (2009) optimized the inventory system of a dual-
channel supply chain with a single period newsvendor model. They compared three 
different management styles. In the first style, the inventory levels of both channels were 
managed by one central manager. In the second style, each channel managed its own 
inventory level. In the third style, the retailer managed its own inventory level while the 
online store’s inventory level was managed by a third-party logistics provider. 
Different than most papers in dual-channel supply chain literature, Chiang and 
Monahan 2005, Takahashi et al. 2011, and Chiang 2010 study Markovian systems that 
capture competition in product availability. Portion of a channel’s loyal customers will 
cross fill when products are not available in their preferred channel (stuck out base 
substitution). Chiang and Monahan (2005) claim that the increase of this portion might 
harm profitability as it could increase total inventory related costs. They argue that 
retailers and manufacturers are, almost, always better off in adopting dual-channel supply 
chain. In there modeling, they capture holding and lost sale costs and apply one-for-one 
inventory control policy. In contrast, Takahashi et al. (2011) have included production 
and delivery setup costs and found that one-for-one inventory control policy is not an 
appropriate policy for a dual-channel supply chain. 
2.1.2  Dual-Channel Retailing Systems 
Other papers in the literature have examined the situation wherein a dual-channel 
retailer offers the same product in both self-owned online and physical stores (Figure 
2.2). Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008) all studied Nash, online-Stackelberg 
and retailer-Stackelberg games to model the price competition that stems from operating a 
dual-channel retailing system. Each of the studies stated that the Stackelberg games 
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always outperform the Nash game. Yan et al. (2010) argue that by using profit sharing to 
integrate the dual-channel retailing system, conflict is eliminated, coordination is 
improved, and both channels generate more profit. Yan (2010) stated that higher brand 
differentiation better handle conflict especially when consumers are less price sensitive 
and market size is large. Additionally, Berger et al. (2006) examined the profit 
enhancement induced by a dual-channel retailer that integrates the advertisement efforts 
of both online and physical stores. They found that higher integration leads both channels 
to generate higher profits. 
 
Figure 2.2: Dual-Channel Retailing System 
Using branch-and-bound algorithm, Mahar et al. (2009) examine the positive 
impact that a real time information capability has on a dual-channel retailer. Such a 
capability allows the dynamic assignment policy to replace the common static assignment 
policy. Based solely on the proximity, the static policy pre-identifies the e-fulfilment 
location responsible to serve a certain customer. On the other hand, based on both 
proximity and real time inventory position, the dynamic policy identifies the e-fulfilment 
location. It is found that such a policy might decrease total cost (holding, backorder and 
shipping) for up to 8.2%. 
One may note that each study presented above examined the possible coordination 
strategies or policies between different competing channels in a dual-channel system. 
None of the papers have considered customer returns and the impact that the returns have 
had on dual-channel retailing systems. Papers that have considered customer returns are 
reviewed next. 
2.2  Literature on Customer Returns 
Before we review the papers under the different settings, it is adequate to examine 
the researchers findings in regard to the different refund policies. A large body of work on 
customer returns has examined a refund policy that is exogenously determined as a full 
refund or a Money Back Guarantee (MBG) (Reimann 2016; Chang and Yeh 2013; Chen 
and Bell 2013; Choi et al. 2013; Akcay et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2010; You et al. 2010; 
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Vlachos and Dekker 2003). Other papers have compared a system’s performance with no 
refund policy to a system’s performance with a full refund policy (Chen and Grewal 
2013; Choi et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2012; Chen and Zhang 2011). Several papers that 
conducted such a comparison also examined a partial refund policy (Chen and Grewal 
2013; Li et al. 2013; Chen and Bell 2012; Chen and Zhang 2011; Su 2009; Yalabik et al. 
2005). Hsiao and Chen (2012) found that the optimal refund policy may exceed the full 
price of the item. Su (2009), Chen and Bell (2009), and Yalabik et al. (2005) all argued 
that a full refund policy is not optimal as it overwhelms retailing systems. In contrast, 
Chen and Zhang (2011) argued that a full refund policy may be optimal in the presence of 
competition. However, Hu et al. (2014) and Su (2009) claimed that the optimal refund 
policy depends upon the refunded product’s salvage value. According to Li et al. (2013), 
retailers should offer either a lenient return policy with a low quality and a low price or a 
strict return policy with a high quality and a high price. Their choice depends upon 
customer sensitivity in regards to price, return policy, and quality. Moreover, Yu and Goh 
(2012) stated that retailers should enforce a return policy that takes the nature of products 
and their condition upon return into consideration. Akcay et al. (2013) encouraged 
retailers to reduce the number of returns they receive by controlling selling prices and 
enforcing a refund policy with restocking fees. However, Hu and Li (2012) argued that 
offering a manufacturer buyback price equivalent to the retailer’s refund price is the 
optimal coordinating mechanism. 
2.2.1  Single Retailer Systems 
Additionally, many papers have considered a retailer faces returns from 
unsatisfied customers (Figure 2.3). Reimann (2016) considered a retailing system where 
refurbished returns can be used to satisfy demand that exceeds the order quantity. Akcay 
et al. (2013) studied a system wherein customers could differentiate between a new sell 
and a resell but their product valuation was uncertain. Yu and Goh (2012) examined a 
retailer facing eight different scenarios. The eight scenarios had several combinations that 
consisted of whether or not returns occurred within a grace period, whether or not returns 
were accompanied by a penalty, and whether or not returns were recoverable. While their 
research did not consider a resell option for returns, it was considered that recoverable 
items could be salvaged in a secondary market. Additionally, according to You et al. 
(2010), a single selling period can be divided into 𝑁 countable sub-periods. Each sub-
period is associated with a probability of return. Chen and Bell (2009) did not allow “as 
good as new” returns to be sold in the same period in which they were sold, but did allow 
them to be salvaged in a single-period setting or resold in the following period in a multi-
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period setting. Wang et al. (2010) investigated a system wherein customer returns could 
be resold several times. Inventory holding cost and deterioration over time is incorporated 
in their model. Selling periods were divided into three sub-periods: a period in which 
sales consumed both new and returned stocks, a period in which sales only consumed 
returned stocks, and a period in which there were only returns, not sales. Li et al. (2013), 
Hsiao and Chen (2012), and Mukhopadhyay and Setaputra (2007) discussed the 
interrelationship between price, refund policy, and quality. Li et al. (2013) define quality 
as product consistency with the online description, while Hsiao and Chen (2012) identify 
product defects, misfit, and unconformity as quality risks that face customers. Choi et al. 
(2013) and Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) examined a system in which demand is 
linearly dependant on price, refund policy, and modularity level, while return is linearly 
dependant on refund policy. They claim that with higher level of modularity, retailer 
should charge higher price regardless of the refund policy applied. Vlachos and Dekker 
(2003) studied six different systems according to whether or not returns could be resold in 
the primary market, whether or not resalable returns needed a recovery process, and 
whether or not the needed recovery process was associated with fixed or variable costs. 
The objective of the paper is to maximize the profit by selecting the optimal ordering 
quantity where resalable returns can be resold once a season. Mostard et al. (2005) and 
Mostard and Teunter (2006) examined a system wherein a resalable return could be 
resold an infinite number of times until it became non- resalable by not having demand to 
consume it or by being returned after the end of the selling season. Mollenkopf et al. 
(2007) studied the effect of customer return related services on the Internet shoppers’ 
perceived loyalty and the key drivers that positively impact the return experience. The 
paper Yalabik et al. (2005) is an extension of the work done by Davis et al. (1998). They 
classify customers into matched and mismatched with product valuation 𝑣1 and 𝑣2, 
respectively. Post purchase the customer will consume a portion 𝛼 of the original value of 
the product. Ultimately, customers will keep the product if the utility of keeping the 
product is more than the utility of returning it. The previous papers considered single 
retailer systems where customers can return unsatisfactory purchases to retailers. None of 
those papers studied the effect of customer returns on dual-channel retailers. 
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Figure 2.3: A Single Retailer System with Customer Returns 
2.2.2  Manufacturer-Retailer Systems 
Several other papers considered a system in which retailers and manufacturers 
handled customer returns through the use of contractual agreements and information 
sharing (Figure 2.4). Chang and Yeh (2013) studied returns from customer to retailer and 
from retailer to manufacturer under centralized and decentralized settings. Returns could 
not be resold in the same selling season during which they were returned due to seasonal 
length constraints. Additionally, Chen and Bell (2013), Hu and Li (2012), Chen and Bell 
(2011), and Chen (2011) examined the effect of sharing return information with a 
manufacturer on the profitability of the system. Chen (2011) claims that not sharing 
return information is a better strategy if the product is mature. Otherwise, and in 
consistence with Chen and Bell (2011) work, not sharing information will negatively 
impact both retailers and manufacturer. Hu and Li (2012), investigate a system under 
Stackelberg game with demand and customer valuation uncertainty. Based on the 
system’s acceptability of returns, four scenarios have been recognized.  Moreover, Hu et 
al. (2014) studied a consignment contract between a vendor and a retailer in which the 
vendor owned the inventory placed in the retailer store. They examined both retailer-
managed and vendor-managed consignment inventory systems. Finally, Su (2009) studied 
four contracts that may be used to resolve conflicts that arise between retailers and 
manufacturers due to customer returns: buy back, differential buy back, return to 
manufacturer, and rebate contracts. The later is found to outperform all other contracts as 
long as manufacturer can monitor sales. The previous papers considered returns from 
customer to manufacturer, from customers to retailer and/or from retailer to manufacturer 
under manufacturer-retailer settings. The effect of customer returns on dual-channel 
retailers was not considered in any of the above papers. 
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Figure 2.4: A Manufacturer-Retailer System with Customer Returns 
2.2.3  Two Competitive Retailers Systems 
Several other papers have considered customer returns when two retailers compete 
in the same market (Figure 2.5). Chen and Bell (2012) examined a system with two 
customer behaviours: return-sensitive customers willing to pay more and enjoy the 
privilege of returning a product if it is a mismatch, and price-sensitive customers willing 
to pay less and keep the product if it is a mismatch. Both a returnable channel and a non-
returnable channel are thus considered in Chen and Bell’s study. Furthermore, Chen and 
Grewal (2013) studied Stackelberg and Nash competitions in situations wherein a new 
channel competes with a well-established retailer that offers a full refund policy. 
Additionally, Chen and Zhang (2011) studied Stackelberg and Nash competitions 
between two retailers that both offered a full refund policy. Balakrishnan et al. (2014) 
studied the browse and switch behaviour exerted by consumers on the brick and mortar 
stores. The effect of such behaviour on system’s profits and prices are examined when 
returns are allowed for online purchases only. None of the above works considered dual-
channel retailers. Contrary to practice, they also assumed returns to be non-resalable. 
 
Figure 2.5: Two Competing Retailers with Customer Returns 
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2.2.4  Dual-channel Retailing Systems 
Widodo et al. (2010) and Widodo et al. (2009) studied both Nash and Stackelberg 
competitions between a retailer’s physical and online channels (Figure 2.6). Contrary to 
practice, they studied returns that were only allowed for online purchases. Online 
customers were allowed to return items to the online store (a same-channel return) or the 
physical store (a cross-channel return). Also, the two studies assumed that returns could 
be exchanged but not refunded. One may note that none of the above two papers has 
collectively considered all common forms of customer returns a dual-channel retailer may 
experience. There is thus a research gap in this area.  
 
Figure 2.6: A Dual-Channel Retailer with Online Store’s Customer Returns 
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 PRICING POLICIES CHAPTER 3:
3.1  Introduction and Motivation 
Since coordination coincides with high costs and imposes operational difficulties, 
most multi-channel retailers (i.e., Target, Nike, Kmart, Barnes and Noble, Jo-Ann Fabric 
and Craft Stores, and Kohl’s) use decentralized teams to run their stores (Zhang et al. 
2010; Yan et al. (2010); Neslin and Shankar 2009; Yan 2008; Berger et al. 2006; Webb 
and Hogan 2002; Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002). Also, a variety of managerial skills 
are needed for different channels; thus, some retailers outsource the management of 
unfamiliar or newly opened channels to a third party. An example is Toys“R”Us, which 
outsources the management of its online channel to Amazon (Berger et al. 2006).  
Many often believe that decentralizing the dual-channels reduces market shares 
due to cannibalization. This will in turn spark competition and trigger a price war that 
may harm the parties involved. If decentralization is uncoordinated, its resulting 
competition may lower supply chain profitability (Ryan et al. 2013; Yan et al. 2010; 
Steinfield 2004; Schoenbachler and Gordon 2002; Webb and Hogan 2002). Furthermore, 
as Webb and Hogan (2002) have stated, “goal incompatibility” (between physical stores 
and online stores, for example) is an inevitable result of decentralization. Channels may 
generate internal conflict due to scarce resources (for example, a tight budget or few 
customers) or tight objectives (for example, a targeted revenue and profit). They define 
competition as goal-centered behaviour and conflict as opponent-centered behaviour. 
Webb and Hogan’s research supports this; they found that 66% of 50 interviewed retail 
businesses viewed channel conflict as the most troublesome issue that is faced when they 
run dual-retailing channels. The competition associated with such conflict may cause 
channels to limit cooperation and inspire customers to change companies due to 
confusion and agitation (Steinfield 2004). These limitations may be so intense that one 
channel may sabotage another. For example, Levi Strauss and Best Buy had terminated 
their online stores after a few years of their first operational trial due to internal 
competition (Yan 2010; Falk et al. 2007). Consequently, companies such as Wal-Mart 
Stores, Gap, and the Home Depot have successfully integrated their dual channels under a 
sole decision maker to maximize their total profits (Yan 2008). 
Several dual-channel retailers offer both same- and cross-channel returns, whether 
their operating channels are integrated or not. Zhang et al. (2010) have stated that if cross-
channel returned items are not offered at a physical store, then the items must be shipped 
to the online store. Otherwise the ownership of such items is transferred to the physical 
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store. This is done by conducting an inventory transfer that is subjected to the retailer’s 
internal rules. The retailer’s policy and practice of having cross-channel returns can be 
acquired through partial integration. As Cao and Li (2015) have stated, channels will only 
have full integration when prices align to meet the retailer’s goals and objectives. That is 
to say, cross-channel returns do not contradict the fact that channels may still undergo 
price competition.  
Many studies have considered competition and possible coordination strategies 
between dual channels, which are owned by either the same retailer or different 
enterprises. The customer returns topic has also been thoroughly studied in single retailer 
or two retailers systems. However, few papers have studied customer returns under a 
dual-channel retailing system. As stated before, there is no work that has collectively 
considered all common forms of customer returns for both types of stores of a dual-
channel retailer. Also, there is no published paper that has studied the impact of cross-
channel returns on both stores of a DCR, especially when those returns are resalable. For 
example, the effect of cross-channel returns on channels’ pricing policies and inventory 
management has not being studied yet. Thus, Chapter 3 studies a dual-channel retailer 
with both return mechanisms and investigates optimal pricing policies. Both 
centralization with differential and unified pricing schemes and competition in regards to 
theoretical game frameworks are addressed. 
When determining prices in a Stackelberg game, the online store leads and the 
physical store follows. However, in a Nash game, the physical store and the online store 
determine optimal prices simultaneously. This study provides several contributions to 
existing literature in three ways. First, it collectively considers all common forms of 
customer returns for a dual-channel retailer. As stated previously, purchasing an item 
from a physical store and returning it to an online store is not a common practice and, 
thus, it is not considered in this work.  Second, it addresses dual-channel competition 
from a game theoretic perspective. Third, it compares dual-channel retailer’s total 
performance under centralization with unified pricing scheme, and Stackelberg and Nash 
games. 
3.2  Model Formulation 
This chapter considers merchants that run both a physical store and an online 
store. It examines two coordination schemes: one in which channels are managed 
collectively in a centralized setting and one in which channels are managed competitively 
in a decentralized setting. Customers may receive a full refund for purchases returned 
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within a merchant-specified time period. The probability that a product purchased from a 
physical store is returned to a physical store is 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1.  The probability that a product 
purchased from an online store is returned to an online store is 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1. The 
probability that a product purchased from an online store is cross-returned to a physical 
store is 0 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 1 (Figure 3.1).  The assumption of ratios for returns has been 
implemented in literature before, such as in works by Chen and Grewal (2013), Mostard 
and Teunter (2006), Mostard et al. (2005), Vlachos and Dekker (2003), and many more. 
 
Figure 3.1: A Dual-Channel Retailer with Same- and Cross-Channel Returns 
Akcay et al. (2013) have stated that apparel is often returned “as good as new”; 
thus, apparel can be resold several times during a single period. Therefore, for a returned 
product to be resalable it must be returned in its original packaging and condition. We 
assume that a returned product has a resalability rate of 𝑘! if the item was purchased from 
and returned to a physical store, 𝑘! if the item was purchased from and returned to an 
online store, and 𝑘!" if the item was purchased from an online store but cross-returned to 
a physical store. 
We assume that all same-channel resalable returns can be resold for 𝜀 times from 
their original channels. Regardless of the number of times an item is sold in the online 
store, all cross-channel resalable returns can be resold for 𝜀 times from the physical store. 
According to Vlachos and Dekker (2003), if a resalable returned product takes a relatively 
long time to be placed on a store’s shelf from the moment it is purchased, then one may 
assume it can only be resold once during a selling season (i.e. 𝜀 = 1). In 
contradistinction, if a resalable returned product takes a relatively short time to be placed 
on a store’s shelf from the moment it is purchased (i.e., if it has a lead time of zero), then 
one may assume it can be resold an infinite number of times (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞) during a selling 
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season until it is permanently sold, cross-channel returned, or returned but not resalable 
(Mostard and Teunter 2006; Mostard et al. 2005). Therefore, two cases are studied: a 
general case where returns are assumed to be resold 𝜀 number of times; 𝜀 ∈ 1,∞ , and a 
more simplified special case where returns are assumed to be resold infinitely; 𝜀 = ∞. 
Each returned item is associated with a return collection cost of the value 𝑑. If an 
item is returned as not resalable or as resalable after the end of the selling season, then its 
salvage value, 𝑠, is acquired by selling the item in a secondary market. The unit’s salvage 
value must be less than or equal to the unit’s purchasing cost 𝑠 ≤ 𝑐; otherwise the profit 
function would be unbounded above. Items that are purchased from or returned to the 
online store will cost the store a per-unit shipping expense of 𝑡.  
The parameter 𝛼 represents the base level of sales, or the sales level when items 
are offered to customers free of charge (Chen et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2012). If 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1 is the degree of customer preference for the physical store, then 𝛼! = 𝛼𝜃 is 
the physical store’s base level of sales. Similarly, if 1− 𝜃 is the degree of customer 
preference for the online store, then 𝛼! = 𝛼 1− 𝜃  is the online store’s base level of 
sales.  
Several papers have considered customer preference in their studies. For example, 
Lu and Liu (2013) argue that customer preference for a certain channel induces 
dominance and profitability to that channel and the degree of that preference greatly 
affects the equilibrium prices. According to Hua et al. (2010), different products lead to 
different degrees of customer preference for the physical store. For example, products that 
are customized, require a high level of examination prior to being purchased (such as 
used cars, clothes, shoes, or eyeglasses), or require after-sale services (such as 
electronics) better-fit physical stores. In contradistinction, products that do not require a 
high level of examination in regards to their quality level prior to being purchased, 
standardized, or mature (such as books and CDs) better fit online stores. Hua et al. (2010) 
also stated that customer preference for the online store is directly affected by lead-time 
and product type. According to Ryan et al. (2013) the positive impact of coordination is 
magnified when customers tend to stick to their preferable channel even in the existence 
of price differentiation. Opposite to the general perception that customer preference for a 
certain channel is the most important driver of demand in that channel, services provided 
to customers (e.g. customer support, presale advice, in-store advertising and promotions, 
technical and shopping assistance, and return services) will be the key factor in driving 
demand up or down (Zhang et al. 2010). As customers are becoming more attached to 
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dual-channel retailing, a new competing player in the market may increase customer base 
for the incumbent, thus, increasing the channel’s profitability (Huang and Swaminathan 
2009).  𝛽 is an ownership price sensitivity that measures the rate at which sales are 
affected by a channel’s own price. 𝛾 is the cross-price sensitivity that reflects the degree 
of cannibalization between two channels. A channel’s cross-price sensitivity has a lesser 
effect on sales than a channel’s ownership-price sensitivity, which is 𝛾 ≤ 𝛽. 𝐷! and 𝐷! 
denote total customer sales within the physical store and the online store, respectively. 
Therefore, physical and online store sales functions are given, respectively, as: 𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝛾𝑝! and (3.1) 𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝛾𝑝!. (3.2) 
Linear sales functions in a dual-channel system were utilized in Ryan et al. (2013), Huang 
et al. (2012), Chen et al. (2012), Bin et al. (2010), and more. 
 𝑄!! and 𝑄!! are the order quantities placed at the physical store and the online store 
at the beginning of the selling season, respectively. Since the studied retailing system 
allows customer returns and a portion of those returns to be resold in the same selling 
season, then it is intuitive to see that a channel’s order quantity is lower than its total 
sales. Thus, if resalable returns can be resold 𝜀 number of times, then an online store will 
sell its order quantity (𝑄!!), all of its same-channel first time resalable returns (𝑤𝑘!𝑄!!), 
all of its same-channel second time resalable returns (𝑤!𝑘!! 𝑄!!), and so on. Thus, 𝐷! = 𝑄!! 1 + 𝑤𝑘! + 𝑤𝑘! ! +⋯+ 𝑤𝑘! ! = 𝑄!! 𝑤𝑘! !!!   (3.3) 
The order quantity is as follows: 𝑄!! = !!!!! !!!   (3.4) 
Due to the ratio 𝑣, a quantity of 𝑣𝐷! is cross-returned from the online store to the 
physical store. A portion, 𝑘!" of this quantity, is resaleable and can be resold 𝜀 number of 
times to satisfy part of the physical store’s total sales 𝐷!. Thus, the physical store will sell 
its order quantity (𝑄!!), all of its same-channel first time resalable returns of (𝑟𝑘!𝑄!!), all 
of its same-channel second time resalable returns (𝑟!𝑘!!𝑄!!), and so on. Similarly, it will 
sell the quantity (𝑣𝑘!!𝐷!) and all of its same-channel first time resalable returns 
(𝑟𝑘!𝑣𝑘!"𝐷!), all of its same-channel second time resalable returns (𝑟!𝑘!!𝑣𝑘!"𝐷!), and so 
on. Thus, 
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𝐷! = 𝑄!! 1 + 𝑟𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑟𝑘! ! + 𝑣𝑘!"𝐷! 1 + 𝑟𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑟𝑘! !!! =𝑄!! 𝑟𝑘! !!! + 𝑣𝑘!"𝐷! 𝑟𝑘! !!!!!   (3.5) 
 The order quantity is as follows: 𝑄!! = !!!!!!"!! !!! !!!!!!!! !!!   (3.6) 
Notice that the term 𝑣𝑘!"𝐷! 𝑟𝑘! !!!!!  is conditioned to be less than or equal to 𝐷! (i.e. 𝑄!! ≥ 0); otherwise the physical store would be overwhelmed by cross-channel 
returns that would allow the store to start its selling season without any quantity ordered 
from the supplier. Such a case is unrealistic; thus, its analytical complications are omitted 
from the calculations.  
Assume that resalable returns can be resold several times in a selling season. If 
return rate, resalability rate and sales requests are not staggeringly high, then 𝜀 is safely 
assumed to be infinity (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞). The previous assumption will greatly simplify the 
calculation of equilibrium points. Under such a case equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) 
are modified respectively as the following: 𝐷! = !!!!!!!!!!, (3.7) 𝑄!!!! = 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝐷!, (3.8) 𝐷! = !!!!! !!!!"!!!!!!! , and (3.9) 𝑄!!!! = 1 − 𝑟𝑘! 𝐷! − 𝑣𝑘!"𝐷!. (3.10) 
To comprehend, let us assume that the apparel industry is being studied. If the selling 
season consists of four months and the unsatisfied customers posses sold items for two 
weeks before reimbursing, then it is expected that 𝜀 = 8. Assume that 𝑤 = 0.5 and 𝑘! = 0.7, then using both equations (3.3) and (3.7) an ordered quantity of 5000 can 
satisfy up to 7692. The answers are closely similar and thus the special case (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞) 
can be used to model the problem. 
The following two sections examine the integration of a dual-channel retailer 
under a centralized management using two pricing strategies: differential pricing mode 
and uniform pricing mode. They also examine online and physical stores’ equilibriums 
when the stores use two different competitive pricing schemes: Stackelberg game and 
Nash game. In the Stackelberg game, a retailer’s online store leads. It announces its 
selling price first and is followed by its physical store. However, in the Nash game both 
channels are equally powerful in price determination. Thus, they set their price strategies 
simultaneously. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the notations used in Chapter 3. 
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Notation Description 𝒓 Probability an item purchased from the physical store is returned to the physical store 𝒘 Probability an item purchased from the online store is returned to the online store 𝒗 Probability an item purchased from the online store is cross-returned to a physical store 𝒌𝒓 Probability an item purchased from and returned to the physical store is resalable 𝒌𝒐 Probability an item purchased from and returned to the online store is resalable 𝒌𝒐𝒓 Probability an item purchased from the online store and cross-returned to the physical 
store is resalable 𝒄 & 𝒔 Unit purchasing cost and salvage value, respectively 𝒅 & 𝒕 Return collection and shipping costs, respectively 𝒄 Amount a physical store pays to an online store for every cross-channel return in the 
decentralization scheme 𝑫𝒓 & 𝑫𝒐 Retail and online stores’ total sales including returns, respectively 𝑸𝜺𝒓 & 𝑸𝜺𝒐 Quantities ordered by retail and online stores, respectively 𝜶, 𝜶𝒓 & 𝜶𝒐 Enterprise, physical store and online store base levels of sale, respectively 𝜽 Customer preference for the physical store 𝜷 & 𝜸 Ownership price and cross-price sensitivities of a channel, respectively 𝒑𝒓 & 𝒑𝒐 Retail and online store’s prices, respectively 𝝅𝜺𝑪𝒓, 𝝅𝜺𝑪𝒐 & 𝝅𝜺𝑪 Physical store, online store, and enterprise profits in the centralized case, respectively 𝝅𝜺𝑫𝒓 & 𝝅𝜺𝑫𝒐 Physical store and online store profits in the decentralized case, respectively 𝜺  Number of times a resalable return can be resold in a selling season 
Table 3.1: Third Chapter’s Notations 
3.3  Centralized Dual-Channel Retailing System 
This section studies pricing policies in a centralized system wherein a retailer’s 
physical and online stores are vertically integrated. One may assume the existence of a 
central decision maker who pursues the maximum total supply chain profit (𝜋!!). The 
central decision maker simultaneously determines the physical store’s price, 𝑝!, and the 
online store’s price, 𝑝!, to meet the retailer’s goals and objectives.  
The online store’s profit function is modeled as the following:  𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠 !!! !!!!!! !!! − 𝑄!!𝑐. (3.11) 
A portion from 𝐷!, 1− 𝑤 − 𝑣 , is a final sale and contributes positively. Every sold 
item contributes negatively due to the shipped cost 𝑡 paid by the store. A 𝑤 portion from 𝐷! is returned to the online store and contributes negatively due to collection and 
shipping costs. A portion of 𝑤 1− 𝑘!  from 𝐷! is salvaged and contributes positively as 
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it is returned as non-resalable. The term 𝑠 !!! !!!!!! !!!  assures the salvaging of an item that 
ends up being returned as resalable after the end of the selling season. Notice that this 
term will be zero when 𝜀 = ∞. The second term is the ordering cost for the quantity 
assigned to the online store. 
The physical store’s profit function is modeled as:  𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠 !!! !!!!!! !!! + 𝑣𝐷! −𝑑 + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 +𝑠 !!" !!! !!!! !!! − 𝑄!!𝑐. (3.12) 
In the first term, a portion of 1− 𝑟  from 𝐷! is a final sale and contributes positively, a 
portion of 𝑟 from 𝐷! is returned to the physical store and contributes negatively due to its 
collection cost, and a portion of 𝑟 1− 𝑘!  from 𝐷! is salvaged and contributes positively 
as it is returned as a non-resalable item. The term 𝑠 !!! !!!!!! !!!  assures the salvaging of items 
that end up being resalable returns after the end of the selling season when the system 
experience no cross-channel returns. This term will be zero when 𝜀 = ∞. In the second 
term, a portion of 𝑣 from 𝐷! is cross-returned to the physical store and contributes 
negatively due to its collection cost. A portion of 𝑣 1− 𝑘!"  from 𝐷! is salvaged and 
contributes positively as it is cross-returned as a non-resalable item. The term 𝑠 !!" !!! !!!! !!!  
considers the increment in salvaged resalable returns at the physical store when the 
system experience cross-channel returns. Again, the term will be equivalent to zero when 𝜀 = ∞. The third term is the ordering cost for the items assigned to the physical store.  
The total supply chain profit function can be modeled by adding functions (3.11) 
and (3.12) as the following: 𝜋!! = 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠 𝑤𝑘𝑜 !+1𝑤𝑘𝑜 𝑛!0 −𝑣𝑑 + 𝑣 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑠 𝑘𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !𝑟𝑘𝑟 𝑛!0 + 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !+1𝑟𝑘𝑟 𝑛!0 −𝑄!!𝑐 − 𝑄!!𝑐. (3.13) 
By replacing the quantity 𝑄!! and 𝑄!! with their functions, the total supply chain 
profit can be transformed into the following: 
General Case (i.e. 𝜺 ∈ 𝟏,∞ ):  
Using the formulas (3.4) and (3.6), one gets: 
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𝜋!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑠 𝑤𝑘𝑜 !+1−𝑐𝑤𝑘𝑜 𝑛!0 + 𝑣 1 −𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘𝑜𝑟 ! !!! !!!!! !𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !!!! !!! + 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !+1−𝑐𝑟𝑘𝑟 𝑛!0 . (3.14) 
Especial Case (i.e. 𝜺 = ∞):  
With the formulas (3.8) and (3.10), one obtains: 𝜋!!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐 +𝑣 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑐 1 − 𝑟𝑘! . (3.15) 
One may reformulate profit functions (3.13) and (3.14) as the following: 𝜋!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐵! + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! + 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! . (3.16) 
Where; 𝐼 = 1− 𝑟, 𝐽 = 1− 𝑤 − 𝑣, 𝐴! = 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !+1−𝑐𝑟𝑘𝑟 𝑛!0 , 𝐵! =𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑠 𝑤𝑘𝑜 !+1−𝑐𝑤𝑘𝑜 𝑛!0 − 𝑣 1− 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘𝑜𝑟 ! !!! !!!!! !𝑠 𝑟𝑘𝑟 !!!! !!! , 𝐴!!! = 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑟 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑐 1− 𝑟𝑘! , and 𝐵!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 + 1− 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐 − 𝑣 𝑐𝑘!" + 1− 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 . 
Notice that 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! and 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! is the revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from 
the online store and physical store, respectively. Thus, the optimal solution is subjected to 
the following constraints: 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, and 𝑄!! ≥ 0.  
Section 3.3.1 presents an analysis of a situation wherein a central decision maker 
adopts a differential pricing strategy or does not add any constraint to prices. Section 
3.3.2 studies a situation wherein a central decision maker adopts a unified pricing strategy 
or constrains prices so that they are equal. 
3.3.1  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Differential Pricing 
Strategy 
It has been argued that differential pricing is the optimal strategy when higher 
prices are assigned to the channel with the highest operational costs (Zhang et al. 2010 
and Yan 2008). Neslin et al. (2006) have also argued in favour of differential pricing, but 
with higher prices assigned to the channel with the fewest price-sensitive customers. 
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However, several other authors have argued that a unified pricing strategy is not optimal 
for a dual-channel retailer and that a channel’s pricing strategy should be proportional to 
its customer’s preference and its provided services (Chen et al. 2012; Dan et al. 2012; 
Hua et al. 2010). Thus, this section investigates the effect customer preference and rates 
of return have on pricing policies when a sole manager chooses to run its enterprise using 
the differential pricing strategy. 
Proposition 3.1 
i. !!!!!" < 0 and !!!!!" < 0 
ii. The profit function (3.16) is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑝!, given that 4𝛽!𝐼𝐽 ≥ 𝛾! 𝐼 + 𝐽 !. The system will perform at its best with the online store’s optimal 
price of 𝑝!! and the physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝!!: 𝑝!! = !"!!!!!!! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! ! . (3.17) 𝑝!! = !"!!!!!!! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! ! . (3.18) 
From (3.17) and (3.18) we get: !!!!!! = !" !!"!! !!!!!"!!!!! !!! !, !!!!!! = − !" !!"!! !!!!!"!!!!! !!! !, !!!!!! − !!!!!! = !" !!! !!!!!"!!!!! !!! ! 
If 𝑝!! = 𝑝!!, then 𝜃  = !" !!"!! !!! !!" !!! !!!!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!! !!! !!!!!! !!"#!! !!! ! . (3.19) 
The proofs for Proposition 3.1 and all other propositions can be found in the 
appendix. The first part of the proposition indicates that returns impose difficulty and loss 
on the system. The assumption that the same-channel return can infinitely generate 
salvage value with each sale does not impose the superiority of a system with returns over 
a system without returns. Since this is true for the worst-case scenario 𝜀 = ∞, then it will 
be true for the general case. Thus, the proof for the later is omitted. 
The condition stated in Proposition 3.1 may not apply if 𝛾 is very close to 𝛽 and 
the total return rate of a channel is much higher than what it is for the other channel. 
Those cases are less likely to occur since 𝛾 is expected to be much less than 𝛽. Also, a 
channel with excessive total return rate will, most likely, be eliminated or its return policy 
will, at least, be changed. 
The optimal price for a certain channel will not always increase as customers’ 
preference for that channel increases. It could instead increase or decrease depending on 
the signs 2𝛽𝐼 − 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽  and 2𝛽𝐽 − 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽  for the physical store and the online store, 
26 
 
respectively. That is, managers should not assume that higher customer preference for a 
certain channel drives prices in that channel up; they must first consider customer returns. 
Compare the above result with the fact that a higher base level of demand in a single sale 
channel leads to a higher selling price. Also, if the physical store has a high level of 
customer preference (i.e., if there is a higher base level of demand for the physical store), 
then when customer returns are not considered, the physical channel should have a higher 
selling price than the online channel (Dan et al. 2012 and Hua et al. 2010). 
As 𝜃 increases, the online store is found to have a higher corresponding rate of 
change in its optimal price than the physical store if 𝑤 + 𝑣 < 𝑟, an identical rate if 𝑤 + 𝑣 = 𝑟, and a lower rate if 𝑤 + 𝑣 > 𝑟. If 𝜃 = 𝜃 and 0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1, then it is optimal for 
both channels to have a similar pricing strategy. Note that 𝜃 will mostly lie out of range if !!!!!!  and !!!!!!  are either positive or negative. From the above proposition, one may 
observe that customer preference for a certain channel has a significant impact on the 
optimal prices of channels. 
3.3.2  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Unified Pricing Strategy 
Webb and Lambe (2007) have stated that pricing strategy causes most of the 
conflicts that arise between channels. In addition, several authors have stated that one 
may avoid customer confusion and retain a business’s image by using a unified price 
across all channels (Neslin and Shankar 2009; Webb and Lambe 2007). Consequently, 
80% of all multichannel retailers choose to unify their pricing strategies across all 
channels (Ofek et al. 2009). Thus, this section investigates the effect that customer 
preference and rates of return have on pricing policies when a sole manager choses to run 
its enterprise with a unified pricing strategy. Due to the added constraint (i.e., 𝑝! = 𝑝! =𝑝), it is trivial that the profit generated by the unified pricing strategy is less than or equal 
to the profit generated by the differential pricing strategy.  
Proposition 3.2 
If 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝, the profit function is strictly concave in 𝑝. Thus, there is a unique optimal 
solution of 𝑝!! that derives the maximum system’s profit 𝜋!!. 𝑝!! = !! !!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!! . (3.20) 
From (3.20) we get !!!!!! = !! !!!!!! !!! .  
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The optimal price will increase as 𝜃 increases under the condition 𝑟 < 𝑣 + 𝑤, and 
will decrease as 𝜃 increases under the condition 𝑟 > 𝑣 + 𝑤. Intuitively, the change in 𝜃 
has no effect on the dual-channel retailer’s pricing strategy when 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤. One may 
notice that the decision to increase or decrease the unified price solely depends on the 
values 𝑟, 𝑣, and 𝑤. This places an emphasis on customer returns when one selects pricing 
policies for dual-channel retailing systems.  
3.4  Decentralized Dual-Channel Retailing System 
According to Zhang et al. (2010), “most retail corporations manage their channels 
in a decentralized fashion and many of them maintain separate teams of inventory 
management.” Falk et al. (2007) claim that integration may not be optimal if it is 
associated with a high implementation cost. As previously stated, a failure to centralize or 
integrate a dual-channel retailer will trigger price and service competition that is normally 
initiated by cannibalization. Notice that a cross-channel return policy allows online stores 
to increase both sales and customer satisfaction and allows physical stores to create cross-
selling opportunities. Assume that 𝑐 is the amount a physical store pays to an online store 
for every cross-channel return. If 𝑐 is constructed fairly, then it is of all channels’ best 
interest to accept such a return policy. Thus, there is no contradiction between having a 
cross-channel return as an accepted practice and the fact that competition takes place 
between channels. 
The performance of the competing channels is studied using a sequential game, 
namely the Stackelberg game, discussed in Section 3.4.1, and a simultaneous game, 
namely the Nash game, discussed in Section 3.4.2. Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and 
Yan (2008) have stated that Target, Nike, and Kohl’s are all good candidates for 
Stackelberg competition. They have also stated that a Stackelberg game always 
outperform a Nash game. Similarly, Lu and Liu (2013) have argued that a Stackelberg 
game influences the profitability of channels more effectively than a Nash game. In a 
competitive environment, each channel forms its own decision in isolation to maximize 
its individual profit. One may assume that all sales function parameters, return rates, cost 
parameters, and decision rules are known to both competitors.  
Due to decentralization, the profit functions below are constructed in a manner 
similar to formulas (3.11) to (3.16), with the exception that 𝑐 is included in the 
formulation.  
General Case (i .e.  𝜺 ∈ 𝟏,∞ ):  
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𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐 + ! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! . (3.21) 𝜋!!! =𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + ! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! + 𝑣𝐷! !!" ! !!! !!!!! !! !!! !!!! !!! +1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 . (3.22) 
Special Case (i.e.  𝜺 = ∞):  𝜋!!!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑤 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐 − 1 − 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐 . (3.23) 𝜋!!!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 1 − 𝑟𝑘! 𝑐 + 𝑣𝐷! 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 −𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 . (3.24) 
One may reformulate the above profit functions as the following: 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! . (3.25) 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴! + 𝑣𝐷!𝐹! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! + 𝑣𝐷!𝐹!. (3.26) 
Where; 𝐺! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣𝑐 − ! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! , 𝐹! = !!" ! !!! !!!!! !𝑠 !!! !!!! !!! + 1− 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑, 𝐺!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑤 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣𝑐 + 1− 𝑤𝑘! 𝑐, and 𝐹!!! = 𝑐𝑘!" + 1− 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑. 𝐹! represents the savings or losses the physical store makes by accepting each cross-
channel return. One may subject the optimal solution to the following constraints: 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, and 𝑄!! ≥ 0. 
Since each channel aims to maximize it own profit in the competitive setting, the 
online store may over estimate the value of cross-channel returns 𝑐. In return, the physical 
store may stop cooperating with the online store. Such a lack of cooperation may create 
havoc in the system and cause unnecessary practices such as returning all cross-channel 
returns back to the online store at its own expense. Therefore, the following condition on 
the value of 𝑐 should be satisfied: 
General Case (i .e.  𝜺 ∈ 𝟏,∞ ):  𝑐 ≤ !!" ! !!! !!!!! !!! !!! !!! !!! + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑. (3.27) 
To better comprehend, assume that 𝜀 = 1. Thus, relationship (3.27) becomes: 
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𝑐 ≤ !!"!!!!!! + !!"!"!!!!!!! + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑. (3.28) 
The right-hand side of the above relationship represents how a physical store should 
consider a cross-channel return. The first term denotes the physical store’s valuation of a 
resalable cross-channel return. Since an item purchased by the physical store at the 
beginning of the selling season can satisfy 1+ 𝑟𝑘!  sales, it is worth a value of 𝑐. In 
contradistinction, since a resalable cross-channel return can only satisfy one sale it is 
worth a value of !!!!!!. The second term calculates the increase in salvaged resalable 
returns at the end of the selling season caused by each resalable cross-channel return. The 
third term denotes the physical store’s gain, due to salvaging, from a non-resalable cross-
channel return. The fourth term denotes the physical store’s loss, due to the collection 
cost, from each cross-channel return. 
Special Case (i.e.  𝜺 = ∞):  𝑐 ≤ 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑. (3.29) 
Due to the assumption that an item owned by a physical store is infinitely sold until it is 
permanently sold or returned but not resalable, both an item purchased by the physical 
store at the beginning of the selling season and a resalable cross-channel return can satisfy !!!!!! sales. Thus, they are both worth a value of 𝑐. 
3.4.1  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Stackelberg Game  
In contrast to the physical store, forming a customer base for the online store is 
not limited to the store’s neighbourhood. Also, due to the advancement in cellular phones 
and IT, customers of a dual-channel retailer may always check the prices of an online 
store before they conduct their purchases from a physical store. Additionally, online 
stores are normally considered to be the distribution centers of enterprises. Therefore, 
they can start the selling season before their competitors. For the aforementioned facts, 
the online store is considered to have more price influence on customers compared to the 
physical store. Thus, a retailer’s online store will lead and its physical store will follow. In 
this game, the physical store optimizes its performance based on the online store’s 
optimal price. The online store optimizes its performance based on the physical store’s 
best response function.  
Proposition 3.3.  
i. !!!!!!" < 0 and !!!!!!" < 0 
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ii. Given the online store’s optimal price, the physical store’s profit function (3.26) is 
strictly concave in 𝑝!. Given the physical store’s optimal price function, the online store’s 
profit function (3.25) is strictly concave in 𝑝!. Thus, the physical store’s maximum profit 
of 𝜋!! and the online store’s maximum profit of 𝜋!! are generated by selecting the unique 
physical store’s optimal price of 𝑝!! and online store’s optimal price of 𝑝!!. 𝑝!! 𝑝!! = !! !!! + !!! + !!!"!" + !! 𝑝!! . (3.30) 𝑝!! = !!!! + !!!!!!!!! + !!!! !!!!!! + !!!"!! !!!!!! + !!!!!!! !!!!!! . (3.31) 
From (3.30) and (3.31), one gets: !!!!!! = − !! !!!!!!!!!! < 0, !!!!!! = !!! !!!!!!"!!!!!!!!! > 0, !!!!!! − !!!!!! = !!!!! !!!!!! > 0, !!!! !!!!!!! = !!! > 0. 
If 𝑝!! = 𝑝!!, then 
𝜃 = 2𝛽 2𝛽2−𝛾2𝛼 8𝛽2−𝛾2−4𝛽𝛾 𝐺𝜀𝐽 − 𝐴𝜀𝐼 − 𝐺𝜀𝛾2𝐽𝛽+ 4𝐼𝛽𝛼+2𝐴𝜀𝛽𝛾−2𝐼𝛼𝛾−𝐴𝜀𝛾2+2𝑣𝛾2𝐹𝜀2𝐼 2𝛽2−𝛾2 − 𝑣𝛾3𝐹𝜀2𝛽𝐼 2𝛽2−𝛾2 − 𝐹𝜀𝑣𝛾𝛽𝐼 . (3.32) 
The above relationships indicate that a physical store’s optimal price will increase 
as 𝜃 increases, while an online store’s optimal price will decrease as 𝜃 increases. The 
follower’s (physical store’s) pricing strategy is always less affected by the change in 𝜃 
than the leader’s (online store’s) pricing strategy. If the online store’s best response of 𝑝!! 
increases by a single unit, then the physical store’s best response of 𝑝!!will increase by 
half a unit at the most. Dan et al. (2012) came to a similar conclusion for a dual-channel 
system without customer returns. This in fact shows how much control the leader has 
over the follower, especially when customer returns are allowed. Similar to Dan et al. 
(2012), Chen et al. (2012), and Hua et al. (2010) a 𝜃 exists, such that if 𝜃 = 𝜃, then the 
pricing strategies in both channels are similar. If customer preference for the physical 
store is lower than the threshold (𝜃 < 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical store is 
lower than the selling price in the online store (𝑝!! < 𝑝!!). If customer preference for the 
physical store is higher than the threshold (𝜃 > 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical 
store is higher than the selling price in the online store (𝑝!! > 𝑝!!). For example, when 
remanufactured or used items are offered for sale, customers are most likely eager to 
verify the quality of the offered items before completing a purchase. Thus higher prices 
should be offered in the physical store. While changing the 𝜃 value may impose a 
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different outcome on the decentralized setting than on the centralized setting, in both 
cases it significantly impacts pricing decisions. 
3.4.2  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Nash Game  
In a dual-channel Nash game, online and physical stores are equally powerful. The 
market has no price leader. Thus, prices are selected simultaneously in both channels. In 
this game, each store optimizes its performance given the rival’s price.  
Proposition 3.4 
A unique Nash equilibrium exists under the physical store’s price, 𝑝!!, and the online 
store’s price, 𝑝!!. Under equilibrium, the physical store generates a profit of 𝜋!! and the 
online store generates a profit of 𝜋!!. 𝑝!!  = !!!!!!! 2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! + !!!!!!! + !!!!!! + !!"!!!! − !!!!! . (3.33) 𝑝!! = !!!!!!! 2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! + !!!!!! + !!!!! + !!!!!! . (3.34) 
From (3.33) and (3.34), one gets: !𝑝𝑁𝑟!! = !!!!!!! 2𝛽𝛼 − 𝛾 𝛼 − 1 . Since 𝛼 − 1 ≈ 𝛼, then !𝑝𝑁𝑟!! ≈ !!!!!!! 2𝛽 − 𝛾 > 0. !𝑝𝑁𝑜!! = !!!!!!! 𝛾𝛼 − 2𝛽 𝛼 − 1 . Since 𝛼 − 1 ≈ 𝛼, then !𝑝𝑁𝑜!! ≈ !!!!!!!! 2𝛽 − 𝛾 < 0. !𝑝𝑁𝑟!! − !𝑝𝑁𝑜!! = !!!!!!!!!! 2𝛽 − 𝛾 > 0. 
If 𝑝!! = 𝑝!!, then 𝜃 = 12𝛼 𝛼+ 𝛽𝐺𝜀𝐽 − 𝛽𝐴𝜀𝐼 − 𝑣𝛾𝐹𝜀𝐼 . (3.35) 
As 𝜃 increases, the physical store’s optimal price will increase and the online 
store’s optimal price will decrease. Different than the Stackelberg game, the online store’s 
pricing strategy is less affected by the change in 𝜃 than the physical store’s pricing 
strategy. Also, there exists a 𝜃, such that if 𝜃 = 𝜃, then the pricing strategies in both 
stores are similar. If customer preference for the physical store is higher than the 
threshold (𝜃 > 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical store is higher than the selling 
price in the online store (𝑝!! > 𝑝!!). If customer preference for the physical store is 
lower than the threshold (𝜃 < 𝜃), then the selling price in the physical store is lower than 
the selling price in the online store (𝑝!! < 𝑝!!). Due to functions’ complexity, it is 
difficult to carry on a comparison between a channel’s price and profitability under the 
different games. Thus, the comparison is done in the sensitivity analysis. 
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3.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
This numerical study aims to provide several key managerial insights by 
answering the following questions: Does a unified pricing strategy under centralized 
management have a higher total profit than competing dual channels? If not, under what 
conditions is this statement not correct? The latter’s answer leads to the following 
question: Under what competition setting and conditions is the total performance best? 
How does a channel’s pricing strategy compare to different cases? Which case will be the 
most affected if returns can be resold several times in a selling season? This study uses 
the following parameters: 𝑐 = 30, 𝑠 = 10, 𝑑 = 2, 𝑡 = 4, 𝑟 = 0.2, 𝑤 = 0.2, 𝑣 = 0.2, 𝑘! = 0.6, 𝑘! = 0.4, 𝑘!" =0.4, 𝜃 = 0.45,0.65 , 𝛾 = 5, 𝛽 = 10, 𝛼 = 15𝑘, 𝜀 = 1,∞ , 𝑐𝜀!! = 𝑘𝑜𝑟 𝑐+𝑠𝑟𝑘𝑟!!!!! + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑, & 𝑐𝜀!! = 𝑐𝑘!" + 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑. 
The parameter 𝜀 = 1 is used throughout this sensitivity analysis except in Section 3.5.4 
where the change in retailer’s performance is tracked and compared. 
3.5.1  Total System Performance under Unified Pricing Strategy and 
Competition 
If the centralization process eliminates conflict by including the unification of 
selling prices across all channels (Yan 2010), then an enterprise may be better off with 
uncoordinated channels. As presented in Figure 3.2a, when customer preference for the 
physical store, 𝜃, and the physical store’s rate of return, 𝑟, are sufficiently high, 
competition between channels leads to a better retailer’s total performance. Similarly, 
when customer preference for the online store, 1− 𝜃, and the online store’s same-channel 
rate of return, 𝑤, are sufficiently high, an enterprise should encourage competition rather 
than coordination (Figure 3.2b). Indeed, embracing a sole price will reduce channel 
conflict but deprive the system of agility. That is, it is difficult for an enterprise to divert 
sales from a high return-rate channel to a low return-rate channel. It should be noted that 
centralization with a differential pricing strategy has not been considered in this section. 
Similar to the findings of Yan (2008, 2010) and of Yan et al. (2010), such a setting will 
lead to the best system performance for all applicable parameters, especially when 
coordination cost is not considered. 
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(a) high 𝜃  (b) low 𝜃 
Figure 3.2: Total profit comparison between centralization with unified pricing strategy and decentralization 
3.5.2  Channel 's Performance and Pricing Strategy under Competition 
Schemes 
This section will compare between the Stackelberg game and the Nash game. 
Similar to the findings of Yan et al. (2010), Yan (2010), and Yan (2008), the Stackelberg 
competition has better channels' profits and thus system performance than the Nash 
competition (Figure 3.3). It also induces higher equilibrium prices compared to Nash 
competition (Figure 3.4). This finding is intuitive, since Stackelberg game imposes a 
higher coordination level between channels. Additionally, both channels are equally 
powerful in the Nash game. This implies that there will be increased price competition. 
This provides an explanation for why the channels prices in a Nash game are lower than 
the channels prices in a Stackelberg game. Thus, enterprises should consider employing 
the Stackelberg scheme rather than Nash scheme to set channel prices in a competitive 
market. However, this statement can’t be generalized on all possible parameters sets, as it 
is not analytically proven. 
	
(a) 
	
(b) 
Figure 3.3: Comparison of a channel’s profit under different competition schemes  
Under the competition schemes, one may notice that the impact a return rate has 
on stores’ prices is not profound. A channel will not drastically increase its selling price 
as it experiences a higher return rate. Intuitively, such an increase will cause a channel to 
lose sales in favour of the competing channel (Figure 3.4).  
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(a) high 𝜃   (b) low 𝜃 
	
(c) high 𝜽 	(d) low 𝜽	
 
(e) high 𝜽  (f) low 𝜽 
Figure 3.4: Return rates’ effect on physical and online store pricing strategies in competition schemes 
3.5.3  Pricing Strategies under Centralized Management 
A comparison of Figures 3.4 and 3.5 shows that channels have higher selling 
prices when coordinating rather than when decentralizing. Since the prices under the two 
settings are not equal, it can be stated that decisions in a decentralized setting deviate 
from the overall system’s perspective. Indeed, coordination eliminates price competition, 
providing a chance for both channels to increase prices. Similarly, Yan et al. (2010) have 
indicated that differential prices set by a sole manager are higher than those set by 
competing channels. In contrast, Ryan et al. (2013) have indicated that coordination 
increases total retailer’s profit, but at the same time decreases the prices of both channels. 
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(a) high 𝜃	 	(b) low 𝜃	
	
(c) high 𝜽	 	(d) low 𝜽	
	
(e) high 𝜽	 	(f) low 𝜽	
Figure 3.5: Return rates’ effect on physical and online pricing strategies under centralization schemes 
As 𝑟 increases within the differential case, the physical store’s price increases in 
an attempt to decrease the negative effect of return. Consequently, the physical store’s 
sales will decline. The online store should decrease the selling price to attract more 
customers and to shift part of the lost sales from the physical store to the online store 
(Figure 3.5 a and b). Under an extremely high 𝑟, the physical store can be used as a show 
room and most purchases can be directed to the online store. When 𝑤 or 𝑣 increase, 
channel prices are set such that sales shifts from the online store to the physical store 
(Figure 3.5 c to f). If 𝑤 and/or 𝑣 are extremely high, then the online store can serve as an 
information channel and the physical store can serve as a transaction channel (Neslin and 
Shankar 2009; and Steinfield 2004). Both channels operate in coordination to fulfill 
organizational-level goals rather than channel-level goals. Indeed, the compensation 
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system in the centralized case should not depend upon the channel’s profitability. It 
should instead depend upon the degree of coordination and the total supply chain’s 
profitability.  
Compare the above pricing strategy to that of both Stackelberg and Nash games 
wherein a store has no intention of losing customers in favour of the competing store 
(Figure 3.4). For example, as 𝑟 increases, a slight increase in the retail price is 
implemented. The online store will consider this increase in the rival’s price as an 
opportunity to increase the channel’s price and to generate more profit. The findings in 
this section support Baal’s (2014) hypothesis that “the higher the degree of 
harmonization, the greater the degree of cannibalization.” 
In the case of unification, it is difficult to mitigate the customer returns problem 
by shifting sales from one channel to another due to the pricing policy used. It has been 
found that the unified price should decrease if the rate of return for the channel with high 
customer preference increases. In contradistinction, if the rate of return for the channel 
with low customer preference increases, the unified price will increase (Figure 3.5). 
3.5.4  Retailer’s Performance under Single Resalability and Infinite 
Resalability 
When returns can be resold several times during a selling season, the quantity that 
is needed is reduced while profit is increased. Thus, this section measures the increase in 
total profitability for the different cases when infinite resalability is applicable. If the 
change is high, then it is probably worth altering the return policy (e.g., by reducing the 
return time limit) or investing in the reverse supply chain (e.g., investing in collection, 
shipping, fixing, and/or repackaging processes).  
As the resalability rate (𝑘!) increases, the profitability of the system increases. 
One may notice that all cases have experienced almost the same changes to ∆𝜋 (Figure 
3.6 a). The system will behave in a similar way when 𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑘! or 𝑘!" change. However, 
the unified pricing strategy experiences the highest change in profitability when the rate 
of return, 𝑟, increases. With a high 𝑟, ∆𝜋 scored $25,000 in the unified pricing case and 
$15,000 in all other cases (Figure 3.6 b). Thus, there is a need to shorten the length of 
time that a return stays off shelves, especially when an enterprise uses the unified pricing 
strategy.  
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(a) high 𝜃  (b) high 𝜃 
Figure 3.6: Increase in profitability for different cases when resalable returns can be resold infinitely 
3.6  Managerial Insights 
This chapter has several implications in regards to the pricing strategies of a dual-
channel retailer wherein both same- and cross-channel returns have been considered. It 
has examined several insights related to the centralization of a dual-channel retailer under 
unified pricing or differential pricing schemes. It has also examined insights related to the 
decentralization of a dual-channel retailer under Stackelberg or Nash games. 
It has been found that when customer preference for the physical channel is higher 
than a threshold value, then the retailer’s set price should be higher in the physical 
channel than in the online channel. The threshold is defined as 𝜃 and 𝜃 in the Stackelberg, 
and Nash games, respectively. Such a situation may occur when products have been 
custom designed or when remanufactured or used items have been offered for sale. 
Consequently, customers are more likely to verify the design or quality of the offered 
items before completing their purchase. However, when customer’ preference for the 
physical channel is lower than the threshold value, the retailer’s set price should be lower 
in the physical channel than in the online channel. Such a situation may occur when the 
products that have been offered for sale do not require a high level of examination in 
regards to their design or quality level before being purchased. For example, products that 
are standardized or mature (such as books and CDs) better fit this category. In a 
centralized situation, the threshold value is defined as 𝜃. Under valid, but unusual 
parameters, 𝜃 could be higher than one, which means that the online store should always 
be priced higher than the physical store. Additionally, 𝜃 could be less than zero, which 
means that the online store should always be priced lower than the physical store. 
Centralization with a differential pricing scheme may cause a retailer to 
significantly shift sales from one channel to another, leaving the first channel with 
virtually no customers. Such a management style imposes hardship on the retailer when it 
comes to tailoring a compensation program that is fair for both channels and dependent 
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on coordination level rather than on sales. As a result, many retailers centralize decision-
making under a unified pricing strategy. Thus, retailers should be aware of several 
important issues related to the price unification process. This strategy, compared to all 
strategies studied in Chapter 3, has the highest positive correlation between profit and 
number of times an item can be resold in a single selling season, especially when the 
online store has a low customer preference and the physical store has a high same-channel 
return rate. In this situation, the retailer may adopt a more stringent return policy when it 
comes to the trial period, or may consider increasing the capability of the reverse supply 
chain by investing more in the collection, shipping, fixing, and/or repackaging processes. 
Additionally, when under a centralized dual-channel retailer and a unified price strategy, 
a retailer’s profit is not always higher than when under a decentralized dual-channel 
retailer. Thus, the retailer should be careful in regards to encouraging or discouraging 
competition between channels. For example, if a channel experiences a sufficiently high 
customer preference and a same-channel rate of return, then it is better for the retailer to 
encourage competition rather than coordination. This could occur in the apparel industry, 
for example, wherein customers are increasingly inclined to use online stores despite 
having up to a 75% chance that they will return their purchases due to size or material 
mismatches. 
Prices in the Nash game when neither channel is a price leader, are lower than in 
the Stackelberg game, when the online channel is the price leader. Our study shows that 
both channels are worse off in the Nash game. This can be attributed to the fact that 
higher competition induces lower prices. Consequently, one may argue that Nash game 
leads to a lower total retailer’s profitability. These results indicate that game schemes 
have a significant impact on retailer payoffs, and that the schemes have a substantial 
influence on sales and customer welfare. 
3.7  Conclusion 
Chapter 3 has studied the effect that same- and cross-channel customer returns 
have on a dual-channel retailer wherein an enterprise runs both a physical store and an 
online store. The results confirm that accounting for both types of returns is very 
important when calculating channels’ optimal prices. Closed form formulas were 
assigned to the optimal unified price and the differential prices set by centralized 
management. The optimal prices for the competing channels were derived using the 
Stackelberg game and the Nash game. 
It has been found that customer preference for a certain channel greatly affects the 
pricing strategy of that channel. For example, the optimal price for a channel facing 
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competition will increase as customer preference for that channel also increases. Unlike 
common perception, the optimal price for a channel under centralized management and a 
differential pricing strategy could either increase or decrease when customer preference 
for that channel increases. The previous setting may not possess a customer preference 
value that causes both channels to optimally be priced equally. When the physical store’s 
rate of return is less than all online store’s rates of returns, then the optimal unified price 
will increase as customer preference for the physical store increases.  
From the numerical example it has been observed that the prices set by centralized 
management are higher than those set by competing channels. When compared to 
Stackelberg competition, Nash competition imposes lower pricing strategies for both 
channels and lower total supply chain profitability. When a channel faces high rate of 
returns and high customer preference, then the retailer should promote competition over 
coordination with price unification. Having the ability to resell returns several times 
rather than once in a selling season increases the total profitability of the system. This has 
been found to be the highest increment when using a unified pricing strategy and when a 
channel with high customer preference experiences a high rate of returns. 
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  PRICES AND RESPONSIVENESS CHAPTER 4:
LEVEL DECISIONS  
4.1  Introduction and Motivation 
Only a few works addressed in Chapter 2 considered the service level provided by 
a certain channel and its effect on a system’s performance. According to Ramanathan 
(2011), services provided by a retailer can be categorized into two groups: pre-purchase 
services and post-purchase services. Hua et al. (2010) have considered a post-purchase 
service level offered by an online channel. The responsiveness of the forward supply 
chain was an important decision variable in their study. However, Dan et al. (2012) have 
studied comprehensive service levels (pre-purchase and post-purchase) offered by a 
physical store. Due to the nature and quantity of returns, one of the online store’s most 
important post-purchase services is its responsiveness level to customer returns. The level 
greatly influences customer demands, customer loyalties, service expenses, and return 
reselability (Ramanathan 2011; Dan et al. 2012). 
As stated earlier, there is no work that has collectively considered all common 
forms of customer returns experienced by a dual-channel retailer. Hence, the impact of 
resalable cross-channel returns on both stores has not being studied previously. In 
addition, no published paper that has investigated online store’s ability to better handle 
returns and, thus, optimize returns’ resalability rate. Accordingly, this chapter is an 
extension of Chapter 3. It discusses dual-channel retailers with both return types, and 
examines optimal pricing policies. Additionally, it studies the optimal responsiveness 
level for online stores when handling product returns, as responsiveness influences online 
and offline channel sales and online store resalability rate. While theoretical game 
frameworks are addressed in regards to competition between channels, unified and 
differential pricing strategies are addressed in regards to integration.  
The study in this chapter makes four important contributions to the existing body 
of work, as shown below. 
• All common forms of customer returns that may arise in a dual-channel retailing 
system are examined. As stated earlier, purchasing an item from a physical store and 
returning it to an online store is not a common practice and, thus, it is not considered in 
this work.   
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• Various theoretical games are used to investigate competition that may arise between 
the channels of a dual-channel retailer. 
• The ability to resell a same-channel online return is related to the responsiveness level 
provided by the store.  
• A comparative study between the total dual-channel retailer’s performance under the 
different schemes is provided. 
4.2  Model Formulations 
As stated before, the online store is normally the distribution centre of the 
enterprise and is not limited to customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store 
experiences a much higher return rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the 
capability and the need to optimize its resalability rate. In this chapter 𝑘! is assumed to be 
responsiveness level dependent and can be estimated by the linear function 𝑘! 𝑒 = 𝑎 +𝑏𝑒. 𝑎 measures the online store’s resalability rate if the store fully utilizes its current 
reverse supply chain capability or responsiveness level. For example, if the online store 
fully utilizes the employees, buildings, tools, systems, and contracts from previous selling 
seasons, then it would have a resalability rate of 𝑎. We assume here that customers do not 
acquire knowledge on products from previous seasons. Otherwise, it is imperative to 
increase resalability rate as they gain more knowledge. This assumption can be satisfied 
when dealing with fashionable apparel items wherein customers’ return behaviour can be 
forecasted from earlier periods and items are regularly redesigned. On the other hand, 𝑏 
represents the sensitivity of the online store’s resalability rate to the change in 
responsiveness level. In another word, it measures the increase (decrease) in resalability 
rate when the store invests in (underutilize) responsiveness level. Two cases are studied: a 
case 𝜀 = 1 where returns are assumed to be resold once and a case 𝜀 = ∞ where returns 
are assumed to be resold infinitely. 
To simplify our problem setting, the models proposed in this paper do not 
consider the salvage value of leftovers, i.e. non-resalable returns or resalable items that 
were returned after the end of the selling season. A change in responsiveness level (an 
increase or a decrease) would cause the online store to bear a cost of 𝑐 𝑒 = 𝜂𝑒! 2. The 
previous function is strictly convex and has the property 𝜕!𝑐 𝑒 𝜕𝑒! > 0. If 𝑒 > 0, then 
the online store’s management would invest more in the channel’s reverse supply chain to 
increase its responsiveness when handling returns. For example, the management could 
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initiate a quality control department to check and fix returns if possible. This will increase 
resalability and boost sales in the online store due to the fact that the store will have a 
reputation not to send damaged items. Additionally, providing pickup services may ease 
the return process. It will also allow the online store to increase its resalability by 
providing a safer packaging for returns. Management could also invest in a department 
that performs data collection and analysis. With such a capability, customers are offered 
more suitable products for their needs. For example, a customer buys shoes online 
regularly and returns uncomfortable ones. When data are collected and analysed, better 
suggestions are given to the customer. Consequently, if a return is to be made by this 
customer, most likely it is material or fabric mismatch. This will decrease the likelihood 
that the return is not resalable. However, if 𝑒 < 0, then the online store’s management 
would underutilize the online store’s current reverse supply chain capability to decrease 
its responsiveness level. Such a technique could be used to shift sales from an online store 
to a physical store when channels are run collectively.  
The total overall sales functions (3.1) and (3.2) have been changed to 
accommodate the effect of responsiveness level as follows: 𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝜆𝑝! − 𝜌𝑒. (4.1) 𝐷! = 𝛼! − 𝛽𝑝! + 𝜆𝑝! + 𝜌𝑒. (4.2) 𝜌 is the sensitivity to responsiveness level. It measures the rate at which sales are affected 
by the responsiveness level set by the online store.  
The next two sections investigate the integration of a dual-channel retailer using 
two pricing strategies: uniform pricing and differential pricing. They also consider the 
equilibrium decisions of the online and physical stores at times when the stores are 
undergoing Stackelberg and Nash competitive schemes. In the Stackelberg scheme, the 
online store leads, declaring its selling price and responsiveness level first and is then 
followed by the physical store. In the Nash scheme, online and physical stores are 
commensurate in power. They therefore make their decisions simultaneously. A summary 
of this chapter’s notations is showing in Table 4.1 below. 
Notation Description 𝒓 Probability an item purchased from the physical store is returned to the physical store 𝒘 Probability an item purchased from the online store is returned to the online store 𝒗 Probability an item purchased from the online store is cross-returned to a physical store 𝒌𝒓 Probability an item purchased from and returned to the physical store is resalable 𝒌𝒐 Probability an item purchased from and returned to the online store is resalable 
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𝒌𝒐𝒓 Probability an item purchased from the online store and cross-returned to the physical 
store is resalable 𝒂 Online store’s current resalability rate 𝒆  Online store’s responsiveness level 𝒃 & 𝝆 Sensitivity of online store’s resalability rate and a channel’s sales to responsiveness 
level, respectively 𝒄  Unit purchasing cost 𝒅 & 𝒕 Return collection and shipping costs, respectively 𝒄 Amount a physical store pays to an online store for every cross-channel return in the 
decentralization scheme 𝑫𝒓 & 𝑫𝒐 Retail and online stores’ total sales including returns, respectively 𝑸𝜺𝒓 & 𝑸𝜺𝒐 Quantities ordered by retail and online stores, respectively 𝜶, 𝜶𝒓 & 𝜶𝒐 Enterprise, physical store and online store base levels of sale, respectively 𝜽 Customer preference for the physical store 𝜷 & 𝜸 Ownership price and cross-price sensitivities of a channel, respectively 𝒑𝒓 & 𝒑𝒐 Retail and online store’s prices, respectively 𝝅𝜺𝑪𝒓, 𝝅𝜺𝑪𝒐 & 𝝅𝜺𝑪 Physical store, online store, and enterprise profits in the centralized case, respectively 𝝅𝜺𝑫𝒓 & 𝝅𝜺𝑫𝒐 Physical store and online store profits in the decentralized case, respectively 𝜺  Number of times a resalable return can be resold in a selling season 
Table 4.1: Fourth Chapter’s Notations 
4.3  Centralized Dual-Channel Retailing System 
This section investigates the optimal decisions of a dual-channel retailer under a 
centralized management. The physical store and online store are integrated vertically. It 
may be assumed that a central decision maker is used with an objective to achieve the 
retailer’s total possible profit. He or she decides the price for the physical store, which is 𝑝!, the price for the online store, which is 𝑝!, and the responsiveness level for the online 
store, which is 𝑒, at the same time. 
The online store’s and physical store’s profit functions are modeled respectively 
as follows: 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑤 − 𝑣 𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑄!!𝑐 − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.3) 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 1 − 𝑟 𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝐷!𝑣𝑑 − 𝑄!!𝑐. (4.4) 
A description of the above profit functions has been omitted due to their similarity to the 
profit functions presented in Chapter 3. The retailer profit function can be modeled as 
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𝜋!! = 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝑡 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑑 + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝑟𝑑 − 𝑄!!𝑐 − 𝑄!!𝑐 −!! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.5) 
Where 𝐼 = 1− 𝑟 and 𝐽 = 1− 𝑤 − 𝑣. By replacing the quantity 𝑄!!, the quantity 𝑄!!, and 
the resalability 𝑘! with their functions, the retailer profit function 𝜋!!  is transformed into 
the equations below. 
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
Based on formulas (3.4) and (3.6) when 𝜀 = 1, one has 𝜋!!!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐵!!! − !!!!"!!"# + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.6) 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 
With formulas (3.8) and (3.10), one obtains 𝜋!!!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐵!!! + 𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑐 + 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.7) 
Where 𝐵!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑣𝑑 − !"!!"!!!!!, 𝐴!!! = 𝑟𝑑 + !!!!!!, 𝐵!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑑 − 𝑐𝑣𝑘!" + 𝑐, and 𝐴!!! = 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑐 1− 𝑟𝑘! .  
One may reformulate (4.6) and (4.7) as  𝜋!! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! + 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.8) 
Notice that 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! and 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! is the revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from 
the online store and physical store, respectively. Thus, the optimal solution is subjected to 
the constraints  𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, 𝑄!! ≥ 0, and −𝑎 𝑏 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1− 𝑎 𝑏. 
Section 4.3.1 presents an analysis of a situation wherein the central decision 
maker chooses a differential pricing strategy or does not constraint prices to be equal. 
Section 4.3.2 examines a scenario in which a central decision maker uses a unified pricing 
strategy or sets equal prices in both stores. 
4.3.1  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Differential Pricing 
Strategy 
This section of the work examines a situation in which a centralized management 
decides to operate its business while utilizing a pricing approach that is differential. 
Proposition 4.1 
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The profit function (4.7) is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝!, 𝑝!, and 𝑒, given that 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! > 0 and 𝐻!!!!! < 0. Similarly, the profit function (4.6) is strictly 
and jointly concave in 𝑝!, 𝑝!, and 𝑒 within the feasible region, given that 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! −𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! > 0 and 𝐻!!!!! < 0. 
The conditions in this proposition guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium 
point. If those conditions were not satisfied, then the profit functions (4.6) and (4.7) could 
have several equilibrium points. This would make the prediction of the system’s 
behaviour difficult in practice. Throughout this work one or two conditions have been set 
in a similar fashion to guarantee the existence of a sole equilibrium point. As stated in 
Chapter 3, the condition 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! > 0 may not be satisfied if cross-price 
sensitivity is very close to ownership price sensitivity, and if one channel experiences 
much higher return rates than the other. 
The online store’s optimal price (𝑝!!!) and responsiveness level (𝑒!!!) and the 
physical store’s optimal price (𝑝!!!) are then found for the cases 𝜀 = ∞ and 𝜀 = 1, 
respectively. 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜀 = ∞) 
If one sets !!!!!!!!! = 0, !!!!!!!!! = 0, and !!!!!!!! = 0 and then solves the first-order 
conditions simultaneously, one gets 
𝑒!!!!! = !!!!"!!! !!! ! !"#!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !"!!"#$ !!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !"!!"#$ !!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!! !!! ! !!!!"#$ ! !"!!"#$ !" !!"!! !!! !!"# !!!!!!! !!!! !"!!"#$ !" !!"!! !!! !!"#$% !!! , (4.9) 
𝑝!!!!! = !!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !" !!"!! !!! !!"# !!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!"!!! !!! ! , and (4.10) 𝑝!!!!! = !!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !" !!"!! !!! !!"#$% !!! !!!!!!!!!!"!!! !!! ! . (4.11) 
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
If one sets !!!!!!!!! = 0, !!!!!!!!! = 0 and !!!!!!!! = 0, then 𝐽𝜌 − !"#$!!!"!!"# ! 𝑝! − 𝜌𝐼 − !"#$!!!"!!"# ! 𝑝! + !"!!!!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌 𝐵!!! − 𝐴!!! + !!!" !!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜂𝑒 = 0. (4.12) 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 = !!!!!!! !!! !!!!! !!!!"!!"# !! !!! ! !!!!" !!!"# !!!!" ! !!! !"!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! ! . (4.13) 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 = !" !!! !!!!! !!!!"!!"# !!!"# !!!!" !! !!! ! !!!!" ! !!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!"!!!!! !!! ! . (4.14) 
Substitute (4.14) and (4.13) in (4.12). If the restrictions in Proposition 4.1 are satisfied, 
then the first-order condition in (4.12) has at most one real root for the responsiveness 
level 𝑒 between −𝑎 𝑏 and 1− 𝑎 𝑏. This root is the optimal responsiveness level 𝑒!!!!! . 
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One may substitute the value of 𝑒!!!!!  in (4.13) and (4.14) to get the online store’s optimal 
price 𝑝!!!!!  and the physical store’s optimal price 𝑝!!!!! . 
4.3.2  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Unified Pricing Strategy 
This section examines a scenario in which a sole manager makes the decision to 
operate its business using a unified pricing approach. Because of an added constraint (i.e., 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝), the unified pricing scheme’s generated profit is equal to or less than that of 
a differential pricing scheme.  
Proposition 4.2 
The profit functions 𝜋!!!!  is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒, given that 𝐻!!!!! >0. Similarly, The profit functions 𝜋!!!!  is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒 within the 
feasible region, given that 𝐻!!!!! > 0. 
Similar to proposition 4.1, one should confirm that 𝜂 is high enough to satisfy the 
above condition so that one may have a single equilibrium point rather than multiple 
points. The retailer’s optimal unified price (𝑝!!!) and online store’s responsiveness level 
(𝑒!!!) are then found for the cases 𝜀 = ∞ and 𝜀 = 1, respectively. 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 
If one sets !!!!!!!! = 0 and !!!!!!!! = 0 and then simultaneously solve the first-order 
conditions, one gets 𝑒!!!!! = ! !!! !!! !!!"#!!!!!!!!!!!! ! !" !!! !!! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!" !!! !! ! !!! !!! !!!!"#$ . (4.15) 𝑝!!!!! = !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!! ! ! !!! !!" !!! ! !!!!!!! !!! !!! . (4.16) 
Selling Resalable Returns once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
If one sets !!!!!!!! = 0 and !!!!!!!! = 0, then 
!! !!! 𝐵!!! + 𝐴!!! + !!!!"!!"# + ! !!!!" !! !!!!"!!! 𝜌 𝐽 − 𝐼 − !" !!! !!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌 𝐵!!! − 𝐴!!! + !!!!"!!"# +!" !!!!" !!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜂𝑒 = 0. (4.17) 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 = !! !!! 𝐵!!! + 𝐴!!! + !!!!"!!"# + ! !!!!" !! !!!!"!!! . (4.18) 
The first-order condition in (4.17) has at most one real root for the responsiveness level 𝑒 
within the range 𝑒 ∈ −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏 . If found, then this is the optimal 
responsiveness level 𝑒!!!!! . Substitute the value of 𝑒!!!!!  in (4.18) to get the dual-channel’s 
optimal unified price 𝑝𝜀=1𝐶𝑢 . 
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4.4  Decentralized Dual-Channel Retailing System 
This section investigates the optimal decisions of a dual-channel retailer under a 
decentralized management. Thus, each channel makes an isolated decision so that it may 
achieve its greatest individual profit. A Stackelberg game, discussed in Section 4.4.1, has 
been used to examine the performance of channels that are sequentially competing. Also, 
a Nash game, discussed in Section 4.4.2, has been used to examine the performance of 
channels that are simultaneously competing. Apart from the inclusion of 𝑐, the profit 
functions below have been constructed in a manner similar to the profit functions in the 
centralization scheme. 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 𝜋!!!!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺!!! + 𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑐 − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.19) 𝜋!!!!!  = 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! + 𝑣𝐷!𝐹!!!. (4.20) 
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 𝜋!!!!! = 𝐷! 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺!!! − !!!!"!!"# − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.21) 𝜋!!!!! = 𝐷! 𝐼𝑝! − 𝐴!!! + 𝑣𝐷!𝐹!!!. (4.22) 
Where 𝐺!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐 − 𝑣𝑐 + 𝑐, 𝐹!!! = 𝑐𝑘!" − 𝑐 − 𝑑, 𝐺!!! = 𝑡 + 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑐, and 𝐹!!! = !!!"!!!!! − 𝑐 − 𝑑. 
The profit functions of the above may be reformulated as 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.23) 𝜋!!! = 𝐷! 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! + 𝑣𝐷!𝐹!. (4.24) 𝐹! represents the savings or losses the physical store makes by accepting each cross-
channel return. The optimal solution is to be subjected to the following constraints: 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝐷! ≥ 0, 𝑄!! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, 𝑅𝐸𝑉!!! ≥ 0, and −𝑎 𝑏 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 1− 𝑎 𝑏.  
4.4.1  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Stackelberg Game 
Under a Stackelberg game, the online stores have more price influence on 
customers compared to the physical store. Consequently, online stores lead and physical 
stores follow. As the leader, an online store will determine the selling price, 𝑝!!! , and the 
responsiveness level, 𝑒!!, first. As a follower, a physical store will determine its selling 
price, 𝑝!!! , based on the online store’s optimal decisions. We analyze first the case 
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wherein a returned item can be resold several time in a selling season (i.e. case 𝜀 = ∞), 
then the case wherein a returned item can be resold only one time in a selling season (i.e. 
case 𝜀 = 1). 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞): 
Given 𝑝! and 𝑒 in (4.20), then the physical store’s profit function (𝜋!!!!! ) is concave on 
(𝑝!). This is due to the fact that !!!!!!!!!!!! = −2𝐼𝛽 < 0. Thus, if we set !!!!!!!!!! = 0, then we 
get the physical store’s optimal price function 𝑝!!!!! 𝑝! , 𝑒 = !! !!! + !!!!! + !"!!!!!" + !! 𝑝! − !! 𝑒 . (4.25) 
If (4.25) is substituted into (4.19), one get the online store’s profit 𝜋!!!!!  as a function of 𝑝! and 𝑒 𝜋!!!!! = 𝛼! − !!!!!!!! 𝑝! + !! !!! + !!!!! + !"!!!!!" + !!!!!! 𝜌𝑒 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺!!! + 𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑐 − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.26) 
Proposition 4.3  
The above online store’s profit function (4.26) is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒 
under the condition 𝐻!!!! > 0. 
The condition in proposition 4.3 assures the existence of a unique equilibrium point. If it 
is satisfied, one can find the online store’s optimal price (𝑝!!!!! ) and responsiveness level 
(𝑒!!!! ) by solving the set of equations !!!!!!!!!! = 0 and !!!!!!!!! = 0. Thus 𝑝!!!!! = !!!!!! + !!!!!!!!! + !!!! !!!!!! + !"!!!!!! !!!!!! + !!!!!!!!! !!!!!! + !!!! !! !!!!!! − !"#!! 𝑒!!!! . (4.27) 
𝑒!!!! =
! !!!!!! !!!!!! !!"!!!!"!!!!"#!𝜀!!! !!"!!!𝜀!!! !!𝜀!! !!!!!! !!"#! !!!!!!!! !!"! !!!!!𝜀!!!" !!!!𝜀!!!" !!!!𝜀!!!!!!!! !!!! !!! !!!!!! !!"#$ !!!!!! !!!!!!! !!!!!!!!" . (4.28) 
Substitute (4.27) and (4.28) into (4.25) to get the physical store’s optimal price 𝑝!!!!! . 
Selling Resalable Returns once (𝜺 = 𝟏):  
Given 𝑝! and 𝑒 in (4.22), the physical store’s profit function	(𝜋!!!!! ) is concave on (𝑝!). 
This is due to the fact that !!!!!!!!!!!! = −2𝐼𝛽 < 0. Thus, if one sets !!!!!!!!!! = 0, one gets the 
physical store’s optimal price function 𝑝!!!!𝑟 𝑝𝑜, 𝑒 = 12 𝛼𝑟𝛽 + 𝐴!=1𝐼 + 𝑣𝜆𝐹!=1𝛽𝐼 + 𝜆𝛽 𝑝𝑜 − 𝜌𝛽 𝑒 . (4.29) 
(4.29) is substituted into (4.21) to get the online store’s profit as a function of 𝑝! and 𝑒: 
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𝜋𝜀!!!! = 𝛼! − !!!!!!!! 𝑝! + !! !!! + !𝜀!!! + !"!𝜀!!!" + !!!!!! 𝜌𝑒 𝐽𝑝! − 𝐺𝜀!! −!!!!"!!"# − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.30) 
Proposition 4.4. 
The aforementioned online store’s profit function (4.30) is concave in 𝑝!, but not jointly 
concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒. 
Proposition 4.4 indicates that one may not find the optimal values of 𝑝! and 𝑒 by using 
the first-order conditions. Thus, one can deal with it using the two-stage optimization 
technique, i.e., we first find the optimal value of 𝑝!!!!!  for a given 𝑒, and then find the 
optimal responsiveness level 𝑒!!!!  that maximizes 𝜋!!!!! . Set !!!!!!!!!! = 0 in (4.30) to get the 
online store’s optimal price as a function of 𝑒, i.e., 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 . Thus, 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 = !!!!!! + !!! !!!"!!"# + !!!!!!! 𝛼! + !!!!! + !!!!!!! + !!!!!!!!!" + 𝜌𝑒 − !"!! 𝑒 . (4.31) 
If (4.31) is substituted into (4.30), then one gets the online store’s profit as a function of 𝑒. 
𝜋!!!!! = !!! − !!!!!!!! !!!!!! + !!! !!!"!!"# + !!!!! + !!!!!!! + !!!!!!!!!" + !"! − !"!! 𝑒 !"!!!!!! 𝛼! + !!!!! + !!!!!!! +
!!!!!!!!!" + 𝜌𝑒 − !"!! 𝑒 − !!!!! − !! !!!"!!"# − !! 𝜂𝑒!. (4.32) 
Now we can start the second stage, i.e., we find the optimal 𝑒!!!!  that maximizes 𝜋!!!!!  in 
(4.32). We differentiate 𝜋!!!!!  in (4.32) with respect to 𝑒, which yields the first-order 
condition  !"#! !!!"!!"# ! + 𝜌 1 − !!! !"!!!!!! 𝛼! + !!!!! + !!!!!!! + !!!!!!!!!" + 𝜌𝑒 1 − !!! −
!!!!!!!" !!!!! + !! !!!"!!"# − 𝜂𝑒 = 0. (4.33) 
One may notice that the first-order condition in (4.33) has at most three real roots for the 
responsiveness level 𝑒. Compare the values of 𝜋!!!!!  at all 𝑒 roots that lie within the range  −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏 . The one at which (4.32) is the largest is the optimal responsiveness 
level 𝑒!!!! . Substitute the value of 𝑒!!!!  in (4.31) to get the online store’s optimal price 𝑝!!!!! . Substitute the values of 𝑒!!!!  and 𝑝!!!!!  in (4.29) to get the physical store’s optimal 
price 𝑝!!!!! . 
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4.4.2  Dual-Channel Retailing System under the Nash Game  
Under a dual-channel Nash game, physical and online stores are commensurate in 
power and the market does not have a leader. As a result, the channels make decisions 
simultaneously. In this game, the performance of each store is optimized, dependent upon 
the rival’s decisions.  
Proposition 4.5  
Under infinite resalability (i.e. case 𝜀 = ∞), there is a unique Nash equilibrium if the two 
conditions 𝐻!!!! > 0 and 𝐻!!!! < 0 are satisfied. Similarly, under one resalability (i.e. 
case 𝜀 = 1), there exist a unique Nash equilibrium at the most within the feasible region if 
the two conditions 𝐻!!!! > 0 and 𝐻!!!! < 0 are satisfied. 
Next, the online store’s optimal price (𝑝!!!) and responsiveness level (𝑒!!) are found, as 
well as the physical store’s optimal price (𝑝!!!) for the cases 𝜀 = ∞ and 𝜀 = 1, 
respectively. 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 
One may set !!!!!!!!!! = 0, !!!!!!!!" = 0 and !!!!!!!!!! = 0. When one simultaneously solves the 
three equations, one gets 𝑒!!!! = !"# !!"!!!!𝜀!! !!!!!! !!" !!!!!!𝜀!!!!"!𝜀!! !"!!"#$ !!"#$ !!"#!!!!!𝜀!! !!!!!!!"! !!!!!! !!!!!! !!!! !!"#$%&' !!! !!"!!!!!! !!!!!! . (4.34) 𝑝!!!!! = !!" !!!!!!!!! !!" !!!!!!!!!!!"!!!! !! !! !"!!"#$ !!"# !!!!!!!"!!!!"!! . (4.35) 𝑝!!!!! = !!" !!!!!!!!!!!"!!!! !!" !!!!!!!!! !! !"#$%!!!"#!!"# !!!!!!!"!!!!"!! . (4.36) 
Selling Resalable Returns once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
If one sets !!!!!!!!!! = 0, !!!!!!!!" = 0 and !!!!!!!!!! = 0. One gets 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 = !!!!!!!! 𝛼! + !!!!!!! + !!!!! + 𝜌𝑒 − !"#!! + !!!!!!!!!" + !!!!!! + !"! !!!"!!"# . (4.37) 𝑝!!!!! 𝑒 = !!!!!! + !"!!!!!!" + !!!! − !"!! + !!!!!!! 𝛼! + !!!!!!! + !!!!! + 𝜌𝑒 − !"#!! + !!!!!!!!!" + !!!!!! +!"! !!!"!!"# . (4.38) 𝜆 !"#!!"!!!!!! 𝛼! + !!𝜀!!! + !"!𝜀!!! − 𝜌𝑒 −!" !!!!!! !!!"#!!!!!! 𝛼! + 𝜌𝑒 + !! 𝐺𝜀!! + !!!!"!!"# − 𝜌𝐺𝜀!! + !!!!"!!"# 𝑤𝑏 !!!!"!!!"!!"# −𝜌 − 𝜂𝑒 = 0. (4.39) 
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The first-order condition in (4.39) has at most one real root for the responsiveness level 𝑒 
within the range 𝑒 ∈ −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏 . If one substitutes the value of 𝑒!!!!  in (4.37) 
and (4.38), then one gets the online and physical store’s optimal prices 𝑝!!!!!  and 𝑝!!!!! , 
respectively. 
4.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section the relationships between a physical store’s price, an online store’s 
price and responsiveness level, and the total system’s profit in both centralized and 
decentralized systems are studied. A comparison is made between responsiveness 
decisions, pricing strategies, and total system profits in the two settings. All parameters 
for this section were chosen such that the constraints and the theorems’ conditions were 
satisfied in order to make the models feasible and meaningful. It was found that the 
customer preference for a certain channel and the different return rates experienced by a 
dual-channel retailer make a significant impact on responsiveness and pricing decisions.  
For this analysis the following parameters 𝑟 = 0.2,0.4 , 𝑤 = 0.1, 𝑣 = 0.1, 𝑐 = 30, 𝑑 = 2, 𝑡 = 4, 𝑘! = 0.2, 𝑘!" = 0.2, 𝑎 = 0.2, 𝑏 = 0.05, 𝛼 = 5𝑘, 𝜃 = 0.5, 𝛽 =10, 𝛾 = 1,5 , 𝜌 = 1, and 𝜂 = 300 were used. Additionally, a situation wherein returns 
can be resold several times in a selling season (i.e. 𝜀 = ∞) has been used. A firm’s 
physical store will pay the firm’s online store the highest amount possible for cross-
channel returns (i.e. 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑘!" − 𝑑 = 14 as per Eq. 3.29 when 𝑠 = 0). Thus, apart from 
the cross-selling opportunities associated with such a policy or practice, the physical store 
does not gain any financial advantage (i.e. 𝐹!!! = 0). 
The impact that customer preference for the physical store imposes on the prices 
of the dual-channel retailer is shown in Figure 4.1. One may compare the results of the 
aforementioned figure to all propositions given in Chapter 3. In addition, one may find 
that the online store’s responsiveness level decreases (increases) when customer 
preference for the physical store increases (decreases) under all studied schemes. 
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 𝑟 = 0.2  𝑟 = 0.2 
 𝑟 = 0.4  𝑟 = 0.4 
Figure 4.1: Effect that 𝜽 and 𝒓 have on the equilibrium prices and responsiveness level 
To proceed, a reader is referred to Chapter 3 in regard to the customer preference 
thresholds that cause all channels to be priced equally. To further explore, it should be 
noted that when under decentralization, this threshold (i.e., 𝜃 ≈ 0.5, as used in the 
example) is not noticeably affected by the values of the different return rates experienced 
by the system. However, under a centralized management with a differential pricing 
scheme, when 𝑟 − 𝑣 + 𝑤  increases (decreases), then this threshold decreases 
(increases). This occurs as a result of increasing (decreasing) the physical store’s prices 
and decreasing (increasing) the online store’s prices under all 𝜃 values, in an attempt to 
switch the sales from the channel experiencing an overwhelmingly high return rates to the 
channel experiencing lower return rates. It should be noted that increasing (decreasing) 
the online store’s responsiveness level also helps in this switch. This should be compared 
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to decentralized situations wherein competing stores have no intention to switch sales 
from one channel to another.  
One may also notice that centralized management sets a lower responsiveness 
level compared to decentralised management. Consequently, customers are offered better 
return services when their purchases are conducted through the competing channels than 
when their purchases are conducted through the integrated channels. In addition, it is 
noticed that the online store offers a higher responsiveness level under the Nash game 
than under the Stackelberg game. Indeed, the online store’s market power is lower under 
the former scheme. Thus, it can be said that the less dominant a channel is in the market, 
it should offer a higher responsiveness level so that it may strengthen its market position. 
It should be noted that this study does not model a competition in the responsiveness level 
between the active channels. 
 𝜆 = 5 and 𝑟 = 0.2  𝜆 = 5 and 𝑟 = 0.4 
 𝜆 = 1 and 𝑟 = 0.2  𝜆 = 1 and 𝑟 = 0.4 
Figure 4.2: Effect that 𝜽, 𝒓 and 𝝀 have on total system profit 
Figure 4.2 shows that when the return rate for purchases conducted through the 
physical store is equivalent to the return rates for purchases conducted through the online 
store (i.e., when 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤), then the total performance of the dual-channel retailer under 
all schemes except the unification scheme is better when customers has a high preference 
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for one channel over the other. To elucidate, when both channels are equally burdened 
with customer returns, then the total dual-channel retailer performance is symmetrical 
along customer preference, and the lowest profits occur around the center value (𝜃 ≈0.5). It should be noted that customer preference for a certain channel has a minimal 
effect on the total performance of a system under a unification scheme. This is intuitive 
since it has also a minimal effect on the pricing strategy of this scheme under the 
condition 𝑟 = 𝑣 + 𝑤 (Figure 4.1). 
However, when the return rate for purchases conducted through the physical store 
is higher than the return rates for purchases conducted through the online store, then the 
total performance of the dual-channel retailer, under all schemes, is better when 
customers prefer the online store over the physical store. Conversely, when the return rate 
for purchases conducted through the physical store is lower than the return rates for 
purchases conducted through the online store, then the total performance of the dual-
channel retailer is better when customers prefer the physical store over the online store. 
Generally speaking, the system performs better when customers prefer the channel that 
causes low return rates over the channel that causes high return rates. Thus, from an 
enterprise or top-level perspective, certain measures can be taken to positively increase 
customer preference for the less troublesome channel (e.g., by changing the presentation 
in the store to create a better shopping experience). Certain technologies can also be used 
to decrease the return rate of the channel with higher customer preference level (e.g., by 
using smart phone applications to help shoe shoppers identify their shoe sizes). 
Additionally, centralized management, as aforementioned, may use the differential 
pricing strategy and an appropriate responsiveness level to give a low return rate channel 
more appeal than a high return rate channel. 
When 𝜆 is low, then the dual channels have a low degree of cannibalization or 
customers of a certain channel do not respond well to the prices of the competing channel. 
This could happen when the channels’ customers are highly segregated. Consequently, 
customers would tend to choose another retailer if their preferred channel were to not 
meet their price expectations. It has been found that in such situations, competition 
(regardless of the channels’ dominance) generates a slightly higher total profit for the 
system than integration. When the dual channels have a high degree of cannibalization, 
then a centralized management with a differential pricing strategy will always out 
perform decentralization. This is also true for a centralized management with a unified 
pricing scheme that is under low observed return rates. In contradistinction, as 𝑟 becomes 
higher (𝑟 ≥ 0.4), all decentralization schemes tend to perform better than a unified 
55 
 
pricing strategy when customer preference for the physical store is high. Similarly, when 𝑣 and/or 𝑤 are high, then competition is better than centralization with unification when 
the customer preference for the online store is high. Generally speaking, competition will 
outperform centralization with a unified pricing scheme when the channel with highest 
customer preference experiences high return rates. 
	
	 	
Figure 4.3: Effect that different return rates have on responsiveness level 
Using Figure 4.3, the diverse impact that different return rates have on 
responsiveness level has been explored. In decentralized settings, the optimal 
responsiveness level stays unchanged when the physical store’s return rate (𝑟) increases. 
This is trivial since such an increase has no effect on the physical store’s competing 
channel (i.e., the online store). In contradistinction, 𝑣’s increase indicates that online 
customers become increasingly inclined to return purchases to the physical store. In this 
situation, fewer customers benefit from the responsiveness provided by the online 
channel. Thus, the online channel’s management reduces responsiveness level as 𝑣 
increases. Intuitively, when 𝑤 increases, the online channel’s management should 
increase its responsiveness level to enhance both sales and resalability at the same time. It 
should be noted that the system will behave as indicated above under all values of 𝜃.  
In centralized situations, no competition exists between channels. Thus, 
encouraging customers to conduct purchases from the more profitable channel is a goal 
the enterprise would work for. When 𝑟 increases, the system’s sole management increases 
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the responsiveness level, encouraging customers to switch to the online store in an effort 
to decrease the negative effect of returns in the physical store. When 𝑣 increases, 
management should decrease this level to avoid unnecessary spending on the online 
store’s responsiveness.  
When 𝑤 increases, the system’s sole management faces a question as to whether it 
should increase the online store’s responsiveness level to better handle return and increase 
sales or decrease its responsiveness level to switch customers to the physical store and 
decrease the negative effect of return. It has been noted that with the online channel’s low 
customer preference level of 𝜃 = 0.7, there is no need to increase its responsiveness level 
in order to boost resaleability. Thus, in general the responsiveness level has a steady to 
decreasing trend. In contradistinction, when the customer preference level for the online 
channel is high (𝜃 = 0.3), then the system’s sole management faces high return 
quantities. It is thus important to increase resalability by increasing responsiveness level. 
Since the management with a differential pricing strategy can better use prices to 
encourage or discourage the use of one channel over the other, it can be said that the 
unified pricing strategy has a higher dependence on responsiveness level to conduct a 
similar task.  
4.6  Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has studied the effect that customer returns have on a dual-channel 
retailer when deciding on prices and responsiveness level. Similar to Chapter 3, this 
chapter has studied dual-channel integration under unified and differential pricing 
strategies and dual-channel competition under the Stackelberg, and Nash games. Returns 
have been assumed to be resold either once or several times in a selling season. 
Through numerical examples and a sensitivity analysis the effect that customer 
preference for a certain channel and that customer return rates have on a dual-channel 
retailer’s pricing and responsiveness decisions have been studied. For example, an 
increase in customer preference for an online channel encourages both centralized and 
competing online managements to increase the channel’s responsiveness level to better 
handle a higher amount of returns. Additionally, the change in the return rates triggers a 
different responsiveness level reaction when under integration than when under 
competition. For instance, while the increase in the physical store’s same-channel return 
rate does not trigger any response from the competing online management, it forces the 
centralized management to increase responsiveness level in order to switch sales to the 
online store. Moreover, while the competing online management simply increases 
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responsiveness level as the online store’s same-channel return rate increases, the 
centralized management faces challenges. The latter must choose between increasing 
online store’s responsiveness level to better handle online returns, and decreasing online 
store’s responsiveness level to switch customers to the physical store and decrease the 
negative effect of online returns. Intuitively, both a competitive and an integrated online 
channel will decrease responsiveness when the rate of cross-channel returns increases. 
Moreover, it has been found that there is a negative correlation between the 
responsiveness level of a competitive online store and the online store’s dominance or 
market power. 
It has been found that a dual-channel retailer generates a higher total profit when 
its customers prefer a low return rate(s) channel. Consequently, when channels 
experience similar return rates, a higher total profit is generated when customers greatly 
prefer any one channel over another. When a dual-channel retailer experiences a degree 
of high cannibalization, then competition can only generate a higher total profit than 
integration with price unification when the channel with the high customer preference 
level experiences high return rate(s). Otherwise, centralization schemes always generate a 
higher total profit. However, when the dual-channel retailer experiences a degree of 
cannibalization that is low enough, then all competition schemes outperform all 
integration schemes. 
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 OPTIMIZING CROSS-CHANNEL CHAPTER 5:
RETURN POLICY 
5.1  Introduction and Motivation 
The cross-channel return policy positively impacts online stores’ sales and 
customer satisfaction, and provides physical stores with additional cross-selling 
opportunities. Nonetheless, such a policy creates disruption in the supply chains of 
enterprises (Zhang et al. 2010; Cao and Li 2015). Consequently, several important 
questions arise regarding such a policy. For example, under what conditions is it ideal to 
permit cross-channel returns? If cross-channel returns are allowed, when is it optimal to 
have physical stores ship all cross-channel returns back to online stores, and when is it 
optimal to have the physical stores retain cross-returned items for coming sales? How 
should the order quantity decisions be rectified if a dual-channel retailer faces both same-
channel returns and cross-channel returns? 
Despite an intensive effort, we could not find any paper that analytically studies 
the different cross-channel return strategies and their impact on dual-channel order 
quantities. Thus, this study has three contributions: first, we study four return strategies 
while simultaneously considering same- and cross-channel returns in a dual-channel 
retailing system; second, we propose mathematical models to determine the optimal order 
quantities for each strategy under uncertain demand; third, we present decision making 
insights by comparing the impacts of the different strategies that would help retailers to 
choose the suitable solution for their specific business environment.  
According to practice, the first strategy is that cross-channel returns are allowed 
with the condition that they are regularly shipped back to the original point of purchase. 
In another word, they are allowed without shifting inventory from an online store to a 
physical store. The second strategy is that cross-channel returns are not allowed or 
banned. The third and fourth strategies are that there is a transfer of ownership or a shift 
of inventory for cross-channel returns from the online store to the physical store under 
decentralized management and centralized management, respectively.  
5.2  Model Formulation 
This work considers a dual-channel retailer that operates noncompeting physical 
and online stores. A full refund is granted for purchases returned in accordance to the 
retailer’s rules and conditions. There is a 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1 chance that a customer of the 
retailer’s physical store will return the purchased product to the physical store. There is a 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 chance that a customer of the retailer’s online store will return the purchased 
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product to the online store. There is a 0 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 1 chance that a customer of the online 
store will prefer to return a purchased product to the physical store if cross-channel 
returns are permissible. If not, the customer will have to return the purchased item to the 
online store (Figure 5.1).  
 
Figure 5.1: A Dual-Channel Retailer with All Common Forms of Customer Returns 
Similar to Chapter 3, we assume that an item purchased from and returned to the 
physical store has a resalability rate of 𝑘!, an item purchased from and returned to the 
online store has a resalability rate of 𝑘!, and an item purchased from the online store and 
returned to the physical store has a resalability rate of 𝑘!". This Chapter examines a 
general case where resalable returns can be resold countable number of times in a selling 
season, i.e. 𝜀 ∈ 1,∞ , and a special case where resalable returns can be resold infinitely 
in a selling season, i.e. 𝜀 = ∞. We give resalable returns a selling priority over unsold 
items. It is worth noting that this priority assumption is only required for classification 
and simplification purposes. Since both resalable returns and unsold items are sold at the 
same price, the decision not to apply this prioritization will impose no change on the 
system’s profitability. 
Items are sold for an exogenous unified price of 𝑝 in both channels. A sale request 
that is not satisfied costs the enterprise a shortage value of 𝑔 whether it will be 
permanently sold or returned. This assumption is realistic since missing a sale request 
greatly affects a retailer’s reputation and its customers’ loyalty. Additionally, a returned 
item should be processed for inventory level correction and reimbursement purposes. 
Thus, it is associated with a return collection cost of 𝑑. If an item is returned as not 
resalable or resalable after the end of the selling season, then it is salvaged in a secondary 
market for a value of 𝑠. The unit’s salvage value is less than or equal to the unit’s 
purchasing cost 𝑠 < 𝑐; otherwise the profit function is unbounded. Under the third 
strategy, the physical store pays a value of 𝑐 to the online store to transfer the ownership 
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of each cross-channel return. Items that are purchased from or returned directly to the 
online store will cost a per-unit shipping expense of 𝑡!". Items that are shipped 
collectively from the physical store to the online store will cost a per-unit shipping 
expense of 𝑡!". 
Due to customer returns and the different associated types of costs, the profit 
functions are constructed using the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale 
rather than the selling price of the item. Thus, the expected revenue generated by 
satisfying a single sale in the physical store should satisfy the condition 𝑝! > 𝑐. 
Otherwise, the system generates losses by conducting the business. Similarly, depending 
on the strategy in use (𝑖), the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale in the 
online store should satisfy the condition 𝑝!! > 𝑐. We remark that 𝑝! and 𝑝!!  have their 
highest values (i.e. 𝑝! = 𝑝!! = 𝑝) when the system experiences no returns (i.e. 𝑟 = 𝑤 =𝑣 = 0). 
Each channel faces a total sales request that is random and independent of the 
other channel. Thus, we assume that the online store’s total sales request (𝑥!) has a 
probability density function (PDF) of 𝑓! 𝑥! , a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 𝐹! 𝑥! , and a mean of 𝜇!, while the physical store’s total sales request (𝑥!) has a 
probability density function (PDF) of 𝑓! 𝑥! , a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 𝐹! 𝑥! , and a mean of 𝜇!. The objective of the channel’s (or channels’) manager is to 
maximize the profit of the store (or stores) by selecting the optimal order quantity (or 
quantities). Chapter’s notations are presented in Table 5.1 below. 
Notation Description 𝒓 Probability an item purchased from the physical store is returned to the physical store 𝒘 Probability an item purchased from the online store is returned to the online store 𝒗 Probability an item purchased from the online store is preferably cross-returned to a 
physical store 𝒌𝒓 Probability an item purchased from and returned to the physical store is resalable 𝒌𝒐 Probability an item purchased from and returned to the online store is resalable 𝒌𝒐𝒓 Probability an item purchased from the online store and cross-returned to the physical 
store is resalable 𝒑 Channels’ selling price 𝒈  Shortage cost 𝒄  Unit purchasing cost 𝒅  Return collection cost 
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𝒔  Salvage value 𝒄 Amount the physical store pays to the online store to transfer the ownership of each 
cross-channel return 𝒕𝒄𝒐  Per unit shipping cost from a customer to the online store  𝒕𝒓𝒐  Per unit shipping cost from the physical store to the online store 𝒙𝒐  Online store’s total sales; where 𝑓! 𝒙𝒐  & 𝐹! 𝒙𝒐  are 𝒙𝒐’s PDF and CDF, respectively 𝒙𝒓  Physical store’s total sales; where 𝑓! 𝑥!  & 𝐹! 𝑥!  are 𝑥!’s PDF and CDF, respectively 𝑸𝒓 & 𝑸𝒐 Quantities ordered by physical and online stores, respectively 𝝅𝒓𝒊  & 𝝅𝒐𝒊  Physical store, and online store profits, respectively 𝒊  Cross-channel return strategy used 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, 𝑟𝑜,𝐷,𝐶  𝜺  Number of times a resalable return can be resold in a selling season 
Table 5.1: Fifth Chapter’s Notations 
5.3  Ship all  Cross-Channel Returns Back to Online Store 
(𝒊 = 𝒓𝒐) 
Under this practice, items purchased from a retailer’s online store and cross-
returned to its physical store should be shipped back to their original point of purchase. 
The physical store in this strategy should only act as a facilitator, and thus all costs 
associated with cross-channel returns (e.g. collection and shipping costs) are paid by the 
online store. We assume that the time it takes an item to be shipped from a customer to 
the online store by a third-party logistics provider (3LP) is equivalent to the time it takes 
an item to be shipped from the physical store to the online store after being cross-channel 
returned. Thus, we use the same online store resalability rate (𝑘!) for both types of 
returns. 
If resalable returns can be resold 𝜀 number of times in a selling season, then the 
online store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales request of up to 𝑄! 1+𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! ! = 𝑄! 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! !!! = 𝜂!𝑄!. Similarly, the 
physical store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales request of up to 𝑄! 1+ 𝑟𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑟𝑘! ! = 𝑄! 𝑟𝑘! !!! = 𝛿!𝑄!.  
For the special case where resalable returns can be resold an infinite number of 
times, i.e. 𝜀 = ∞, in a selling season, the online store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a 
total sales request of up to 𝑄! 1+ 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! ! = !!!! !!! !! =𝜂!!!𝑄!. Similarly, the physical store’s ordered quantity 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales 
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request of up to 𝑄! 1+ 𝑟𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑟𝑘! ! = !!!!!!! = 𝛿!!!𝑄!. A similar procedure was 
used in works such as Mostard and Teunter (2006) and Mostard et al. (2005).  
The expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the online store is 𝑝!!" = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣 2𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + !!! 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! !!!. 
In the first term, every sold item contributes negatively due to the shipped cost 𝑡!" paid 
by the store. In the second term, there is a 1− 𝑣 − 𝑤  chance that the item is a final sale 
and contributes positively due to the selling price. In the third term, there is a 𝑤 chance 
that the item is returned to the online store and contributes negatively due to the 
collection cost, negatively due to the shipping cost, and positively due to salvaging non-
resalable returns. In the fourth term, there is a 𝑣 chance that the item is cross-returned to 
the physical store and contributes negatively due to the collection cost at both stores, 
negatively due to the shipping cost, and positively due to salvaging non-resalable returns. 
The fifth term assures the salvaging of an item that ends up being returned as resalable 
after the end of the selling season. Notice that this term will be zero when 𝜀 = ∞. 
Similarly, the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the physical 
store is 𝑝! = 1− 𝑟 𝑝 − 𝑟𝑑 + 𝑟 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 + !!! 𝑟𝑘! !!!. Due to the similarity, a detailed 
explanation of the relationship has been omitted. Under this strategy, the decision of one 
channel does not impose any changes to the optimal decision of the other channel. Thus, 
each channel maximizes its own profit function in isolation. 
The profit function for the online store can be constructed as 𝜋!!" = 𝑥!𝑝!!" + 𝑠 𝑄! − !!! 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝜂!𝑄!𝑝!!" − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜂!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑐𝑄!. (5.1) 
Since priority is given to resales rather than first sales and the items are sold several times 
until they become non-resalable, the online store’s total sales request of 𝑥! can be 
satisfied by the quantity 1 𝜂! 𝑥!. Accordingly, the first term includes the expected 
revenue and salvage value of items that have never been sold before when the sales 
request is less than 𝜂!𝑄!. Notice that the expected salvage value for non-resalable returns 
and those items that end up being returned as resalable after the end of the selling season 
are included in the expected revenue (i.e. 𝑝!!"). The second term depicts the expected 
revenue and shortage value when the sales requests are more than 𝜂!𝑄!. The third term is 
the cost of purchasing inventory for the online store. 
The profit function for the physical store is constructed as 𝜋!!" = 𝑥!𝑝! + 𝑠 𝑄! − !!! 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝛿!𝑄!𝑝! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝛿!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑐𝑄!. (5.2) 
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The physical store’s profit function is constructed similarly to the online store’s profit 
function. Thus, a detailed explanation of it has been omitted. 
Proposition 5.1 
The expected profit function 𝜋!!" is strictly concave on 𝑄!. Thus, a unique maximum 
exists at 𝑄!!"∗. 𝑄!!"∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!"!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!! . (5.3) 
The expected profit function 𝜋!!" is strictly concave on 𝑄!. Thus, a unique maximum 
exists at 𝑄!!"∗. 𝑄!!"∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . (5.4) 
Assuming that the total sales request of each store follows a uniform distribution 
is sufficiently general to capture the effect that same- and cross-channel returns have on 
both stores. Such a generality made the application of uniform distribution common in the 
field of supply chain management (Yao et al. 2009). Furthermore, the distribution is 
bounded and tractable. Hu and Li (2012) stated that sales uncertainty for the apparel 
industry is best described by a uniform distribution. 
 Thus, the total sales request of the online store (𝑥!) is distributed between 0 and 𝑏!, i.e. 𝑥!~𝑈 0, 𝑏! . Additionally, the total sales request of the physical store (𝑥!) is 
distributed between 0 and 𝑏!, i.e. 𝑥!~𝑈 0, 𝑏! . Accordingly, the optimal quantity and 
maximum profit for the online and physical stores when sales are uniformly distributed 
are given below. 𝑄!!"∗ = !! !!!"!!!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! . (5.5) 𝜋!!"∗ = !!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!!"!!!!!!!! − 𝑔𝜂! . (5.6) 𝑄!!"∗ = !! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! . (5.7) 𝜋!!"∗ = !!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑔𝛿! . (5.8) 
Under the condition that 𝑏! = 𝑏!, the magnitude in which a channel’s order 
quantity and profitability differ from the other channel is determined by return rates and 
return processes (Equations 5.5 – 5.8). Also, one may notice that a channel’s optimal 
order quantity and profit is similar to that of a classical newsvendor model. In fact, they 
become identical when a retailer does not permit customer returns (i.e. 𝑟 = 𝑤 = 𝑣 = 0 
and 𝑝! = 𝑝!! = 𝑝). 
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5.4  No Cross-Channel Returns (𝒊 = 𝒄𝒐) 
This strategy requests that all online customers return unsatisfactory items to the 
location the items were purchased from. Thus, cross-channel returns are not allowed. 
According to Steinfield (2004), more than 90% of all examined retailers and more than 
60% of all examined department stores ban cross-channel returns. Due to the added 
constraint in the online store’s return policy, some customers may develop channel 
intolerance and stop purchasing from the online store. Thus, a fixed portion of 1− 𝛼 of 
the online store’s total sales request 𝑥! is lost. Consequently, the store loses an expected 
shortage value of 𝑔 1− 𝛼 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!  just by embracing this strategy. The observed 
total sales request for the online store is defined as 𝑦! = 𝛼𝑥!. We assume that multiplying 
the random variable 𝑥! with the constant 𝛼 will not change the general shape of the 
distribution. Such a property exists in the uniform and normal distributions. 
Consequently, 𝛼𝜇!, 𝑓! 𝑦! , and 𝐹! 𝑦!  are the mean, PDF, and CDF for the online 
store’s observed total sales request, respectively. Note that the parameter 𝛼 might be 
thought of as the portion of the online store’s customers who are loyal and willing to stay 
with the channel even when the store’s policies change.  
While the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the online 
store becomes 𝑝!!" = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 +!!! 𝑤 + 𝑣 𝑘! !!!, it is unchanged in the physical store. The profit function for the online 
store can be formulated as 𝜋!!" = − 𝑔 1 − 𝛼 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!! + 𝑦!𝑝!!" + 𝑠 𝑄! − !!! 𝑦! 𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦!!!!!! + 𝜂!𝑄!𝑝!!" − 𝑔 𝑦! −!!!!!𝜂!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦! − 𝑐𝑄!. (5.9) 
Since this strategy has no effect on the physical store, the store’s optimal quantity and 
maximum profit stay unchanged – i.e., 𝑄!!"∗ = 𝑄!!"∗and 𝜋!!"∗ = 𝜋!!"∗. 
Proposition 5.2 
The expected profit function 𝜋!!" is strictly concave on 𝑄!. Thus, a unique maximum 
exists at 𝑄!!"∗. 𝑄!!"∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!"!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!! . (5.10) 
 From the previous proposition one may find the optimal quantity and maximum 
profit when the online store’s total sales request is uniformly distributed. Thus, 𝑄!!"∗ = !!! !!!"!!!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! , and (5.11) 
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𝜋!!"∗ = !!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!!"!!!!!!!! − !!!! . (5.12) 
Based on formulas (5.5) and (5.11), when 𝛼 is higher than a threshold of 𝛼, the online 
store’s order quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 is higher than its order quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, i.e. 𝑄!!"∗ > 𝑄!!"∗, where 𝛼 is calculated as 𝛼 = !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! . (5.13) 
Similarly, when 𝛼 is higher than a threshold of 𝛼, the online store’s maximum profit 
under policy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 is higher than its maximum profit under policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, i.e. 𝜋!!"∗ > 𝜋!!"∗, where 𝛼 is formulated as 𝛼 = !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!!"!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! ! = 𝛼 !!!"!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!! . (5.14) 
Since 𝜋!!"∗ = 𝜋!!"∗, the value of 𝜋!! ∗ identifies which strategy, i.e. 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 or 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, generates a higher retailer profit. Furthermore, 𝑡!" is uniquely defined in strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. Consequently, one can easily use it for a comparison of the above-stated 
strategies. If the derivative for 𝛼 with respect to 𝑡!" is taken, then the outcome is a 
negative term as per relationship (5.15). That is to say, as the shipping cost for each item 
moved from the physical store to the online store increases, the superiority of strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 over strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 occurs at a lower value of 𝛼. !!!!!" = −𝑣𝜂! !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! !!!"!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!"!!!!!!!! ! !!!"!!!!!!!! ! . (5.15) 
Corollary 5.1: 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0 
From the previous corollary we notice that the online store will not order a higher 
quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 unless the former policy is more 
profitable than then the latter. That is to say, 𝑄!!"∗ > 𝑄!!"∗ if and only if 𝜋!!"∗ > 𝜋!!"∗. 
Additionally, due to the effect that 𝛼 has on 𝑄!!"∗, managers may jump to a false 
conclusion that it is lower than 𝑄!!"∗. Therefore, observing the costs associated with each 
strategy is essential to make such a claim.  
5.5  Perform Inventory Shift for Cross-Channel Returns Under 
a Decentralized Management (𝒊 = 𝑫) 
Zhang et al. (2010) indicated that if cross-channel returns are not offered at the 
physical store, then they must be shipped to the online store. Otherwise they could be 
claimed by the physical store through an inventory-shift process that is subject to the 
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retailer’s internal rules. Channels might have not aligned their objectives at that point or it 
might be too expensive to do so; thus each channel seeks to maximize its own profit 
regardless of the other channel’s performance. To transfer the ownership of a cross-
channel return, the physical store pays a value of 𝑐 to the online store. For simplicity, the 
physical store will use the expected, rather than the observed, total amount of cross-
channel returns (𝑄!") to conduct its analysis. A portion 𝑘!" of 𝑄!" is resalable and can be 
used to satisfy some of the sales requested through the physical store. We assume that all 
parameters and decision rules are known to both supply chain members. Therefore 𝑄!" 
can be correctly estimated by the physical store. 
If resalable returns can be resold 𝜀 number of times, then 𝑄! can satisfy a total 
sales request in the online store of up to 𝑄! 1+ 𝑤𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑤𝑘! ! = 𝑄! 𝑤𝑘! !!! =𝜆!𝑄!. Notice that the online store normally starts the selling season before the physical 
store does and most of its sales occur at the beginning of the season. Thus, we may 
assume that all cross-channel returns reach the physical store at the beginning of its 
selling season. Consequently, the quantity ordered from the supplier (𝑄!) and the 
resalable cross-channel returns of (𝑘!"𝑄!") can satisfy a total sales request in the physical 
store of up to 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 1+ 𝑟𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑟𝑘! ! = 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑟𝑘! !!! =𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" . 
For the special case where resalable returns can be resold an infinite number of 
times, i.e. 𝜀 = ∞, the ordered quantity of 𝑄! can satisfy a total sales request in the online 
store of up to 𝑄! 1+ 𝑤𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑤𝑘! ! = !!!!!!! = 𝜆!!!𝑄!. However, the quantity 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!"  can satisfy a total sales request in the physical store of up to 𝑄! +𝑘!"𝑄!" 1+ 𝑟𝑘! +⋯+ 𝑟𝑘! ! = !!!!!"!!"!!!!! = 𝛿!!! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" .  
While the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the physical 
store is unchanged, the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single sale from the 
online store becomes 𝑝!! = −𝑡!" + 1 − 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 − 𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1 − 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑐 + !!! 𝑤𝑘! !!!. (5.16) 
The profit function for the online store is formulated as 𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝑥!𝑝!! + 𝑠 𝑄! − !!! 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝜆!𝑄!𝑝!! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜆!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑐𝑄!. (5.17) 
The expected quantity of all cross-channel returns is estimated as 𝑄!" = 𝑣 𝑥!!!!!! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! + 𝑣 𝜆!𝑄!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! . (5.18) 
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The profit function for the physical store is formulated as 𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝑥!𝑝! + 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" − !!! 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!! !!!!!"!!"! + 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑝! −!!! !!!!!"!!"𝑔 𝑥! − 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐𝑄! − 𝑐 + 𝑑 − 𝑠 1 − 𝑘!" 𝑄!". (5.19) 
 In function (5.16), we assumed that the reimbursement process for all cross-
channel returns was done through the original point of purchase (i.e., the online store and 
not the physical store). Due to the similarity between function (5.17) and online store’s 
previous profit functions, a detailed explanation has been omitted. Equation (5.18) has 
two parts. The first part captures the expected number of cross-channel returns if the 
online store’s sales request is below 𝜆!𝑄!. The second part captures the expected number 
of cross-channel returns if the online store’s sales request is above 𝜆!𝑄!. Finally, in 
constructing the profit function for the physical store, i.e. formula (5.19), we considered 
several issues. The physical store will have to pay a value of 𝑐 to the online store for all 
expected cross-channel returns, pay a collection cost for all expected cross-channel 
returns, and collect a salvage value for all expected non-resalable cross-channel returns. 
The physical store will also use all resalable cross-channel returns to satisfy some of the 
sales requested through its channel. Otherwise, the profit functions (5.19) and (5.2) were 
constructed similarly. 
Proposition 5.3 
The expected profit function 𝜋!! is strictly concave on 𝑄!. Thus, a unique maximum 
exists at 𝑄!!∗. 𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . (5.20) 
The expected profit function 𝜋!! is strictly concave on 𝑄!. Therefore, a unique maximum 
exists at 𝑄!!∗, where 𝑄!!∗ is conditioned to be positive. 𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑘!"𝑄!" . (5.21) 
 When a channel’s total sales request follows a uniform distribution, using the 
above functions one may derive the online store’s optimal order quantity, the online 
store’s maximum profit, the physical store’s optimal order quantity, and the physical 
store’s maximum profit, respectively. 𝑄!!∗ = !! !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! . (5.22) 𝜋!!∗ = !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑔𝜆! . (5.23) 𝑄!!∗ = !! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! − !!!"!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!! ! . (5.24) 
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𝜋!!∗ = !!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑔𝛿! + !!! !!!!! !!!" !!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!! ! . (5.25) 
 Comparing the profit function (5.25) to the profit function (5.8), one may notice 
that the physical store will incur losses by cooperating with this strategy if the amount 
paid to the online store for each cross-channel return, i.e. value 𝑐, is more than 𝑠 − 𝑑 +𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . Under such a condition the physical store should refuse to perform the 
inventory shift or to be part of this strategy. However, it is vital that the online store 
calculate the minimum 𝑐 that will make this policy more appealing than the previous two 
policies, i.e. 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!! ∗, where 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, 𝑐𝑜 . By equating the profit function (5.23) to both 
profit functions (5.6) and (5.12), one may derive the relationship 
𝜆!! 𝑝!! ! + 𝜆! 𝑔𝜆! − 2𝑐 − !!!!! 𝜋!! ∗ 𝑝!! + 𝑠 − 𝑔𝜆!  !!!!! 𝜋!! ∗ − 𝑔𝜆! 2𝑐 − 𝑠 + 𝑐! = 0. (5.26) 
The function (5.26) is convex in terms of 𝑝!! and has at most two real positive roots 𝑝!! ,𝑝!! . Thus, the online store generates a higher profit under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 than under 
policy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜, 𝑐𝑜 , if the value of 𝑐 drives 𝑝!! to be higher than 𝑝!!. 
Consider the retailer’s profit under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷, i.e. 𝜋!!∗. It may be calculated by 
summing both the online store’s profit function (5.23) and the physical store’s profit 
function (5.25). If the derivative for 𝜋!!∗ with respect to 𝑐 is taken, then one gets !!!!∗!! = !!!!!! !!!!!!!!" !!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!! ! . (5.27) 
Notice that the sign of the previous derivative is dependent on the value of 𝑐. Since the 
physical store will not be involved in policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 if the value of 𝑐 is higher than 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , one may say that !!!!∗!! > 0 and 𝜋!!∗ score the highest profit when 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . It is worth noting that the highest value of 𝜋!!∗ requires the 
physical store to not generate any financial benefit out of this strategy.  
When 𝑣 and 𝑘!" are non-zeroes, then it can be noted that 𝑄!!∗ < 𝑄!!"∗ and 𝑄!!∗ < 𝑄!!"∗. It is intuitive to say that physical stores will have higher order quantities 
under strategies that do not include shifts in inventories. If we take the derivative of 𝑄!!∗ 
in equation (5.22) with respect to 𝑐, then one may notice that it is strictly positive (please 
refer to function (5.28), given below). In contrast, if we take the derivative of 𝑄!!∗ in 
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equation (5.24) with respect to 𝑐, then one may notice that it is strictly negative (please 
refer to function (5.29), given below).  !!!!∗!! = !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !, and (5.28) !!!!∗!! = − !!!!!!"!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!! ! . (5.29) 
This indicates that the online store is encouraged to order a higher quantity when the 
value of 𝑐 increases. Accordingly, the expected total amount of cross-channel returns will 
increase, allowing the physical store to decrease its order quantity.  
5.6  Perform Inventory Shift for Cross-Channel Returns Under 
a Centralized Management (𝒊 = 𝑪) 
It is well known that centralization is expensive and requires a significant amount 
of effort. Therefore, it is important that the enterprise realize whether it enhances profits 
or it is not vital for the enterprise. However, under this practice the objectives are aligned 
and a sole decision-maker maximizes the total profit of the supply chain. The internal 
transactions between channels can thus be excluded from the analysis, as they do not 
induce any change to the system’s profit. Thus, an inventory shift is still conducted, but 
no payment is required for cross-channel returns. The expected revenue generated by 
satisfying a single sale from the online store changes to 𝑝!! = −𝑡!" + 1− 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 −𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 − 𝑣 𝑑 − 1− 𝑘!" 𝑠 + !!! 𝑤𝑘! !!!. The total profit of the 
retailer is formulated as below. Due to similarity, no explanation is needed to comprehend 
its terms. 𝜋! = 𝑥!𝑝!! + 𝑠 𝑄! − !!! 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝜆!𝑄!𝑝!! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝜆!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! +𝑥!𝑝! + 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" − !!! 𝑥! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!! !!!!!"!!"! + 𝛿! 𝑄! +!!! !!!!!"!!"𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑝! − 𝑔 𝑥! − 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥! − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑄!   (5.30) 
Proposition 5.4 
The expected profit function 𝜋!  is strictly and jointly concave on 𝑄! and 𝑄!, and thus a 
unique global maximum exists at 𝑄!!∗ and 𝑄!!∗, where 𝑄!!∗ is conditioned to be positive. 𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! . (5.31) 𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑘!"𝑄!" . (5.32) 
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 If uniform distributions are used for total sales requests, then one may use the 
above functions to derive the online store’s optimal order quantity, the physical store’s 
optimal order quantity, and the retailer’s maximum profit, respectively. 𝑄!!∗ = !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! . (5.33) 𝑄!!∗ = !! !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! − !!!"!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! ! !!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! ! . (5.34) 𝜋!∗ = !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! − 𝑔𝜆! + !!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑔𝛿! . (5.35) 
Similar to before, when 𝑣 and 𝑘!" are non-zeros, then 𝑄!!∗ < 𝑄!!"∗ and 𝑄!!∗ <𝑄!!"∗. Next we compare the online store’s optimal order quantity under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 
and 𝑖 = 𝐶 – i.e. equations (5.22) and (5.33). One may notice that by comparing between 
the values 𝑝!! and 𝑝!! + 𝑣𝑘!"𝑐 we can identify under what policy the online store will 
have a higher ordered quantity. The latter is written as −𝑡!" + 1− 𝑣 − 𝑤 𝑝 −𝑤 𝑑 + 𝑡!" − 1− 𝑘! 𝑠 + 𝑣 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 + !!! 𝑤𝑘! !!!.  
Since 𝑐 ≤ 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , then 𝑝!! ≤ 𝑝!! + 𝑣𝑘!"𝑐. Therefore, the online 
store’s ordered quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 is at most as high as its ordered quantity 
under policy 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. 𝑄!!∗ ≤ 𝑄!!∗. Notice that 𝑄!!∗ = 𝑄!!∗ when 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 −𝑠 . In a similar fashion, one may compare the physical store’s optimal order quantity 
under policies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. equations (5.24) and (5.34). Following the above 
logic one may find that the physical store’s ordered quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝐶 is at most 
as high as its ordered quantity under policy 𝑖 = 𝐷, i.e. 𝑄!!∗ ≥ 𝑄!!∗. One may notice that 
they are equivalent under the condition 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . One may also note that 
under this condition policy 𝑖 = 𝐷 performs as ideally as policy 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. 𝜋!!∗ = 𝜋!∗. 
Next we compare the retailer’s performance under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐶 and 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. 
One may calculate 𝜋!!"∗ by summing both the online store’s profit function (5.6) and the 
physical store’s profit function (5.8). By equating 𝜋!∗in (5.35) to the calculated 𝜋!!"∗ one 
derives the relationship 𝜂!! 𝑝!!" ! + 𝜂! 2𝑔𝜂! − 2𝑐 − !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! 𝑝!!" + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑐 ! − 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! = 0. (5.36) 
The function (5.36) is convex in terms of 𝑝!!" and has at most two real positive 
roots 𝑝!!" ,𝑝!!" . Thus, the retailer generates a higher profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 than 
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under strategy 𝑖 = 𝐶 if 𝑝!!" 𝑡!" < 𝑝!!". Notice that we used the parameter 𝑡!" to compare 
the two strategies above, because it solely effects the strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. Thus, if the online 
store’s management can lower 𝑡!" so that 𝑝!!" drops below 𝑝!!", then the channel may not 
need to lose its inventory for the physical store. 
 We then consider the retailer’s profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, i.e. 𝜋!!"∗. It is 
calculated by summing both the online store’s profit function (5.12) and the physical 
store’s profit function (5.8). By equating 𝜋!∗ to 𝜋!!"∗ one may find the threshold at which 𝛼 is higher; then 𝜋!!"∗ > 𝜋!∗. 
5.7  Sensitivity Analysis and Managerial Insights  
In this analysis we compare a store’s optimal quantity, a store’s performance, and 
a retailer’s performance under the different strategies. We also derive important 
managerial insights that form general guidelines for managers running dual-channel 
retailing systems. To conduct our analysis we consider the following parameters: 𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑤 = 0.1, 𝑣 = 0.3, 𝑘! = 0.6, 𝑘! = 0.4, 𝑘!" = 0.4, 𝑝 = 100, 𝑐 = 30, 𝑡!" = 4, 𝑡!" = 5, 𝑑 = 3, 𝑠 = 5, 𝑔 = 40, 𝑏! = 300, 𝛼 = 0.995, 𝑏! = 300 and 𝜀 = 1. 
Under strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 the physical store should order the same 
quantities, i.e. 𝑄!!"∗ = 𝑄!!"∗. This is intuitive since the system does not permit shifting the 
inventories of cross-channel returns and the physical store may only assist in shipping 
those returns to their original point of purchase, i.e. online store. However, when the 
system permits the inventory shift process, then the physical store will order lower 
quantities under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶 than under strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, i.e. 𝑄!!∗ ≤ 𝑄!!"∗, 𝑄!!∗ ≤ 𝑄!!"∗, 𝑄!!∗ ≤ 𝑄!!"∗, and 𝑄!!∗ ≤ 𝑄!!"∗. This is comprehensible since 
the physical store may use resalable cross-channel returns to satisfy some of its sales 
requests. 
As mentioned before, the majority of online stores’ return policies request that 
customers return all unsatisfactory purchases to the online store, i.e. that they apply 
strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜. This in turn imposes a constraint that many customers dislike. Thus, only 
a portion of 𝛼 will conduct their purchases from the channel. If the portion is higher than 
the threshed of 𝛼 defined in equation (5.13), i.e. 𝛼 > 𝛼, then 𝑄!!"∗ > 𝑄!!"∗. Thus, one may 
conclude that the reduction in sales requests does not always induce a lower order 
quantity for the online store under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜.  
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We then compare the online store’s order quantity when the system does not 
permit an inventory shift, i.e. strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜, and its order quantity when 
the system permits an inventory shift, i.e. strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶. It is noted that the 
order quantity under any no-inventory shift strategy is lower than the order quantity under 
any inventory shift strategy. That is to say, 𝑄!!∗ ≥ 𝑄!!"∗, 𝑄!!∗ ≥ 𝑄!!"∗, 𝑄!!∗ ≥ 𝑄!!"∗, and 𝑄!!∗ ≥ 𝑄!!"∗. Although this is not analytically proven, several tests were conducted under 
different parameter sets. The notion is logical since the inventory shift strategies cause the 
online store to lose items for the physical store, and thus order a higher quantity at the 
beginning of the season. Not doing so might leave the store starving for items to satisfy 
the sales request with. Thus, it is crucial that a dual-channel retailer define the strategy of 
handling cross-channel returns prior to the beginning of the selling season, and that it 
orders the optimal quantity for a channel accordingly. 
When the system permits an inventory shift, one should compare a channel’s 
optimal quantity under strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶. As indicated in Section 5.6, 𝑄!!∗ is at 
most equivalent to 𝑄!!∗, while 𝑄!!∗ is at least equivalent to 𝑄!!∗. That is to say, 𝑄!!∗ ≤ 𝑄!!∗ 
and 𝑄!!∗ ≥ 𝑄!!∗. In (5.27) and (5.28) one may note that 𝑄!!∗ increases and 𝑄!!∗ decreases 
when 𝑐 increases. Thus as the amount paid to the online store for each cross-channel 
return increases, the store will be encouraged to order more as the negative consequences 
of such type of return is diminished. As this happens, the expected amount of cross-
channel returns will increase, which will allow the physical store to reduce its order 
quantity. Conversely, as 𝑐 decreases, the store will order less as the negative 
consequences of this type of return are intensified. As a result, the expected number of 
cross-channel returns will decrease, forcing the physical store to increase its order 
quantity. 
We next study the channel’s performance and the retailer’s performance when 
strategies 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 are followed. Under the earlier strategies, the physical store 
only assists in returning cross-channel returns to the online store. Thus, its measurable 
performance under both strategies is the same, i.e. 𝜋!!"∗ = 𝜋!!"∗. Note that there could be 
an increase in the physical store’s sales and thus in the profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 due to 
the cross-channel selling opportunity. That is to say, the online customer might return an 
item purchased from the online store to the physical store and at the same time purchase 
an item that is appealing to him or her. Such a purchase is mostly impulsive and not 
planned. According to Neslin and Shankar (2009), a physical store may experience up to 
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a 20% increase in sales if the online store’s policy allows for cross-channel returns. Thus, 
another study in the field of dual-channel retailing and customer returns might include 
cross-channel selling opportunities in the system analysis. 
Regarding the profitability of the online store and the retailer, they are higher 
under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 if 𝛼 > 𝛼, they are lower if 𝛼 < 𝛼, and 
they are equal if 𝛼 = 𝛼. Therefore, managers should pay a careful attention to the value 
of 𝛼. This value is controllable as the online store can invest in several other reverse 
supply chain options. For example, the service of picking up items from customers’ 
locations at their chosen times may increase 𝛼 drastically. Indeed, such a service may be 
costly to the online channel, and switching to another strategy could be a wiser decision. 
Thus, studying the benefits and drawbacks of the provided services are vital to the 
success of the enterprise. Nonetheless, one of the parameters that has a clear effect on the 
threshold 𝛼 and can be controlled by the enterprise is the value 𝑡!". As per relationship 
(5.15), 𝛼 increases as 𝑡!" decreases. Thus, if 𝑡!" is too small, then it might be hard for 
strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 to outperform strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. This could be the case when the online 
store performs the function of a distribution center and ships items to the physical store 
on a regular basis. Thus, empty trucks could return to the online store and be used freely 
(e.g. 𝑡!" = 0) to ship cross-channel returns to their original points of purchase. 
For the physical store to prefer strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷 over the no-inventory shift 
strategies, i.e. 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗ and 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗, the amount paid to the online store for each 
cross-channel return (𝑐) should be less than 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . If 𝑐 is higher than the 
indicated value, then the physical store will benefit more from satisfying its entire 
inventory needs from the supplier. If they are equivalent, then the store will not generate 
any extra measurable profit or loss under the strategy, i.e. 𝜋!!∗ = 𝜋!!"∗ = 𝜋!!"∗. Note that 
based on the parameters given above, 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 = 12. 
For the online store to prefer strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷 over the no-inventory shift strategies, 
i.e. 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗ and 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗, the amount paid by the physical store for each cross-
channel return should be sufficient. The minimum 𝑐 that allows for 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗ is 
calculated next. By applying formula (5.29) and using the above parameters, one gets 0.097𝑐! + 26.30𝑐 − 213.53 = 0. Solving the quadratic equation reveals that 𝑐 =−278,7.9 . Thus, when 𝑐 > 7.9, 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗. By applying the same formula and 
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procedure for strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 one finds that when 𝑐 > 9, 𝜋!!∗ > 𝜋!!"∗. The above 
outcomes can also be found in Figure 5.2 when 𝑐 changes from 5 to 12.  
 
Figure 5.2: 𝒄’s Effect on Online Stores’ Profits 
In (5.27), one may notice that as 𝑐 increases within the range 0, 𝑠 − 𝑑 +𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , the retailer’s profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷, i.e. 𝜋!!∗, increases. Conversely, as 𝑐 increases within the range 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 ,∞ , 𝜋!!∗ decreases (Figure 5.3). At the 
point that 𝑐 = 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 , the strategy performs at its full potential and is 
equivalent to strategy 𝑖 = 𝐶, i.e. 𝜋!!∗ = 𝜋!!∗, 𝑄!!∗ = 𝑄!!∗, and 𝑄!!∗ = 𝑄!!∗. According to 
our parameters, one may note that the difference in the retailer’s performances 𝜋!!∗ − 𝜋!!∗ 
is insignificant. Note that under different parameters the difference may increase to a 
significant level. 
 
Figure 5.3: 𝒄’s Effect on Retailers’ Profits	
Thus, if our focus is aimed at the total performance rather than at a channel’s 
performance, the physical store should pay the maximum value of 𝑐 to the online store. 
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Consequently, there will be no tangible profit increase for the physical store under 
strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷. This could be considered a form of channel cooperation. One would need 
to remind the physical store that the online store would also be involved in this 
cooperation indirectly. For example, cross-channel returns increase the physical store’s 
sales, as stated before. Moreover, items’ descriptions posted on the online store’s website 
would positively impact the physical store’s sales and, eventually, its profit. Indeed, many 
physical store customers have a desire to purchase certain products only after going 
through the items’ descriptions. Additionally, it is known that centralization is expensive 
and requires a significant amount of effort. Since the two strategies 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶 are 
equivalent in performance under the highest value of 𝑐, then we see no point to 
centralization. 
The rates 𝑘! and 𝑘!" induce tangible and contradicting effects on the superiority 
of inventory shift strategies, i.e. 𝑖 = 𝐷 and 𝑖 = 𝐶, over no-inventory shift strategies, i.e. 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜 and 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜. In Figure 5.4, one may notice that as 𝑘! increases the no-inventory 
shift strategies generate higher profits and start to perform better than the inventory shift 
strategies at a similar value of 𝑘! ≈ 0.525. Conversely, as 𝑘!" increases, the inventory 
shift strategies generate higher profits and start to perform better than the no-inventory 
shift strategies at a similar value of 𝑘!" ≈ 0.525. Notice that both rates, to some extent, 
can be controlled by the enterprise. For example, simple measures such as sending emails 
to customers and asking for their feedback regarding a product’s look and functionality 
may be used. A return form and a return procedure may be attached to that email. Such an 
approach might positively increase the resalability rates 𝑘! and 𝑘!". Additionally, the 
online store could be provided with a refabricating facility to fix damaged items and thus 
increase the online store’s resalability rate of 𝑘!. Indeed, the enterprise must weigh the 
financial benefits and drawbacks of such measures to better judge their effectiveness. 
  
Figure 5.4: 𝒌𝒐’s and 𝒌𝒐𝒓’s Effects on Retailer’s Profit 
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5.8  Conclusion 
Identifying the optimal order quantity through the use of the newsvendor model is 
a tangible problem in the field of supply chain management. As customers are able to 
return their purchases and a high percentage of those returns are considered as good as 
new and resalable, many retailers seem to overestimate their order quantities. Thus, 
researchers have expanded the newsvendor model to include customer returns. Today’s 
retailing businesses normally run both a physical store and an online store to meet 
customers’ desires to shop through multiple channels. The complications that customer 
returns impose on the optimal quantities of a dual-channel retailing system have not yet 
been sufficiently studied. Customers can return items to the items’ original points of 
purchase. They also can cross-return online purchases to physical stores. Cross-channel 
returns may destabilize the retailing system and retailers may simultaneously 
overestimate one channel and underestimate another. Thus, in Chapter 5 we developed 
newsvendor models that consider both same- and cross-channel returns experienced by a 
dual-channel retailer running a physical store and an online store. Four strategies that may 
be used to handle cross-channel returns were studied. The first strategy was to collect all 
cross-channel returns on a regular basis and to send them back to the online store (𝑖 =𝑟𝑜). The second strategy was to ban cross-channel returns (𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜). The third and fourth 
strategies were to transfer the ownership of all cross-channel returns to the physical store 
under decentralized (𝑖 = 𝐷) and centralized (𝑖 = 𝐶) management styles, respectively. Our 
results confirmed that selecting the right policy might noticeably increase a system’s 
performance and profitability. To simplify the analysis of the different strategies, uniform 
distributions were assigned to sales requests in both channels. 
The optimal order quantity for the physical store (the online store) under any 
inventory shift strategy is at most (least) equivalent to its order quantity under any no-
inventory shift strategy. Additionally, the order quantity for the physical store (the online 
store) under strategy 𝑖 = 𝐷 is at least (most) equivalent to its order quantity under 
strategy 𝑖 = 𝐶. If customer loyalty to a retailer’s online store exceeds a threshold of 𝛼, 
then the online store will order a higher quantity under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. 
If customer loyalty to the retailer’s online store exceeds a threshold of 𝛼, then the 
online store will generate a higher profit under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜 than under strategy 𝑖 = 𝑟𝑜. 
This threshold increases as the cost of shipping each unit from the physical store to the 
online store decreases. The physical store is encouraged to be part of the decentralized 
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inventory shift strategy if the amount paid to the online store for each cross-channel 
return (𝑐) is less than 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . However, the online store is encouraged to be 
part of this strategy if 𝑐 derives 𝑝!! to be higher than 𝑝!!. Both the decentralized and 
centralized inventory shift strategies have exact quantities and total performance when 𝑐’s 
value is equivalent to 𝑠 − 𝑑 + 𝑘!" 𝑐 − 𝑠 . 
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 OPTIMAL ONLINE STORE’S CHAPTER 6:
OUTSOURCING STRATEGY 
6.1  Introduction and Motivation 
Customer returns have a massive effect on a DCR’s business functions, especially 
on the field of operations management. The failure to satisfy customers’ orders and the 
expenses associated with customer returns were among the major reasons for 
unsuccessful e-tail attempts.  Certainly, potential unsatisfied customers may exhaust the 
enterprise with forward and reverse logistics. It is common for e-tail stores to heavily 
invest on marketing activities, while exerting much less efforts on managing customers’ 
orders and returns. Indeed, an elegant online store is useless if it is not able to deliver 
goods as promised, deal with customer returns, and still generate profit. Therefore, 
successful management of channels’ inventory levels when customer returns are allowed 
is vital for the DCR existence. 
Over the past years, third party logistics and service providers (herein called 
providers) have drastically developed their competences to support services such as 
transportation, warehousing, inventory management, fleet management, production 
management, and many others. The management of a retailer-provider relationship is a 
complex task and literature has reported conflicting results with regard to outsourcing 
(Hartmann and de Grahl 2012). However, successful outsourcing for services can boost a 
retailer’s competitiveness and improve its performance. 
In today’s market, several common inventory, logistics and warehousing 
strategies are being used by DCRs. For example, a number of firms pile their selling 
items in a single warehouse, i.e. a big store or a distribution center, from where both e-tail 
and retail stores demand fulfillment are satisfied. Such businesses include The Home 
Depot, and Wal-Mart Stores (Yan 2008). Other DCRs use two different locations or two 
different inventory piles in the same location to fulfill demand from each channel. 
According to Yao et al. (2009), Penny is implementing such a business strategy to avoid 
the intermixing of inventory items for both stores. Other firms adopt such a strategy to 
avoid the expensive and difficult coordination process between channels (Zhang et al. 
2010; Yan 2008; Berger et al. 2006).  
It is common to have selected e-tail store-related logistics and warehousing tasks 
outsourced to one or several providers. Such outsourcing strategy allows a firm to 
improve its services and concentrate on its main competency, while exploiting external 
resources and expertise. For example, around 70% of the retailing firms outsource the 
transportation needs to third party logistics providers (Lei et al. 2006). According to Min 
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(2013), outsourcing policies range from a simple per service charge (most common) to a 
real partnership with gain sharing (least common). Modern examples of this partnership 
are the alliance between several logistics providers and Sheetz Corporation as well as the 
alliance between Transplace and AutoZone Inc. According to Lei et al. (2006), profit 
sharing is the vital compensation policy that enabled the success of the previous 
partnerships. Also, Toys“R”Us had formed a well known alliance with Amazon.com to 
provide inventory management, site development, order fulfilment, and customer services 
for duration of ten years (Berger et al. 2006). Amazon.com, in this case, housed the 
inventory of Toys“R”Us in its distribution centers.  
Research on outsourcing logistical activities to a third party logistics and service 
provider has been growing noticeably in recent years. For example, Giri, and Sarker 
(2017) examined the supply chain’s performance under a manufacturer, a third party 
logistics service provider, and multiple independent retailers facing price sensitive and 
uncertain demand. Buyback and revenue sharing contracts are implemented to coordinate 
the decentralized supply chain wherein production disruption may take place in the 
manufacturing facility. He et. al (2016) studied several strategies that can be implemented 
between the manufacturer’s and retailer’s online stores. They assumed demand to be 
influenced by price, national advertising effort, and logistics service level. Jiang et al. 
(2014) investigated decision and coordination in a system consisting of a manufacturer, a 
third-party logistics provider, and two competing retailers wherein the product 
distribution functions are implemented. Cai et. al (2013) considered a producer providing 
a fresh product to a distant distributor who sells it to end customers. The product is 
transported through a third-party logistics provider where both quantity and quality may 
deteriorate during the transportation process. They assumed market demand to be 
stochastic, and sensitive to selling price and product freshness. Liu et al. (2013) 
investigated the fairest revenue-sharing coefficient for a two-echelon system consisting of 
a logistics integrator and provider, and a three echelon system consisting of a logistics 
integrator, provider and subcontractor. Through the use of profit distribution equity, a fair 
entropy function is introduced and the fairest coefficient is measured. Lei et al. (2006) 
studied the impact that coordination and pricing policies have on system’s profitability 
when the cost function of the logistics provider is concave in nature. Jharkharia and 
Sankar (2007) proposed two methodologies that can assist in the selection process of a 
third-party logistics and service provider: preliminary screening of the available 
providers, and analytic network process-based final selection. Fabbe-Costes et al. (2009) 
examined the logistics providers’ role in supporting supply chain integration and clients’ 
performance. Lim (2000) developed a game-theoretic model that examines the 
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contractual agreement between a third party logistics buyer and a third party logistics 
provider. The paper assumes that service quality and service cost to be known to the 
logistics provider only. Chen et al. (2001) analyzed third party warehousing contracts 
wherein demand on space is uncertain. A contract is set by an initial space commitment 
and it can be modified for a certain number of times. Alp et al. (2003) studied designing 
the parameters of a specific transportation contract that may be used between a 
transporter and a manufacturer. They claimed that vehicle dispatching, inventory control, 
and contract value define the contract-designing problem. Their proposed model 
minimizes the total cost of the manufacturer by considering various parameters 
combinations. Although its importance in the modern retailing systems, none of the above 
papers have considered customer returns and their impact on the interactions between a 
retailer and a third-party logistics and service provider. 
However, there is no work that has considered and compared the different 
inbound/outbound outsourcing options for the online store when a DCR faces customer 
returns. Thus, a profound task in Chapter 6 is to determine the inventory level of both 
stores of a DCR when all common forms of customer returns are allowed. This paper 
considers the case when customers are split in their preference between the two channels 
and the system’s total demand is random. It, also, investigates three different outsourcing 
policies a DCR may implement with a third-party logistics and service provider as the 
following: 
(1) Transaction-based fee strategy: In this strategy, the DCR fulfills retail and e-
tail stores’ customer demand from two inventory piles or two different 
locations. With regard to the e-tail store’s orders and returns, the firm may 
depend on its fleet to perform the required logistic activities or hire a provider 
with a transaction-based fee compensation policy. In such a policy, a dollar 
amount is paid to the provider per delivered or returned order, without a 
significant amount of upfront fee. Since this policy lacks a long-term retailer-
provider agreement, the fee is assumed to be exogenous to the system and, 
thus, there exist a sole decision maker within this strategy. 
(2) Flat-based fee strategy: In this case, the firm only fulfills the retail store’s 
orders from the traditional store. However, a provider is outsourced to manage 
the e-tail store’s orders. As a Stackelberg leader, the provider charges the 
retailer a quantity dependent flat fee for the entire selling season. As a 
Stackelberg follower, the retailer decides the order quantity for both stores. 
Since the retailer is the one making the inventory decision on the e-tail store, 
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then this strategy is similar to that of the vendor-managed inventory (VMI) 
strategy. 
(3) Gain sharing strategy: Similar to the previous strategy, the retailer fulfills the 
retail store’s orders from the traditional store and the provider fulfills the 
online orders from the e-tail store. On top of the quantity dependent seasonal 
fee paid by the retailer, the partners strengthen their strategic alliance by 
sharing the profit of the e-tail store. 
6.2  Model Formulation 
This research considers a dual-channel retailer with both traditional retail and  e-
tail stores selling a single item that is perishable or has a short life cycle. Thus, our 
problem may be modeled using the single period or newsvendor modeling technique. 
Customers  may purchase the product through the DCR’s   retail store or e-tail store. 
System’s total demand is assumed to be stochastic. A portion 𝜃 of buyers prefers to 
conduct their purchases through the retail store, while a portion 𝜃 = 1− 𝜃 of buyers 
prefers to conduct their purchases through the e-tail store. Since customers prefer a 
certain channel over another, their unmet demand from that channel is considered to be 
lost. This is rational for customers that are channel loyal. For example, e-tail store’s 
customers may enjoy making their purchases online due to store’s all day availability and 
convenience. They are more likely to switch to another online store if the requested items 
are not available. On the other hand, retail store’s customers may seek to touch and feel 
the product before conducting their purchases. Thus, they are more likely to switch to 
another product or retail store if their requested items are not available. We assume that 
there is no transhipment between channels if a product is out of stock due to the shortage 
of the selling season.  
We also assume that system’s demand is drawn from a certain distribution and in 
accordance to customer preference it splits between the two channels. Therefore, if the 
observed system’s demand is 𝑥, then the retail store’s demand and the e-tail store’s 
demand will be 𝜃𝑥 and 𝜃𝑥, respectively. Demand split has appeared in papers related to 
the topic of dual-channel supply chain (For example, in Chiang and Monahan 2005, Yao 
et. al 2009). Also, 𝑓 𝑥  is the probability density function of total system’s demand. 
Since the Uniform distribution is tractable and bounded, then we assume that total 
demand is Uniformly distributed, i.e., 𝑥 ~ 𝑈 𝑎, 𝑏 . 𝑥 = 𝑎 represents minimum possible 
total demand, while 𝑥 = 𝑏 represents maximum possible total demand. The uniform 
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distribution is general enough to capture variability in a short selling season with little or 
no demand history. This is why it is commonly used in the supply chain literature. 
We assume here that channel’s selling prices are exogenously determined due to 
market competitiveness. Thus, 𝑝! and 𝑝! are the unit sale price for retail store and e-tail 
store, respectively. Unmet demand from the retail store costs the channel a shortage value 
of 𝑔!, while unmet demand from the e-tail store costs the channel a shortage value of 𝑔!.  
Buyers are provided the opportunity to acquire a full refund of their purchases if 
the items are returned within a time-period specified by the firm. We assume the 
following: a ratio of 𝑟! from the retail store’s total demand will be returned back to the 
retail store in person, a ratio of 𝑟!" from the e-tail store’s total demand will be cross-
returned back to the retail store in person, and a ratio of 𝑟! from the e-tail store’s total 
demand will be returned back using the e-tail store’s logistic services. Due to the seasonal 
length constraint, we assume that returned items may not be resold again in the same 
selling season. However, they can be salvaged in a secondary market with a value of 𝑠!. 
We assume that an unsold item can be salvaged for a value higher than that of a 
returned item, i.e. 𝑠! > 𝑠!. This assumption is satisfactory since salvagers (i.e. secondary 
market customers or the manufacturer) can, normally, distinguish between sold and 
unsold items. Both salvage values are assumed to be less than the unit’s purchasing cost, 
i.e. 𝑤 > 𝑠! > 𝑠!. If this is not the case, then the profit function will be unbounded above. 
Due to the economy of scale, a provider incurs a lower forward/return handling cost 
compared to a retailer who uses his own fleet or pays the provider a transaction fee for 
each logistical service performed, i.e. ℎ! < ℎ!.  
Indeed, many DCRs fail in their first attempt to establish successful e-businesses 
that can balance between the services provided to customers and deal with the negative 
consequences of customer returns. Therefore, the inventory strategy implemented when 
customer returns are allowed is a vital decision to be made from the retailer’s perspective. 
This   work offers inventory related decision-making models for a DCR aiming to 
maximize channels’ profits wherein customer returns are permitted and demand is 
uncertain. For suitability, we refer to the retailer as he, and to the provider as she. Next, 
we study a centralized case where the retailer uses his own logistics fleet or uses a 
provider with a transaction-based fee compensation strategy. Table 6.1 presents a 
summary of the notations used in Chapter 6. 
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Notation Description 𝒓𝒆 Probability an item purchased from a retail store is returned to the retail store 𝒓𝒆 Probability an item purchased from an e-tail store is returned to the e-tail store 𝒓𝒆𝒓 Probability an item purchased from an e-tail store is cross-returned to a retail store 𝒘 An item wholesale price or purchasing cost 𝒑𝒓 & 𝒑𝒆 Unit sale price for retail store and e-tail store, respectively 𝒔𝒏 & 𝒔𝒓 Unit salvage value for new items and open items, respectively. Note that 𝑤 > 𝑠! > 𝑠! 𝒉𝒓 & 𝒉𝒍  Forward/reverse per unit transaction handling cost incurred by retailer and provider, 
respectively. Note that ℎ! > ℎ! 𝒈𝒓 & 𝒈𝒆  Unit shortage cost for the retail channel and e-tail channel, respectively 𝒙 Total system’s demand 𝒇 𝒙   Probability density function of total system’s demand 𝜽 Customer preference for the retail store 𝜽 = 𝟏 − 𝜽  Customer preference for the e-tail store 𝑸𝒓 & 𝑸𝒐  Quantities ordered for retail and e-tail stores, respectively 𝝅𝒊𝒓 & 𝝅𝒊𝒆 Retail store and e-tail store profits, respectively 𝝅𝒊𝑳  Third party logistics and service provider’s profit 𝑭𝒊  Flat fee or seasonal fee paid to the provider at the beginning of the selling season 𝒊  Strategy used to manage the e-tail store; where 𝑖 = 1,2,3  
Table 6.1: Sixth Chapter’s Notations 
6.3  Transaction-Based Fee Strategy (𝒊 = 𝟏) 
In this setting, the provider is not a key player, and the retailer fully controls the 
decision making process of the whole system. Therefore, there is no strategic alliance 
between the retailer and the provider. Channels’ demands are satisfied from segregated 
inventories within the same facility or from two different stores. Companies, such as 
Penny, use segregation to avoid items intermingling, and, thus, assure satisfying e-tail 
store’s accepted orders. E-tail orders and returns are shipped from or back to the facility 
using the retailer’s own fleet or using a provider where she is paid a service fee per 
delivery. Thus, the retailer optimizes two objective functions and the decision variables 
here are retail store’s inventory level 𝑄! and e-tail store’s inventory level 𝑄!.  
The revenue generated by satisfying a single demand from the e-tail store is 𝑝!! = 1− 𝑟! − 𝑟!" 𝑝! + 𝑟! + 𝑟!" 𝑠! − 1+ 𝑟! ℎ!. In the first term, there is a 1− 𝑟! −𝑟!"  chance that a sold item is a final sale and contributes positively due to the selling 
price. In the second term, there is a 𝑟! + 𝑟!"  chance that a sold item is returned back to 
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the retailer and contributes positively due to the salvage value. The third term measures 
the expected handling or shipping cost acquired when a single customer demand is met. 
Similarly, the expected revenue generated by satisfying a single demand from the retail 
store is 𝑝!! = 1− 𝑟! 𝑝! + 𝑟!𝑠!. Due to the similarity, a detailed explanation of the 
previous relationship has been omitted. For the e-tail and retail stores to generate profits, 
the following conditions are essential 𝑝!! > 𝑤 and 𝑝!! > 𝑤. The total expected profit for 
the retail store is modeled in Eq. (6.1): 
𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! + 𝑄!𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! − 𝑤𝑄! (6.1) 
The first term in Eq. (6.1) is the expected profit when the channel’s demand 𝜃𝑥 is 
less than or equal to the order quantity 𝑄!. It considers the expected revenue generated by 
the channel and the salvage value for unsold items. The second term is the expected profit 
when the channel’s demand 𝜃𝑥 is more than the order quantity 𝑄!. This is the expected 
revenue generated by satisfying orders excluding the shortage cost for unsatisfied demand 
at the retail store. The third term is the purchasing cost associated with the inventory level 𝑄!. Similarly, the total expected profit for the e-tail store could be modeled as: 
𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! + 𝑄!𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! − 𝑤𝑄! (6.2) 
Given the aforementioned expected profit functions, we find the optimal inventory 
levels as follows: 
Proposition 6.1 
The optimal order quantity for the retail store and the e-tail store are given respectively as 
follows: 𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 − 𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑤 − 𝑠!𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 − 𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑤 − 𝑠!𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  
Proposition 6.1 gives closed-form solutions of the retail and e-tail stores’ optimal 
order quantities. If all customers prefer the retail store (i.e. 𝜃 = 1), and returns are not 
allowed by the store (i.e. 𝑟! = 0), then optimal order quantity is similar to that of the 
classical newsvendor problem. Also, Proposition 6.1 shows that the variation in 𝑄!!  and 𝑄!!  when 𝜃 changes are different. It is interesting to see that as customer preference to the 
retail store, i.e. 𝜃, increases, the inventory level in the retail store increases at a rate of 
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𝑏 − !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!  and the inventory level in the e-tail store decreases at a rate of 𝑏 − !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!! . We can, also, state that as 𝜃 increases the total retailer’s inventory 
level, i.e. 𝑄!! + 𝑄!!, changes in correspondence to the rates in both channels. That is to 
say, total inventory level will increase as 𝜃 increases if 𝑝!! + 𝑔! < 𝑝!! + 𝑔!, will decrease 
as 𝜃 increases if 𝑝!! + 𝑔! > 𝑝!! + 𝑔!, and will stay unchanged if 𝑝!! + 𝑔! = 𝑝!! + 𝑔!. 
6.4  Flat-Based Fee Strategy (𝒊 = 𝟐) 
In this section, we consider another outsourcing strategy that requires a higher 
involvement of the provider. Presently, several companies outsource e-tail store’s orders 
fulfillment to a provider, because they lack the competency needed to handle small and 
unstable customer demand. Normally, those providers have validated their competency 
and acquired fairly noticeable reputation in the market. Such outsourcing strategy allows 
retailers to avoid capital investment while improving flexibility, productivity, and 
customer satisfaction. For example, HP has a warehouse in Memphis that is used to fulfill 
e-tail store’s customer orders. The management of the entire warehouse (i.e. facility 
layout, and orders transaction processing, picking up, labeling, bar coding/RFID, 
packaging and packing) and the execution of orders delivery were outsourced to FedEx. 
This form of integration enabled the retailer to better use the provider’s efficient 
operation and economy of scale. Therefore, reducing the unit handling cost for sales 
conducted over the Internet. Another way to apply this strategy is when the provider is 
used to carryout the inventory of the e-tail store in her own distribution center. An 
example for that is Global Sports outsourcing Kmart.com (Yao et al. 2009). When 
customer returns are allowed, then the provider is responsible for the fulfillment of e-tail 
store’s orders and returns. The retailer in return pays a seasonal fee that is correlated to 
the size of the business. Rationally, this business size can, also, be correlated to the 
number of units the provider will manage, i.e. 𝑄!. We notify here that the retailer still 
decides on the quantity ordered for the e-tail store. 
In this strategy, both the retailer and provider select their decisions in isolation to 
maximize their individual profits. Despite the fact that outsourcing is referred to as a 
‘strategic alliance’, the partners involved may have contradicting interests. Consequently, 
it is vital for the firm to compare between the negative consequences stemmed from 
double marginalization and those incurred by the high handling fees. We need to point 
out here that it is not always advantageous for a firm to outsource a logistics provider 
when she can be hired for a single service instead. In this study, we assume that the 
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retailer and provider undergo a Stackelberg competition where the provider is the leader 
and the retailer is the follower. The game’s decisions sequences are as the following: 
(1) In order to maximize her expected profit, the provider decides first on the flat 
fee (𝐹) paid by the retailer in response to the management of each online item. 
This is done given the expected response function of the e-tail store that is run 
by the DCR. We assume here that the provider has full knowledge of the 
parameters associated with customer demand and return behavior in the e-tail 
store. 
(2) In response to the provider’s decision, the retailer decides on the order 
quantity of the e-tail store, i.e. 𝑄!, to maximize his own expected profit.  
A similar procedure has been implemented by Giri and Sarker (2017) study wherein the 
retailer places the order size in response to the service charge set by the provider. Notice 
that this strategy has no effect on the decision process carried at the retail store. Also, the 
revenue generated by satisfying a single demand from the e-tail store becomes 𝑝!! =1− 𝑟! − 𝑟!" 𝑝! + 𝑟! + 𝑟!" 𝑠!. 
6.4.1  The Retailer’s Problem 
The expected profit for the e-tail store is formulated as the following: 
𝜋!! 𝑄! 𝐹 = 𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! + 𝑄!𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! − 𝑤 + 𝐹 𝑄! (6.3) 
Due to similarity, a detailed explanation of the previous profit function is omitted. In the 
coming proposition we find the best response function of the e-tail store (the Stackelberg 
follower) given 𝐹. 
Proposition 6.2 
The optimal order quantity for the e-tail store is as follows: 𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 − 𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑤 + 𝐹 − 𝑠!𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  
From Proposition 6.2, one may notice that for as long as the seasonal fee 𝐹 is less 
than the term ! !!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! , then as 𝜃 increases the inventory level in the e-
tail store decreases at a rate of 𝑏 − !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! . One may, also, notice that the 
satisfaction of such a condition promotes a positive inventory level in the e-tail store. 
Corollary 6.1 proofs that this is always the case under the Stackelberg competition. 
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6.4.2  The Provider’s Problem 
The profit function of the provider (the Stackelberg leader) can be modeled as the 
following: 
𝜋!! 𝐹 = 𝑄!𝐹 − 𝜃𝑥𝑐𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! − 𝑄!𝑐𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!!  (6.4) 
 The first term in Eq. (6.4) is the total seasonal fee paid by the retailer to acquire 
the provider’s logistical and handling services. The second term is the expected handling 
expenditure when the e-tail store’s demand is less than or equal to the order quantity 𝑄!. 
The third term is expected handling expenditure when the e-channel’s demand is more 
than the channel’s order quantity. Notice that 𝑐 = ℎ! 1+ 𝑟!  is the expected handling 
cost incurred by the provider when a single customer demand is met. In the next 
proposition we find the provider’s optimal policy given the retailer’s best response 
function. 
Proposition 6.3 
The optimal seasonal fee for each item handled by the provider is as follows: 
𝐹! = 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑐2 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑐2  
Proposition 6.3 gives a closed-form solution of the optimal seasonal charge for 
each e-tail store’s item managed by the provider. One may notice that this charge is 
influenced by the revenue acquired when a single online request is met, purchasing cost, 
salvaging value, shortage cost, return rates, and handling costs. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to see that customer preference to a certain channel has no effect on this 
charge from the provider’s perspective.  
Corollary 6.1: 𝐹! < ! !!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠!  
Corollary 6.1 shows that the optimal seasonal fee does not prevent the retailer 
from conducting business with the logistics provider. In another word, the e-tail store’s 
inventory level is always positive, i.e. 𝑄!! > 0, when the involved parties undergo 
Stackelberg competition. 
6.5  Gain Sharing Strategy (𝒊 = 𝟑) 
This section studies a scheme wherein the parties involved further strengthen their 
alliance or partnership. The study Hartmann and de Grahl (2012) has identified that 
sharing of benefits and burdens are among the most important factors in the formation of 
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retailer-provider successful alliance. It reflects the parties’ willingness to accept hardships 
and success. In this compensation policy, each partner has a specific role to perform and 
they eventually share the total revenue of the e-channel. On top of that, the provider may 
charge the retailer a seasonal fee for each item assigned to the e-channel. An example of 
this strategy is the long-term alliance that was established by Toys “R” Us and 
Amazon.com during the year of 2001. Toys “R” Us was responsible of identifying, 
buying and managing inventory, while Amazon.com was responsible of developing site, 
fulfilling customer orders, conducting customer services and carrying inventory in her 
own distribution center. Under the terms of their agreement, Amazon.com will be 
rewarded with fixed payments, per unit payments, and a share of the total revenue.  
According to Min (2013), due to the substantial risk involved in the gain sharing 
compensation policy, it is scarcely being used despite the possible enhancement in the 
firms’ long-term performance, productivity and profitability. Another reason that caused 
the low popularity of the gain sharing policy is the difficulty in specifying a share for 
each partner that will govern a win-win situation. Also, the performance stress exerted 
upon the provider when such a partnership is offered may leave the management reluctant 
to accept it. The aforementioned facts give this work a tangible potential to help retailers 
form a successful alliance with their logistics providers.  
We assume here that all costs and revenue associated with the e-tail store is shared 
between partners. The retailer’s share is ∅, while the provider’s share is 1− ∅. The value 
of ∅ is influenced by each partner’s market position and, thus, negotiation power. It, also, 
reflects each partner’s share in the responsibilities needed for the success of the e-
channel. On top of that, the retailer is charged a seasonal fee for each item managed by 
the provider.  
Notice that the retail store’s inventory decision is similar to what it is in the 
previous sections. However, 𝑝!! = 1− 𝑟! − 𝑟!" 𝑝! + 𝑟! + 𝑟!" 𝑠! − 1+ 𝑟! ℎ! is the 
revenue generated by satisfying a single sale at the e-tail store. Again, we apply 
Stackelberg competition when the provider is the game leader and the retailer is the game 
follower. The retailer’s and the provider’s profit functions from the e-channel are 𝜋!! 𝑄! 𝐹 = ∅𝜋!" − 𝐹𝑄! and 𝜋!! 𝐹 = 1− ∅ 𝜋!" + 𝐹𝑄!, respectively, where: 
𝜋!" = 𝜃𝑥𝑝!! + 𝑄! − 𝜃𝑥 𝑠! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! + 𝑄!𝑝!! − 𝜃𝑥 − 𝑄! 𝑔! 𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥!!!! − 𝑤𝑄! (6.5) 
Proposition 6.4 
The optimal order quantity for the e-tail store and the optimal seasonal fee for each item 
handled by the provider are given, respectively, as: 
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𝑄!! = 𝜃 𝑏 − 𝑏 − 𝑎 𝐹∅ + 𝑤 − 𝑠!𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  
𝐹! = ∅!∅+ 1 𝑏 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!𝑏 − 𝑎 − 𝑤 − 𝑠!  
Proposition 6.4 considers the optimal decisions when the compensation policy 
includes both gain sharing and seasonal fee. We notify readers that the two partners can 
extract a higher surplus out of the e-channel by centralizing the decision-making process 
and, thus, eliminating double marginalization and all forms of retailer-provider 
competition. In the fully centralized case, the seasonal fee becomes an internal parameter. 
Thus, there is a single decision to be made and that is the channel’s optimal inventory 
level. It can be easily calculated using the above stated formula given that 𝐹 = 0. 
Consequently, centralization promotes a higher inventory level compared to 
decentralization. For centralization to be applicable, retailer’s share from the e-channel 
should be lowered such that each player is guaranteed a higher surplus. 
Corollary 6.2: 𝐹! < ∅ ! !!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠!  
Similar to Corollary 6.1, the aforementioned corollary shows that the gain sharing 
contract does not prevent the retailer from conducting business with the logistic provider. 
Therefore, the e-tail store’s inventory level is always positive under such a setting, i.e. 𝑄!! ≥ 0. 
Corollary 6.3 
i. !!!!∅ = ∅!! !!∅ ∅!! > 0. 
ii. !!!!!∅ = − !∅!! ! ! !!!!!!!! !! !!!!!!!!!!!!! < 0. 
iii. 𝐹! ≤ 𝐹!. 
Corollary 6.3 indicates that as the provider’s share from the gain of the e-channel 
increases, i.e. ∅ decreases, the seasonal fee decreases. In another word, a more attractive 
compensation policy causes a lower initial payment required for services. Consequently, 
the retailer is encouraged to increase the order quantity in an attempt to increase his own 
profitability. This, in turns, will positively reflect back on both the provider’s 
performance and the e-channel’s performance, as it is yet to come in Corollary 6.5. Due 
to the same logic stated above, the seasonal fee when the provider shares the e-channel’s 
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gain, i.e. 𝐹!, is lower than the seasonal fee when the provider does not share the e-
channel’s gain, i.e. 𝐹!. 
Corollary 6.4 
i. It is always true that 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!. 
ii. If the condition ℎ! ≤ ℎ! − !!!!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!! !! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!  holds, then 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!. 
Otherwise, 𝑄!! > 𝑄!!. 
iii. If the condition ∅ ≥ !!! !!!! !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! !! !!!! !!!!!!!!!  holds, then 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!!. 
Otherwise, 𝑄!! < 𝑄!!. 
Compared to flat-based fee compensation policy, revenue sharing offers a more 
attractive partnership opportunity for the provider and leads to a lower seasonal payment. 
This low initial burden on the retailer encourages the e-store’s management to further 
increase the inventory level, i.e. 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!!. Also, strategically partnering with a provider 
allows the retailer to increase his e-tail store’s initial stocking for as long as she has a high 
logistical efficiency, i.e. low ℎ! cost. Consequently, the firm is expected to satisfy a 
higher demand from the e-channel, become more responsive, and provide better services 
to customers. However, if the provider does not posses high enough logistical efficiency 
and her share from the e-channel is low, then the e-tail store’s initial stocking may be the 
highest when the retailer forms no partnership with the provider. Therefore, inventory 
management in a system with a retailer and a provider is greatly dependent on the type of 
strategy used, and the efficiency of the logistics and service provider. 
6.6  Managerial insight with numerical analysis 
The aim of this numerical analysis is to gain additional insights with regard to the 
optimal policies. The optimal profits for the different strategies will be compared. Also, 
the change in the optimal profits will be studied under various market conditions 
particularly those assumed to be exogenous to our model. The results may generate 
several managerial insights into the avenue of the retailer-provider compensation policies. 
In this analysis, we normalize the demand such that 𝑥 ~ 𝑈 0,1 . This will greatly simplify 
the different mathematical expressions and yet offer reliable insights. The optimal 
decision variables and profits are simplified accordingly in Table 6.1 below. Unless 
otherwise stated the following parameters are used: 𝑟! = 0.15, 𝑟!" = 0.15, 𝑟! = 0.1, 𝑝! = 60, 𝑝! = 60, ℎ! = 15, ℎ! = 2, 𝑤 = 15, 𝑠! = 10, 𝑠! = 5, 𝑔! = 5, 𝑔! = 5, ∅ = 0.7, 𝜃 = 0.5. 
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Strategy 𝑖 Transaction based fee Strategy 𝑖 = 1 Flat-based fee strategy 𝑖 = 2 Gain sharing strategy 𝑖 = 3 𝑄!!  𝜃 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  𝜃 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 − 𝐹𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  𝜃∅ + 1 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!  𝐹!  --- 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑐2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐  ∅!∅ + 1 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤  𝜋!!  𝜃2 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 !𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑔!  𝜃2 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 − 𝑐 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐 ! − 𝑔!  ∅ 𝜃2 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 !∅ + 1 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑔!  
𝜋!!  --- 𝜃 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 − 𝑐 !2 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐  
𝜃2 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 !∅ + 1 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!− 1 − ∅ 𝑔!  
Table 6.2: Optimal decision variables and profits when demand is uniformly distributed between zero and one  
6.6.1  Effect of Retailer’s Share on the Provider’s Performance 
Corollary 6.5   
i. 𝜋!! increases as ∅ decreases. 
ii. ! !!!!!!!!∅ = − !∅∅!! ! !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! < 0. 
iii. 𝜋!! < 𝜋!!. 
To be realistic, we assume that the retailer’s profit is positive, i.e. 𝜋!! ≥ 0, given 
any split value ∅ . The contrary occurs, i.e. 𝜋!! < 0, when the e-channel’s shortage value 
is extremely high. Corollary 6.5 and Figure 6.1 show the increase in the provider’s 
performance as she attains a higher portion of the e-store’s gain, i.e. a lower ∅ value. As 
indicated in Corollary 6.3, this not only supported by the increase in her own share, but 
also by the increase in the e-channel’s total performance. Corollary 6.5, also, indicates 
that the provider strictly generates a higher profit under gain sharing strategy compared to 
flat fee strategy, i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!. With this in mind, she can have her mined set even before 
the negotiation process starts. Indeed, with gain sharing strategy the provider is expected 
to be more involved in preforming the different logistical tasks, however, her gain is 
expected to be worthy especially when we know that it is, probably, from the retailer’s 
best interest not to attain extremely high share. 
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Figure 6.1: Effect of retailer’s share on logistics provider 
6.6.2  Effect of retailer’s share on his performance 
Corollary 6.6 
i.  !!!!!!∅! = − ! !!∅ !!!!!!!! !∅!! ! !!!!!!!!! < 0. 
ii. If there exist a root, i.e. ∅, for the function ∅!𝐴 + ∅!𝐵 − ∅𝐶 + 𝐷 = 0 within the 
range 0,1 , then 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! on the range 0,∅  and 𝜋!! ≤ 𝜋!! on the range ∅, 1 . 
Otherwise, 𝜋!! ≥ 𝜋!! at all values of ∅. 
The concavity test in the previous corollary shows that it may not be optimal for 
the retailer to earn the highest possible e-store’s revenue share. The retailer needs to 
consider the pros and cons of having high share and high flat seasonal fee verses 
somewhat fare share and a lower fee. To find the value ∅ that enhances the retailer’s 
profit the most, the following relationship is solved: !!!!!∅ = 0 or 𝑔! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ∅+1 ! − 1− ∅ 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 ! = 0. The aforementioned expression has at the most a sole 
root, i.e. ∅, within the range ∅ = 0,1 . If found and ∅ > ∅, then it is from all partners’ 
interests to lower the retailer’s share to the value of ∅. However, if ∅ < ∅, then a 
contradicting outcomes take place when the retailer’s share changes. If not found, then 
contradictions with regard to splitting the revenue always exist and each player is better 
off with a higher share. Part ii of Corollary 6.6 indicates that the retailer should be careful 
when it comes to choosing his proper strategy. Although the flat fee strategy may seem 
quite unpredictable from the retailer’s point of view, it could be his best strategy even 
with high share allocation when undergoing the gain sharing strategy. This, in fact, may 
trigger conflict between the parties involved that could be eliminated by centralizing the 
decision process and redefining a new split that guarantees a win-win situation for both 
partners. From the above analysis and Figure 6.2, we remark that if there exist a value ∅ 
with in the range 0,1 , then there exist a value ∅ with in the range ∅, 1 . 
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Figure 6.2: Effect of retailer’s share on retailer 
6.6.3  Effect of return rates on partners’ performances and choices 
Both forms of returns, i.e. same-channel and cross-channel returns, negatively 
affect the parties involved. For example, the retailer’s profit, from the e-store, decreases 
as 𝑟! increases due to the burden exerted on the online channel. In an effort to mitigate the 
losses caused by returns, the retailer should reduce the e-store’s inventory level. 
Interestingly, the provider should, also, decrease the seasonal fee (Figure 6.3 a). Since she 
is required to exert higher operational and logistical efforts due reverse shipping and 
handling, one may think the opposite is true. Notice that the increase in the seasonal fee is 
responded by a further decrease in the inventory level, which may drastically decrease the 
provider’s financial efficiency. It is, also, noticed that customer returns have profound 
effect on the retailer’s choice when it comes to his optimal partnership setting. If the e-
store experiences low return rates, then he may perform well under the transaction-based 
fee strategy. In contrast, if the store experiences high return rates, then a higher logistical 
involvement and support are needed (Figure 6.3 b). Thus, with low return rates, the loss 
caused by double marginalization exceeds the handling expenditure paid the retailer. One 
may find that the opposite is true when the e-channel experiences high return rates. In 
relation to what indicated above, Hartmann and de Grahl (2012) confirmed that not all 
partnerships developed with logistics and service providers improve retailers’ 
performances, at least in the short run. To clarify the concept, a different set of variables 
have been used as follows: 𝑟! = 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, 𝑟!" = 0, 𝑟! = 0.1, 𝑝! = 75, 𝑝! = 60, ℎ! = 20, ℎ! = 2, 𝑤 = 7, 𝑠! = 5, 𝑠! = 2, 𝑔! = 2, 𝑔! = 2, ∅ = 0.7, 𝜃 = 0.5. 
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(b) 
Figure 6.3: Effect of e-tail store’s same-channel return rate on partners’ performances 
However, with the decline in trade barriers, decline in obstacles related to crossing 
national borders, and increase in transportation and handling efficiencies, current retailing 
systems are heading towards further globalization. Also, return rates for purchases 
conducted through online stores are staggeringly high in several documented cases, i.e. up 
to 70%. Due to the aforementioned facts, there is a tangible demand to have competent 
and responsive distribution systems that can handle an increasingly complex supply 
chains. Thus, a logistics and service provider may become an essential partner for a DCR 
in the coming near future. 
6.6.4  Effect of customer preference on the retailer’s profitability 
Hua et al. (2010) stated that different products lead to different degrees of 
customer preference for the different channels. Products that are customized, require a 
high level of examination prior to being purchased, or require after-sale services better-fit 
retail stores. In contradistinction, products that do not require a high level of examination, 
standardized, or mature better-fit online stores. They, also, indicated that customer 
preference for the e-tail store is directly affected by the services provided to customers 
(e.g. shipping lead time, customer support, technical and shopping assistance, and return 
services). When hiring a competent logistics and service provider all the aforementioned 
services are expected to improve. Thus, it is essential for business owners to understand 
that such a decision may noticeable decrease customer preference to the retail store. 
Definitely, the retailer’s profitability from the e-store may increase (Figure 6.4 a); 
nonetheless, he may suffer a decline in his total performance due to customers shifting 
from a more profitable channel to a less profitable one (Figure 6.4 b). For example, public 
acceptance for purchasing grocery goods through the online channel is increasing. To 
accommodate such an acceptance, several grocery stores offer pickup points for online 
orders. However, they have not yet taken tangible leaps towards the implementation of 
reliable logistical services due to the expected reduction in their total profits.  
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Figure 6.4: Effect of customer preference 
6.7  Conclusion 
Today’s retailing businesses normally run both a retail store and an e-tail store to 
meet customers’ desires to shop through multiple channels. Many of those retailers offer 
full refunds for unsatisfied purchases and that led to a drastic increase in customer returns 
especially in the e-channel. Customers can return items to the items’ original points of 
purchase or can cross return the e-channel items to the retail channel. Also, many dual-
channel retailers focus on their core competencies while outsourcing e-stores’ logistical 
activities to third-party logistics and service providers. Therefore, we studied three 
strategies that can be used to handle orders and customer returns under the context of a 
dual-channel retailer. The first strategy is the transaction-based fee, where a retailer 
handles all logistical activities using his own fleet or pays a logistics and service provider 
a per deliver fee. The second strategy is the flat-based fee, where a retailer hand over the 
logistical operation of his e-tail store to a logistics and service provider for a flat fee per 
managed item. In the third strategy the provider manages the operations of the e-channel 
and gains a share of the channel’s revenue and a fee per managed item. Under each 
strategy, we present a profit maximization model to select the optimal inventory level in 
each channel while considering both same- and cross-channel returns. To make the 
analysis of the different strategies tractable, the retailer demand is assumed to follow the 
uniform distribution. 
Our study shows that as customer preference to the retail store increases, the 
inventory level increases in the retail store and decreases in the e-tail store with different 
proportions. Those proportions, greatly, depend on channels’ prices, channels’ total return 
rate and the e-channel’s logistical effort. Consequently, the total order quantity for both 
channels changes as customer preference for a certain channel changes. That is to say, 
running a dual channel retailing system would not just divide the inventory level between 
the channels, but would also change its level. We, also, compared the e-channel’s 
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
πie  
1 - θ
Transaction-based  
Flat-based 
Gain Sharing 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
20.0 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
R
et
ai
le
r's
 T
ot
al
 P
ro
fit
 
1 - θ
Transaction-based 
Flat-based 
Gain Sharing 
96 
 
performance under the aforementioned strategies. We found it to be better under the flat-
based fee or gain sharing strategies when the channel’s total return rate is high. However, 
we found it to be better under the transaction-based fee when the channel’s total return 
rate is low. While the logistics provider always preforms better under the gain sharing 
strategy compared to the flat-based fee strategy, the retailer’s performance greatly 
depends on his share from the e-channel’s gain.  
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 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE CHAPTER 7:
RESEARCH 
7.1  Conclusion 
Many retailers are adopting a dual-channel retailing strategy in which products are 
offered through two channels: physical stores and online stores. Due to regulations or 
competitive measures, such a strategy allows customers who find a purchase 
unsatisfactory to obtain a full refund through a same-channel return (i.e., purchasing an 
item from a physical store and returning it to the same physical store or purchasing an 
item from an online store and returning it to the same online store) or a cross-channel 
return (i.e., purchasing an item from an online store and returning it to a physical store). 
Therefore, the objective of this dissertation is to analyze the problem of customer returns 
under a dual-channel retailing system. The main goal is to investigate the different cross-
channel return practices or polices, examine several outsourcing options for the 
management of the online store’s operations, and to develop proper methodologies of 
inventory control management, price management and responsiveness level management. 
In Chapter 3 we captured competition and goals conflict that may develop 
between stores due to cannibalization in sales, scarce resources, or tight objectives. The 
optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer with 
same- and cross-channel returns are studied. We considered two factors: dual-channel 
retailer performance under centralization with unified and differential pricing schemes, 
and dual-channel retailer performance under decentralization with the Stackelberg and 
Nash games. In this study, a channel’s sales requests was modeled as a linear function of 
a channel’s own pricing strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy. 
Due to the high number of customer returns, one of the online store’s important 
post-purchase services is the responsiveness level of its reverse supply chain. This level 
greatly influences customer demand, customer loyalty, service expenses, and return 
resalability. Also, an online store may fulfill the role of a retailer’s distribution center. It 
is not limited to a certain geographical neighbourhood and it is less constrained to area 
compared to a physical store. Therefore, it has the capability and the need to optimize its 
responsiveness level along its pricing strategy. Consequently, Chapter 4 is an extension of 
Chapter 3 and it helps retailers expand their horizon a step further when dealing with 
customer returns in a dual-channel context. In Chapter 4, a channel’s sales requests was 
modified so that it is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a cross-channel’s price, 
and the online store’s responsiveness level. While theoretical game frameworks are 
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addressed in regards to competition between channels, unified and differential pricing 
strategies are addressed in regards to integration. 
Identifying the optimal order quantity through the use of the newsvendor model is 
a tangible problem in the field of supply chain management. As customers are able to 
return their purchases and a high percentage of those returns are considered as good as 
new and resalable, many retailers seem to overestimate their order quantities. Thus, 
researchers have expanded the newsvendor model to include customer returns. However, 
the complications that customer returns impose on the optimal quantities of a dual-
channel retailer have not yet been sufficiently studied. In this context, cross-channel 
returns may destabilize the retailing system and retailers may simultaneously 
overestimate one channel and underestimate another. Thus, in Chapter 5 we developed 
newsvendor models that considered both same- and cross-channel returns experienced by 
a dual-channel retailer. Four strategies that may be used to handle cross-channel returns 
were studied. The first strategy was to collect all cross-channel returns on a regular basis 
and to send them back to the online store. The second strategy was to ban cross-channel 
returns. The third and fourth strategies were to transfer the ownership of all cross-channel 
returns to the physical store under decentralized and centralized management styles, 
respectively. 
Due to the continuously growing global recession, many dual-channel retailers 
focus on their core competencies while outsourcing e-stores’ logistical activities to third-
party logistics and service providers. In Chapter 6, we studied three strategies that can be 
used to handle orders and customer returns under the context of a dual-channel retailing 
system. The first strategy is the transaction-based fee, where a retailer handles all 
logistical activities using his own fleet or pays a logistics and service provider a per 
deliver fee. The second strategy is the flat-based fee, where a retailer hand over the 
logistical operation of his e-tail store to a logistics and service provider for a flat fee per 
managed item. In the third strategy the provider manages the operations of the e-channel 
and gains a share of the channel’s revenue and a fee per managed item. Under each 
strategy, we present a profit maximization model to select the optimal inventory level in 
each channel while considering both same- and cross-channel returns. 
7.2  Future Research 
In Section 7.2 we will consider some of the possible avenues researchers may take 
to expand the knowledge of multi-channel retailers who are offering customer returns as a 
competitive business strategy. 
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Multiple items: This dissertation considers a retailer that offers a single item to 
customers. In reality, a retailing business contains thousands of items under the same 
return policy. Thus, considering a system with multiple items would be a beneficial 
extension of this work. The decision process of selecting the ideal cross-channel return 
policy would be more realistic as it considers customers’ behaviours with regards to the 
whole retailing system.  
Multiple physical stores: In this study one physical store is considered to represent 
the offline channel. However, retailers may posses several physical stores in the same 
geographical region. Purchases from a physical store can be cross-returned to another 
physical store in the same city in a regular bases. The assumptions in this study could be 
extended to include such a notion.  
Two-echelon system: A supplier of a dual-channel retailer was not considered in 
problem formulation of this study. Therefore, it is interesting to see Chapter 5 extended to 
include a two-echelon system where the retailer study the option of retuning 
unsatisfactory items directly to the supplier. Indeed, such a return process will deprive the 
retailer from being able to resell returns. The retailer should clarify under what contract or 
agreement this process is optimal. 
Partial refund policy: Several researchers support a partial refund rather than a full 
refund policy. Such a policy can be implemented by charging unsatisfied customers a 
restocking fee or shipping fee. Thus, another beneficial extension of this study is to 
optimize the refund policy along the other decision variables in each channel. It is trivial 
to notice that return rates and total sales are policy dependant. For example, if 
unsatisfactory online purchases should be shipped to the online store at the expense of 
customers, then such a return policy might provoke customers to return items to the 
physical store instead. Thus, an increase in the rate of cross-channel returns might be 
experienced. Also, a noticeable reduction in the online store’s total sales will be observed. 
System with more uncertain parameters: Today’s business environment is full of 
uncertainties. Thus, extending Chapter 3 and 4 to include sales uncertainty could be 
helpful to retailers. Chapters 3 – 6 may also be extended to include uncertainty in the 
different return rates. Also, uncertain sales in Chapters 5 and uncertain demand in 
Chapters 6 are assumed to follow uniform distributions wherein all possible outcomes are 
equally likely. However, this may not be the case and a distribution with a most likely 
outcome will be more realistic. Therefore, future works may conduct similar studies with 
triangular or normal distributions. 
Sales distribution over a selling season: In this dissertation, resalable returns are 
those that were returned before the end of the selling season and in their original 
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packaging and condition. Since this study does not include the distribution of sales over a 
selling season, there might be no demand to consume some of those returns. The problem 
is even amplified when cross-channel returns are considered. Thus, it is helpful to see 
such an impact on the optimal cross-channel return policy. 
Dealing with returns: Having the ability to resell returns several times in a selling 
season is not applicable to a wide rage of products. Thus, more realistic assumptions and 
models could be used to better study customer returns. For example, a multi-period 
setting could be investigated. Indeed, demand range and variability along that range is 
different from a period to another as customers develop more knowledge about a product. 
Also, customer acceptance to a certain product may not be known at the beginning of the 
selling season. Thus, attempting to resell a return could be related to the popularity of the 
product especially when the retailer is limited in space. 
Stock-out substitution: One of the limitations in this study is not considering stock-
out substitution where a channel’s customers seek to purchase from the other channel 
when stock-out occurs. It is interesting to see the effect of such a fact on cross-channel 
return policies. Also, this substitution may have a noticeable impact on the retailer and 
provider behaviours, especially when customers are product loyal rather than channel 
loyal.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Proof of CHAPTER 3’s propositions 
A.1  Proof of Proposition 3.1 (Part i) and Proposition 3.3 (Part i) 
First proof must be provided that 𝑝! > 𝑐 and 𝑝! > 𝑐. Since revenue that is generated by 
satisfying a single sale should be positive and for the worst-case scenario (𝑐 = 𝑐𝑘!" +1− 𝑘!" 𝑠 − 𝑑 and 𝑠 = 𝑐), the following is true. 
From (3.15 and 3.23), 𝑝! > !!! !!! !! !!!! !! !!!!! !!! !!!"! !!!!" !!!!!!!! . 
For the worst case scenario, 𝑝! > !!! !!! !!"!!!!! + 𝑐, thus 𝑝! > 𝑐. 
From (3.15 and 3.24), 𝑝! > !"!! !!!! !! !!!!! !!!! . 
For the worst case scenario, 𝑝! > !"!!! + 𝑐, thus 𝑝! > 𝑐. 
The first condition for the profit functions is then taken with respect to the rate of same-
channel-return (𝑤 or 𝑟). !!!!!!!" = !!!!!!!!" = 𝐷! 𝑠 + 𝑐𝑘! − 𝑝! + 𝑑 + 𝑡 + 𝑠𝑘!   !!!!!!!" = !!!!!!!!" = 𝐷! 𝑠 + 𝑐𝑘! − 𝑝! + 𝑑 + 𝑠𝑘!   
For the worst-case scenario, assume that 𝑠 is as high as 𝑐, and 𝑑 and 𝑡 are as low as zero. 
Thus, !!!!!!!" = !!!!!!!!" = 𝐷! 𝑐 − 𝑝! < 0  !!!!!!!" = !!!!!!!!" = 𝐷! 𝑐 − 𝑝! < 0  
A.2  Proof of Proposition 3.1 (Part ii) 
Substitute sales functions into (3.16). Thus, !!!!!!!!! = −2𝛽𝐼 < 0  !!!!!!!!! = −2𝛽𝐽 < 0  !!!!!!!!!! = !!!!!!!!!! = 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽   !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! − !!!!!!!!!! ! = 4𝛽!𝐼𝐽 − 𝛾! 𝐼 + 𝐽 !. 
Thus, if 4𝛽!𝐼𝐽 ≥ 𝛾! 𝐼 + 𝐽 !, then the function is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑝!. 
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!!!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝!! = !"!!!!!!! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! !  !!!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝!! = !"!!!!!!! !!! !!"!! !!! !!! !"!!!!!!!!!"!!!!! !!! !  
A.3  Proof of Proposition 3.2 
Substitute sales functions into (3.16) with 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝. Thus, !!!!!!!! = −2 𝛽 − 𝛾 𝐼 + 𝐽 < 0. 
Thus, the profit function is strictly concave in 𝑝. Therefore,  !!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝!! = !! !!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!! . 
A.4  Proof of Proposition 3.3 (Part ii) 
Substitute sales functions into (3.25) and (3.26). Thus, 
Given 𝑝! 
From (3.26), !!!!!!!!!! = −2𝛽𝐼 < 0.  Thus, 𝜋!!! is concave in 𝑝!. !!!!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝!! 𝑝! = !! !!! + !!! + !!!"!" + !! 𝑝!  
After substituting the value of 𝑝!! 𝑝!  into (3.25), !!!!!!!!!! = ! !!!!!!! < 0 because 𝛽 ≥ 𝛾. 
Thus, 𝜋!!! is concave in 𝑝! and there exist a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. !!!!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝!! = !!!! + !!!!!!!!! + !!!! !!!!!! + !!!"!! !!!!!! + !!!!!!! !!!!!!   
Substitute 𝑝!! into 𝑝!! 𝑝!  gives 𝑝!! = !! !!! + !!! + !!!!!" + !!!!!!!!! + !!!!!! !!!!!! + !!!!!! !!!!!! + !!!!!!!" !!!!!! + !!!"!"   
A.5  Proof of Proposition 3.4 
Substitute sales functions into (3.25) and (3.26). Thus, !!!!!!!!!! = −2𝐼𝛽 < 𝑜 !!!!!!!!!! = −2𝐽𝛽 < 𝑜  !!!!!!!!!!!! = 𝐽𝛾  !!!!!!!!!!!! = 𝐼𝛾  !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! − !!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!! = 𝐼𝐽 4𝛽! − 𝛾! > 0  
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Since 𝛽 > 𝛾, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the game. !!!!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝! 𝑝! = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"   !!!!!!!! = 0, thus 𝑝! 𝑝! = !!!!!!!!!!!!!!"   
By simultaneously solving the two equations, an equilibrium point is reached. Thus, 𝑝!! = !!!!!!! 2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! + !!!!!!! + !!!!!! + !!"!!!! − !!!!!   𝑝!! = !!!!!!! 2𝛽𝛼! + 𝛾𝛼! + !!!!!! + !!!!! + !!!!!! . 
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Appendix B. Proof of CHAPTER 4’s propositions 
B.1  Proof of Proposition 4.1 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 
Substitute sales function into (4.7). Thus, 
𝐻 !!!!! =
!!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!
= −2𝛽𝐽 𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 −𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 𝜌𝐽𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 −2𝛽𝐼 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼−𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 𝜌𝐽 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼 −𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐   
!!! !!!!!!!! = −2𝛽𝐽 < 0   !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! = 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 !  𝐻 !!!!! = −𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 4𝛽!𝐽𝐼 − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! − 2𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐽 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼 + 2𝛽 𝐽 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐼 ! + 𝐼 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝜌𝐽 !   
Thus, under the conditions 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! > 0 and 𝐻 !!!!! < 0 the profit function is 
strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝!, 𝑝! and 𝑒. As stated earlier, the value of 𝜂 can be 
associated with the cost of signing new contracts, hiring more employees, and/or 
incorporating more reliable technologies. Consequently, it is realistic that 𝜂 will derive 
the value of 𝐻 !!!!!  to be negative. 
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
Substitute sales function into (4.6). Thus, 
𝐻 !!!!! =
!!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!
= −2𝛽𝐽 𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 − !"#$!!!"!!"# ! + 𝜌𝐽𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 −2𝛽𝐼 !"#$!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌𝐼− !"#$!!!"!!"# ! + 𝜌𝐽 !"#$!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌𝐼 −𝜂 − !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! + !!"#$!!!"!!"# !   !!! !!!!!!!! = −2𝛽𝐽 < 0   !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! = 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 !  𝐻 !!!!! =−𝜂 − !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! + !!"#$!!!"!!"# ! 4𝛽!𝐽𝐼 − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! − 2𝜆 𝐽 + 𝐼 !"#$!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌𝐼 !"#$!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌𝐼 + 2𝛽 𝐽 !"#$!!!"!!"# ! −𝜌𝐼 ! + 𝐼 !"#$!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌𝐽 !   
It is required that 4𝐼𝐽𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝐽 + 𝐼 ! > 0. Also, if 𝐷! is set to be zero and 𝐻 !!!!!  is 
calculated to be negative for all values of 𝑒 ∈ −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏 , then profit function is 
strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝!, 𝑝! and 𝑒 within the feasible region. Since the value of 𝜂 
is normally high, the above conditions are satisfied naturally when virtual system 
parameters are used. 
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B.2  Proof of Proposition 4.2 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 
Substitute sales function into (4.7), and set 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝. Thus, 
𝐻 !!!!! = !!! !!!!!!! !!! !!!!!"!#!!! !!!!!"!# !!! !!!!!!! = −2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 −𝑤𝑏 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝑐 − 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽−𝑤𝑏 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝑐 − 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽 −𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐   !!! !!!!!!! = −2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 < 0   𝐻 !!!!! = 2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 𝜂 − 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽 !  
Thus, under the condition 𝐻 !!!!! > 0 the profit function is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒.  
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
Substitute sales function into (4.6), and set 𝑝! = 𝑝! = 𝑝. Thus, 
𝐻!!!!! = !!! !!!!!!! !!! !!!!!"!#!!! !!!!!"!# !!! !!!!!!! = −2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 −
!" !!! !!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽− !" !!! !!!!"!!"# ! − 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽 −𝜂 − !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! + !!"#$!!!"!!"# !   !!! !!!!!!! = −2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 < 0   𝐻!!!!! = 2 𝛽 − 𝜆 𝐼 + 𝐽 𝜂 + !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! − !!"#$!!!"!!"# ! − !!! !"#!!!"!!"# ! + 𝜌 𝐼 − 𝐽 !  
If 𝐷! is set to be zero and 𝐻!!!!!  is calculated to be positive for all values 𝑒 ∈ −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏 , then the profit function is strictly and jointly concave in 𝑝 and 𝑒 
within the feasible region. 
B.3  Proof of Proposition 4.3 
From (4.26).  
𝐻!!!! = !!! !!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!! =
−𝐽 !!!!!!!  − !"# !!!!!!!! + 𝐽𝜌 1 − !!! − !"# !!!!!!!! + 𝐽𝜌 1 − !!! −𝜂 + 𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 !!!!!   !!! !!!!!!!!! = −𝐽 !!!!!!!  < 0  𝐻!!!! = 𝐽 !!!!!!!  𝜂 − 𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 !!!!! − !"# !!!!!!!! − 𝐽𝜌 1 − !!! !  
Thus, under the conditions 𝐻!!!! > 0 the online store’s profit function 𝜋 !!!!!  is strictly 
and jointly concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒.  
B.4  Proof of Proposition 4.4 
From (4.30):  
𝐻!!!! = !!! !!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!! =
−𝐽 !!!!!!!  − !"# !!!!!!!! !!!"!!"# ! + !" !!!!!!− !"# !!!!!!!! !!!"!!"# ! + !" !!!!!! !"#$ !!!!! !!!"!!"# ! − 𝜂 −𝛼! − 𝑝! !!!!!!!! + !! !!! + !!!!! + !"!!!!!" + !" !!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!"!!"# !   
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!!! !!!!!!!!! = −𝐽 !!!!!!!  < 0  𝐻!!!! = 𝐽 !!!!!!!  𝜂 + 𝛼! − 𝑝! !!!!!!!! + !! !!! + !!!!! + !"!!!!!" + !" !!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! − !"#$ !!!!! !!!"!!"# ! − !"# !!!!!!!! !!!"!!"# ! −!" !!!!!! !  
If 𝑝! is high enough, then 𝐻!!!!  could be negative. Thus, the online store’s profit 
function 𝜋!!!!!  is indefinite with respect to 𝑝! and 𝑒 and hence is not strictly and jointly 
concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒. 
B.5  Proof of Proposition 4.5 
Selling Resalable Returns Infinitely (𝜺 = ∞) 
Substitute sales functions into (4.19) and (4.20). Thus, 
𝐻!!!! =
!!! !!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!" !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!"!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!" !!! !!!!!!!!!
= −2𝐽𝛽 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 𝐽𝜆𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 −𝜂 + 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐𝐼𝜆 −𝐼𝜌 −2𝐼𝛽   
!!! !!!!!!!!! = −2𝐽𝛽 < 0   !!! !!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!! = 𝐻!!!! = 2𝐽𝛽 𝜂 − 2𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 − 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 !  !!! !!!!!!!!! = −2𝐼𝛽 < 0  𝐻!!!! = −𝐼𝐽 4𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝜂 + 𝜌𝜆 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 2𝜆𝑤𝑏𝑐 + 2𝐼𝐽𝛽𝜌𝑤𝑏𝑐 4𝛽 − 𝜆 + 2𝐼𝛽 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐 ! + 𝐼𝜆!𝑤𝑏𝑐 𝐽𝜌 − 𝛽𝑤𝑏𝑐   
If 𝐻!!!! > 0, then the online store’s profit function is concave on the store’s own 
decision variables. Intuitively, the physical store’s profit function is concave on the 
store’s own decision variable. If 𝐻!!!! < 0, then there exist a unique Nash equilibrium.   
Selling Resalable Returns Once (𝜺 = 𝟏) 
Substitute sales functions (4.21) and (4.22). Thus, 
𝐻!!!! =
!!! !!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!" !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!"!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!" !!! !!!!!!!!!
= −2𝐽𝛽 𝐽𝜌 − !"#$!!!"!!"# ! 𝐽𝜆𝐽𝜌 − !"#$!!!"!!"# ! −𝜂 − !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! + !!"#$!!!"!!"# ! !"#$!!!"!!"# !𝐼𝜆 −𝐼𝜌 −2𝐼𝛽   
!!! !!!!!!!!! = −2𝐽𝛽 < 0   !!! !!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!"!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!! !!!!!!!! = 𝐻!!!! = 2𝐽𝛽 𝜂 + !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! − !!"#$!!!"!!"# ! − 𝐽𝜌 − !"#$!!!"!!"# !
!   
!!! !!!!!!!!! = −2𝐼𝛽 < 0   𝐻!!!! =−𝐼𝐽 4𝛽! − 𝜆! 𝜂 + !!!!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! + 𝜆𝜌 𝐽𝜌 + !"# !!!!!!!"!!"# ! + !!"#$%&' !!!!!!!"!!"# ! + 2𝐼𝛽𝐽𝜌 − !"#$ !!!!!!!!!"!!"# ! 𝐽𝜌 − !"#$!!!"!!"# !   
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If 𝐷! is set to be zero and 𝐻!!!!  is calculated to be positive for all values 𝑒 ∈ −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏 , then the online store’s profit function is strictly and jointly 
concave in 𝑝! and 𝑒 within the feasible region. Also, the physical store’s profit function is 
concave in 𝑝!. If 𝐻!!!! < 0 under all values 𝑒 ∈ −𝑎 𝑏 , 1− 𝑎 𝑏  and 𝐷! = 0, then 
there exist a unique Nash equilibrium at the most within the feasible region. 
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Appendix C. Proof of CHAPTER 5’s propositions and corollaries 
C.1  Proof of Proposition 5.1 
The profit function (5.1) is reformulated as: 𝜋!!" 𝑄! = 𝑝!!" − !!! 𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝!!" + 𝑔 − !!! 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! +𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!!   
Then, !!!!"!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!!   !!!!!"!!!! = −𝜂! 𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜂!𝑄! . Since 𝑝!!" > 𝑠 and 𝜂! ≥ 1, then !!!!!"!!!! < 0 
A unique optimal solution for profit function (5.1) exists. If !!!!!!!! = 0, then  𝑄!!"∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!"!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!!   
Additionally, profit function (5.2) is reformulated as 𝜋!!" 𝑄! = 𝑝! − !!! 𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝! + 𝑔 − !!! 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝑝!𝛿! +𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!!   
Then, !!!!"!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! , and !!!!!"!!!! = −𝛿! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿!𝑄! . Since 𝑝! > 𝑠 and 𝛿! ≥ 1, then !!!!!"!!!! < 0  
A unique optimal solution for profit function (5.2) exists. If !!!!"!!! = 0, then  𝑄!!"∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!! !!!   
C.2  Proof of Proposition 5.2 
The profit function (5.5) is reformulated as: 𝜋!!" 𝑄! =𝑝!!" − !!! 𝛼 − 𝑔 1− 𝛼 𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝!!" + 𝑔 − !!! 𝑦!𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦!!!!!! +𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦!!!!!!   
Then, 
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!!!!"!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑦! 𝑑𝑦!!!!!! , and !!!!!"!!!! = −𝜂! 𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜂!𝑄! . Since 𝑝!!! > 𝑠 and 𝜂! ≥ 1, then !!!!!"!!!! < 0. 
A unique optimal solution for profit function (5.5) exists. If !!!!"!!! = 0, then  𝑄!!"∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!"!!! !!!!!!"!!! !!!   
C.3  Proof of Corollary 5.1 
For 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0 to hold true, then from (5.14) the relationship 𝑝!!" ≥ 𝑝!!" is true. 
Thus, 𝑥 = 𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂! ≥ 𝑦 = 𝑝!!"𝜂! + 𝑔𝜂!. Based on 𝑥 and 𝑦 values, equation (5.13) 
can be rewritten as: 𝛼 = !!! !!!!!! !!! ≤ 1. The previous relationship is only satisfied when 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦. That is a contradiction with our previous assumption. Thus, 1 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 0 at all 
reasonable values. 
C.4  Proof of Proposition 5.3 
The profit function (5.7) is reformulated as: 𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝑝!! − !!! 𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! − 𝑝!! + 𝑔 − !!! 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝑝!!𝜆! +𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!!   
Then, !!!!!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!!𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! , and !!!!!!!!! = −𝜆! 𝑝!!𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆!𝑄! < 0. Since 𝑝!! > 𝑠 and 𝜆! ≥ 1, then !!!!!!!!! < 0. 
A unique optimal solution for the profit function (5.7) exists. If !!!!!!! = 0, then  𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!   
The profit function (5.9) is reformulated as: 𝜋!! 𝑄! =𝑝! − !!! 𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 − 𝑑 𝑄!" −𝑝! + 𝑔 − !!! 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" +𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!!𝑄!" 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!"   
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!!!!!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" , and !!!!!!!!! = −𝛿! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" . Since 𝑝! > 𝑠 and 𝛿! ≥ 1, then !!!!!!!!! < 0. 
A unique optimal solution for the profit function (5.9) exists. If !!!!!!! = 0, then 𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!! !!! − 𝑘!"𝑄!"  
C.5  Proof of Proposition 5.4 
The profit function (5.12) is reformulated as: 𝜋! 𝑄! ,𝑄! = 𝑝!! − !!! 𝜇! + 𝑝! − !!! 𝜇! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑠 − 𝑐 𝑄! + 𝑠𝑘!"𝑄!" −𝑝!! + 𝑔 − !!! 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝑝!!𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! − 𝑝! + 𝑔 −!!! 𝑥!𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" +𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!"  𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" . 
Then,  !!!!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" , !!!!!!!! = −𝛿! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" , !!!!!! = 𝑠 − 𝑐 + 𝑣𝑘!"𝜆!𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! + 𝑝!!𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! +𝑣𝑘!"𝜆! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" , and !!!!!!!! =−𝜆! 𝑝!!𝜆! + 𝑔𝜆! + 𝑠𝑣𝑘!"𝜆! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆!𝑄! −𝑣𝑘!"𝜆!! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" +𝛿!𝑘!"𝑣 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! ! 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" . 
Since 𝑝!  & 𝑝!! > 𝑠 and 𝛿!  & 𝜆! ≥ 1, then !!!!!!!! < 0 & !!!!!!!! < 0. 
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Also, !!!!!!!!!! = −𝑣𝑘!"𝜆!𝛿! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!!!! . 
Thus, !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! − !!!!!!!!!! ! = 𝛿!𝜆! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝜆!𝑄! 𝑓! 𝛿! 𝑄! + 𝑘!"𝑄!" 𝑝!!𝜆! +𝑔𝜆! + 𝑠𝑣𝑘!"𝜆! − 𝑠 + 𝑣𝑘!"𝜆! 𝑝!𝛿! + 𝑔𝛿! − 𝑠 𝑓! 𝑥! 𝑑𝑥!!!! !!!!!"!!" . 
Since !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!! − !!!!!!!!!! !is positive, then the profit function is strictly and jointly 
concave on 𝑄! and 𝑄!, and a unique global maximum exists. 
If !!!!!! = !!!!!! = 0, then  𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!! !!!!!!!! !!! − 𝑘!"𝑄!" and 𝑄!!∗ = !!! 𝐹!!! !!!!!!!!!"!! !!!!!!!!!!!!"!! !!! . 
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Appendix D. Proof of CHAPTER 6’s propositions and corollaries 
D.1  Proof of Proposition 6.1 
We can rework function (6.1) to be as follows: 𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝜃 𝑝!! − 𝑠! !!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑄! + !!!!!!!!!! !!! 2𝑏𝑄! − !!!! − 𝜃𝑏! . 
Thus, !!!!!!!!! = − !!!!!!!!!! !!! < 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄!. By solving !!!!!!! =0, one may find the optimal inventory level 𝑄!!. 
Also, we can rework function (6.2) to be as follows: 𝜋!! 𝑄! = 𝜃 𝑝!! − 𝑠! !!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! 𝑄! + !!!!!!!!!! !!! 2𝑏𝑄! − !!!! − 𝜃𝑏! . 
Thus, !!!!!!!!! = − !!!!!!!!!! !!! < 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄!. By solving !!!!!!! =0, one may find the optimal inventory level 𝑄!!. 
D.2  Proof of Proposition 6.2 
For the e-tail store decision we rewrite equation (6.3) as the following: 𝜋!! 𝑄! 𝐹 = 𝜃 𝑝!! − 𝑠! !!!! − 𝑤 + 𝐹 − 𝑠! 𝑄! + !!!!!!!!!! !!! 2𝑏𝑄! − !!!! − 𝜃𝑏! . 
Given 𝐹, !!!!!!!!! = − !!!!!!!!!! !!! < 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄!. By 
solving !!!!!!! = 0, one may find the best response function for the e-tail store 𝑄!!. 
D.3  Proof of Proposition 6.3 
Equation (6.4) can be rewritten as 𝜋!! 𝐹 = 𝑄!𝐹 − 𝜃𝑐𝜇 − !! !!! 2𝑏𝑄! − !!!! − 𝜃𝑏! . 
Thus, !!!!!!!! = −2 ! !!!!!!!!!!!! ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − !! . Knowing the following: 𝑐 = ℎ! 1+ 𝑟!  
and ℎ! > ℎ!, one may conclude that 𝑝!! − !! > 𝑝!! > 𝑤 > 𝑆!. Therefore, !!!!!!!! < 0 and the 
function is strictly concave in 𝐹. By solving !!!!!" = 0, one may find the optimal seasonal 
fee 𝐹!. 
D.4  Proof of Corollary 6.1 
We assume the opposite is true, thus 𝐹! > ! !!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! . By substituting the 
value of 𝐹! in the previous inequality and performing basic algebra we get !!!! <!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!. Since 𝑐 = ℎ! 1+ 𝑟!  and ℎ! > ℎ!, thus, 𝑝!! − 𝑐 > 𝑝!! > 𝑤 > 𝑆!. Thus, 
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!!!! ≥ 1, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! < 1. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction and Corollary 6.1 is 
always true. 
D.5  Proof of Proposition 6.4 
The e-tail channel’s profit function, i.e. equation (6.5), can be rewritten as: 𝜋!" = 𝑝!! − 𝑠! 𝜃𝜇 + 𝑠! − 𝑤 𝑄! + !!!!!!!!!! !!! 2𝑏𝑄! − !!!! − 𝑏!𝜃 . 
Given 𝐹, !!!!!!!!! = − ∅! !!!!!!!!!!!! < 0 and the function is strictly concave in 𝑄!. By 
solving !!!!!!! = 0, one may find the best response function for the e-tail store 𝑄!!. 
Substitute the value of 𝑄!! in the function 𝜋!!. Since, !!!!!!!! = − ! !!! ∅!!∅! !!!!!!!!! < 0, then 
function is strictly concave in 𝐹. By solving !!!!!" = 0, one may find the optimal seasonal 
fee 𝐹!. 
D.6  Proof of Corollary 6.2 
We assume the opposite is true, thus 𝐹! > ∅ ! !!!!!!!!!!!! − 𝑤 − 𝑠! . By substituting 
the value of 𝐹! in the previous inequality and performing basic algebra we get ∅ > ∅+ 1. 
Therefore, there is a contradiction and Corollary 6.2 is always true. 
D.7  Proof of Corollary 6.3 
We proof this corollary by contradiction. Thus, assume that the opposite is true, i.e. 𝐹! ≥ 𝐹!. Since !!!!∅  is positive, then 𝐹! will have its highest value at ∅ = 1. By substituting 
the values of 𝐹! and 𝐹! into the inequality 𝐹! ≥ 𝐹! when ∅ = 1, one may find the 
following relationship: 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − !! ≥ 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! + !!!! !!! !!! . Since 𝑝!! ≥ 𝑝!!, 
then it is a necessity that 𝐿𝐻𝑆 ≤ 𝑅𝐻𝑆, and, therefor, the inequality 𝐹! ≤ 𝐹! always holds 
true.  
D.7  Proof of Corollary 6.4 (Part ii) 
We can easily proof this corollary by contradiction. Assume that the opposite is true, i.e. 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!!. Since !!!!!∅  is negative, then 𝑄!! will have its lowest value at ∅ = 1. By 
substituting the values of 𝑄!! and 𝑄!! into the inequality 𝑄!! ≥ 𝑄!! when ∅ = 1, one may 
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find the following relationship: 𝑏 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 < −𝑎 𝑤 − 𝑠! . It is trivial to see that 
this is not true and, thus, the inequality 𝑄!! ≤ 𝑄!! always holds true.  
D.8  Proof of Corollary 6.5 (Part i) 
We assume that 𝜋!! ≥ 0 under all values of ∅ = 0,1 . That is to say the e-tail store’s 
shortage value is not unrealistically high, i.e. 𝑔! < 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 ! 4 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! . 
Thus, !!!!!∅ = !! 𝑔! − !!!!!!!! !∅!! ! !!!!!!!!! < 0. 
D.9  Proof of Corollary 6.5 (Part ii) 
Under the above condition, we can easily use contradiction to prove that 𝜋!! < 𝜋!!. We 
assume the opposite is true, i.e. 𝜋!! > 𝜋!!. Since !!!!!∅ < 0, then 𝜋!! will have its lowest 
value at ∅ = 1. Substituting ∅ = 1 into the relationship 𝜋!! > 𝜋!! and performing simple 
algebraic manipulation leads to 2 < 1. That is a contradiction and, thus, our statement is 
correct. 
D.10  Proof of Corollary 6.6 
We know that 𝜋!! is concave on ∅. Also, we can easily prove that 𝜋!! ≥ 𝜋!! at ∅ = 1. 
Assume the opposite is true and substitute ∅ = 1 into the relationship 𝜋!! ≤ 𝜋!! to get 1+ 𝑟! ℎ! ! ≤ 0. That is a contradiction and, thus, our statement is true. We now set 𝜋!! = 𝜋!! to find the formula ∅!𝐴 + ∅!𝐵 − ∅𝐶 + 𝐷 = 0. Since 𝜕𝜋!! 𝜕∅ < 0 and 𝜕𝜋!! 𝜕∅ = 0, the previous formula has at the most a single root that satisfies the 
condition 0 ≤ ∅ ≤ 1 where;  𝐴 = 𝑔! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐 !  𝐵 = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 𝑔! 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐 ! + 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠!   𝐶 = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! + 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! ! + 𝑔! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 2𝑝!! +2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐 !  𝐷 = 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑤 ! 𝑝!! + 𝑔! − 𝑠! − 𝑔! 2𝑝!! + 2𝑔! − 2𝑠! − 𝑐 !   
 
  
115 
 
REFERENCES 
Akcay, Y., Boyaci, T., and Zhang, D. (2013). Selling with Money-Back Guarantees: The 
Impact on Prices, Quantities, and Retail Profitability. Production and Operations 
Management, 22 (4), 777–791. 
Alp, O., Erkip, N. K., Gullu, R. (2003). Outsourcing Logistics: Designing Transportation 
Contracts Between a Manufacturer and a Transporter. Transportation Science, 37 (1), 
23–39. 
Balakrishnan, A., Sundaresan, S., and Zhang, B. (2014). Browse-and-Switch: Retail-
Online Competition under Value Uncertainty. Production and Operations 
Management, 23 (7), 1129–1145. 
Berger, P., Lee, J., and Weinberg, B. (2006). Optimal Cooperative Advertising 
Integration Strategy for Organizations Adding a Direct Online Channel. Journal of 
the Operational Research Society, 57, 920–927. 
Bin, L., Rong, Z., and Meidan, X. (2010). Joint Decision on Production and Pricing for 
Online Dual Channel Supply Chain System. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 34 
(12), 4208–4218. 
Cai, G., Zhang, Z. G., and Zhang, M. (2009). Game theoretical perspectives on dual-
channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 117 (2009), 80–96. 
Cai, X., Chen, J., Xiao, Y., Xu, X., and Yu, G. (2013). Fresh-Product Supply Chain 
Management with Logistics Outsourcing. Omega, 41 (4), 752–765. 
Cao, L., and Li, L. (2015). The Impact of Cross-Channel Integration on Retailers’ Sales 
Growth. Journal of Retailing, 91 (2), 198–216. 
Chang, S. Y., and Yeh, T. Y. (2013). A Two-Echelon Supply Chain of a Returnable 
Product with Fuzzy Demand. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 37 (6), 4305–4315. 
Chen, F. Y., Hum, S. H., and Sun, J. (2001). Analysis of Third-Party Warehousing 
Contracts with Commitments. International Journal of Operational Research, 131 (3), 
603–610. 
Chen, J. (2011). The Impact of Sharing Customer Returns Information in a Supply Chain 
With and Without a Buyback Policy. European Journal of Operational Research, 
213 (3), 478–488. 
116 
 
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2009). The Impact of Customer Returns on Pricing and Order 
Decisions. European Journal of Operational Research, 195 (1), 280–295. 
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2011). The Impact of Customer Returns on Decisions in a 
Newsvendor Problem With and Without Buyback Policies. International 
Transactions in Operational Research, 18 (4), 473–491. 
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2012). Implementing Market Segmentation Using Full-Refund and 
No-Refund Customer Returns Policies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Structure. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 136 (1), 56–66. 
Chen, J., and Bell, P. (2013). The Impact of Customer Returns on Supply Chain 
Decisions Under Various Channel Interactions. Annals of Operations Research, 206 
(1), 59–74. 
Chen, J., and Grewal, R. (2013). Competing in a Supply Chain Via Full-Refund and No-
Refund Customer Returns Policies. International Journal of Production Economics, 
146 (1), 246–258. 
Chen, J., and Zhang, H. (2011). The Impact of Customer Returns on Competing Chains. 
International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 6 (1), 
58–70. 
Chen, J., Zhang, H., and Sun, Y. (2012). Implementing Coordination Contracts in a 
Manufacturer Stackelberg Dual-Channel Supply Chain. Omega, 40 (5), 571–583. 
Chiang, W. Y. (2010). Product Availability in Competitive and Cooperative Dual-
Channel Distribution With Stock-Out Based Substitution. European Journal of 
Operational Research, 200 (1), 111–126. 
Chiang, W. Y., and Monahan, G. E. (2005). Managing Inventories in a Two-Echelon 
Dual-Channel Supply Chain. European Journal of Operational Research, 162 (2), 
325–341. 
Choi, T. M., Liu, N., Ren, S., and Hui, C. L. (2013). No Refund or Full Refund: When 
Should a Fashion Brand Offer Full Refund Consumer Return Service for Mass 
Customization Products? Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 
Dan, B., Xu, G., and Liu, C. (2012). Pricing Policies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain 
with Retail Services. International Journal of Production Economics, 139 (1), 312–
320. 
117 
 
David, A., and Adida, E. (2015). Competition and Coordination in a Two-Channel Supply 
Chain. Production and Operations Management, 24 (8), 1358–1370. 
Fabbe-Costes, N., Jahre, M., and Roussat, C. (2009). Supply Chain Integration: the Role 
of Logistics Service Providers. International Journal of Productivity and Performance 
Management, 58 (1), 71–91. 
Falk, T., Schepers, J., Hammerschmidt, M., and Bauer, H. H. (2007). Identifying Cross-
Channel Dissynergies for Multi-Channel Service Providers. Journal of Service 
Research, 10 (2), 143–160. 
Giri, B. C., and Sarker, B. R. (2017). Improving Performance by Coordinating a Supply 
Chain with Third Party Logistics Outsourcing Under Production Disruption. 
Computers & Industrial Engineering, 103 (2017), 168–177. 
Hartmann, E., and de Grahl, A. (2012). Logistics Outsourcing Interfaces: the Role of 
Customer Partnering Behavior. International Journal of Physical Distribution & 
Logistics Management, 42 (6), 526–543. 
He, L., Liao, X., Zhang, Z. G., and Haug, P. (2016). Analysis of online dual-channel 
supply chain based on service level of logistics and national advertising. Quality 
Technology & Quantitative Management, 13 (4), 473–490. 
Hsiao, L., and Chen, Y. J. (2012). Returns Policy and Quality Risk in E-Business. 
Production and Operations Management, 21 (3), 489–503. 
Hu, W., and Li, J. (2012). How to Implement Return Policies in a Two-Echelon Supply 
Chain. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society. 
Hu, W., Li, Y., and Govindan, K. (2014). The Impact of Consumer Returns Policies on 
Consignment Contracts with Inventory Control. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 233 (2), 398–407. 
Hua, G., Wang, S., and Cheng, T. (2010). Price and Lead Time Decisions in Dual-
Channel Supply Chains. European Journal of Operational Research, 205 (1), 113–
126. 
Huang, S., Yang, C., and Zhang, X. (2012). Pricing and Production Decisions in Dual-
Channel Supply Chains with Demand Disruptions. Computers and Industrial 
Engineering, 62 (1), 70–83. 
Jharkharia, S., and Shankar, R. (2010). Selection of Logistics Service Provider: an 
Analytic Network Process (ANP) Approach. Omega, 35 (3), 274–289. 
118 
 
Jiang, L., Wang, Y., and Yan, X. (2014). Decision and Coordination in a Competing 
Retail Channel Involving a Third-Party Logistics Provider. Computers & Industrial 
Engineering, 76 (2014), 109–121. 
Lei, L., Wang, Q., and Fan, C. (2006). Optimal Business Policies for a Supplier-
Transporter-Buyer Channel with a Price-Sensitive Demand. The Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 57 (3), 281–289. 
Li, Y., Xu, L., and Li, D. (2013). Examining Relationships Between the Return Policy, 
Product Quality, and Pricing Strategy in Online Direct Selling. International Journal 
of Production Economics, 144 (2), 451–460. 
Lim, W. S. (2000). A Lemons Market? An Incentive Scheme to Induce Truth-Telling in 
Third Party Logistics Providers. European Journal of Operational Research, 125 (3), 
519–525. 
Liu, W., Xu, X., and Kouhpaenejad, A. (2013). Deterministic Approach to the Fairest 
Revenue-Sharing Coefficient in Logistics Service Supply Chain Under the Stochastic 
Demand Condition. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 66 (1), 41–52. 
Lu, Q., and Liu, N. (2013). Pricing Games of Mixed Conventional and E-Commerce 
Distribution Channels. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 64 (1), 122–132. 
Min, H. (2013). Examining Logistics Outsourcing Practices in the United States: from the 
Perspectives of Third-Party Logistics Service Users. Logestics Research, 6 (4), 133–
144. 
Mollenkopf, D. A., Rabinovich, E., Laseter, T. M., and Boyer, K. K. (2007). Managing 
Internet Product Returns:  A Focus on Effective Service Operations. Decision 
Sciences, 38 (2), 215–250. 
Mostard, J., Koster, R., and Teunter, R. (2005). The Distribution-Free Newsboy Problem 
with Resaleable Returns. International Journal of Production Economics, 97 (3), 
329–342. 
Mostard, J., and Teunter, R. (2006). The Newsboy Problem with  Resaleable Returns: A 
Single Period Model and Case Study. European Journal of Operational Research, 
169 (1), 81–96. 
Mukhopadhyay, S., and Setaputra, R. (2007). A Dynamic Model for Optimal Design 
Quality and Return Policies. European Journal of Operational Research, 180 (3), 
1144–1154. 
119 
 
Mukhopadhyay, S., and Setoputro, R. (2005). Optimal Return Policy and Modular Design 
for Build-to-Order Products. Journal of Operations Management, 23 (5), 496–506. 
Neslin, S. A., and Shankar, V. (2009). Key Issues in Multi-Channel Customer 
Management: Current Knowledge and Future Directions. Journal of Interactive 
Marketing, 23 (1), 70–81. 
Neslin, S. A., Grewal, D., Leghorn, R., Shankar, V., Teerling, M. L., Thomas, J., and 
Verhoef, P. C.  (2006). Challenges and Opportunities in Multi-Channel Customer 
Management. Journal of Service Research, 9 (2), 95–112. 
Ofek, E., Katona, Z., and Sarvary, M. (2009). “Bricks and Clicks”: The Impact of Product 
Returns on the Strategies of Multichannel Retailers. Marketing Science, 30 (2), 42–
60. 
Ramanathan, R. (2011). An empirical analysis on the influence of risk on relationships 
between handling of product returns and customer loyalty in E-commerce. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 130 (2), 255–261. 
Reimann, M. (2016). Accurate Response with Refurbished Consumer Returns. Decision 
Sciences, 47 (1), 31–59. 
Ryan, J., Sun, D., and Zhao, X. (2013). Coordinating a Supply Chain With a 
Manufacturer-Owned Online Channel: A Dual Channel Model Under Price 
Competition. IEEE Transactions of Engineering Management, 60 (2). 
Schoenbachler, D. D., and Gordon, G. L. (2002). Multi-Channel Shopping: 
Understanding What Drives Channel Choice. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 19 
(1), 42–53. 
Steinfield, C. (2004). Does Online and Offline Channel Integration Work in Practice? 
Paper presented at the Workshop on E-Commerce Impacts Revisited, DIW- Berlin. 
Su, X. (2009). Customer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance. Manufacturing 
Service Operations Management, 11 (4), 595–612. 
Takahashi, K., Aoi, T., Hirotani, D., and Morikawa, K. (2011). Inventory Control in a 
Two-Echelon Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Setup of Production and Delivery. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 133 (1), 403–415. 
Vlachos, D., and Dekker, R. (2003). Return Handling Options and Order Quantities for 
Single Period Products. European Journal of Operational Research, 151 (1), 38–52. 
120 
 
Wang, K. H., Tung, C. T., and Lee, Y. J. (2010). EOQ Model for Deteriorating Items with 
Resaleable Returns. Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences, 31 (1), 189–
204. 
Webb, K. L., and Hogan, J. E. (2002). Hybrid Channel Conflict: Causes and Effects on 
Channel Performance. Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, 17 (5), 338–
356. 
Webb, K. L., and Lambe, C. J. (2007). Internal Multi-Channel Conflict: An Exploratory 
Investigation and Conceptual Framework. Industrial Marketing Management, 36 (1), 
29–43. 
Widodo, E., Takahashi, K., Morikawa, K., Pujawan, N., and Santosa, B. (2009). 
Managing Sales Return in Dual Sales Channel: An Analysis if its Product 
Substitution. International Journal of Industrial and Systems Engineering, 9 (2). 
Widodo, E., Takahashi, K., Morikawa, K., Pujawan, N., and Santosa, B. (2010). 
Managing Sales Return in Dual Sales Channel: Common Return Versus Cross-
Channel Return Analysis. International MultiConference of Engineers and Computer 
Scientists, 3. Hong Kong. 
Yalabik, B., Petruzzi, N., and Chhajed, D. (2005). An Integrated Product Returns Model 
With Logistics and Marketing Coordination. European Journal of Operational 
Research, 161 (1), 162–182. 
Yan, R. (2008). Pricing Strategy for Companies with Mixed Online and Traditional 
Retailing Distribution Markets. Journal of Product and Brand Management, 17 (1), 
48–56. 
Yan, R. (2010). Product Brand Differentiation and Dual-Channel Store Performances of a 
Multi-Channel Retailer. European Journal of Marketing, 44 (5), 672–692. 
Yan, R., Wang, J., and Zhou, B. (2010). Channel Integration and Profit Sharing in the 
Dynamics of Multi-Channel Firms. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 17 
(5), 430–440. 
Yao, D. Q., Yue, X., Mukhopadhyay, S. K.,  and Wang, Z. (2009). Strategic Inventory 
Deployment for Retail and E-tail Stores. Omega, 37 (2009), 646–658. 
121 
 
You, P. S., Ikuta, S., and Hsieh, Y. C. (2010). Optimal Ordering and Pricing Policy for an 
Inventory System with Trial Periods. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 34 (10), 
3179–3188. 
Yu, M. C., and Goh, M. (2012). Time-Bound Product Returns and Optimal Order 
Quantities for Mass Merchandisers. International Journal of Systems Science, 43 (1), 
163–179. 
Zhang, J., Farris, P., Irvin, J., Kushwaha, T., Steenburgh, T., and Weitz, B. (2010). 
Crafting Integrated Multi-channel Retailing Strategies. Journal of Interactive 
Marketing, 24 (2), 168–180. 
  
122 
 
VITA AUCTORIS 
NAME: Mohannad Hassan Radhi 
PLACE OF BIRTH: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 
YEAR OF BIRTH: 1979 
 
EDUCATION: 
2012 – 2018: Ph.D. Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering, University of 
Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 
2009 – 2012: M.Sc. Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering, University of 
Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada. 
1996 – 2002: B.Sc. Mechanical Engineering, King Fahad University of Petroleum and 
Minerals, AL-Khobar, Saudi Arabia. 
 
PEER REVIEWED JOURNAL PUBLICATION: 
Radhi, M., Zhang G. (2016). Optimal Configuration of Remanufacturing Supply Network 
with Return Quality Decision. International Journal of Production Research, 54 (5), 1487–
1502.  
 
RECENT CONFERENCES: 
Radhi, M., Zhang, G. (2016). Pricing Policies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Offering a 
Full Refund for Resalable Returns, CORS 2016 Annual Conference, Banff, Alberta, 
Canada. 
